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ABSTRACT 
 
The International New Venture phenomenon continues to spark academic inquiries and 
challenge traditional models of firm internationalization. The growth and survival of 
international new ventures, however, have not been extensively studied. The objective 
of the thesis is to substantiate the growth phases and survival of Finnish B2B and B2C 
international new ventures that manufacture physical goods (PMINV).  
 
The study addresses growth along the dimensions of foreign expansion as well as firm 
size and stipulates that a PMINV must choose between the Born Global and Born 
International -paths of accelerated internationalization. It projects four phases of 
PMINV growth and constructs a framework as well as propositions concerning the 
impact the industry, physical product, resources, capabilities, entrepreneurial 
orientation, lateral rigidity and market orientation have on PMINV growth and survival.  
 
A multiple-case study, based on four active and one inactive Finnish PMINV, is done to 
determine the influence these factors have on PMINV advancement along the projected 
(1) introductory, (2) commercial breakthrough and foreign growth, (3) global 
breakthrough and expansion as well as (4) global rationalization and maturity -growth 
phases. Growth is classified as firm advancement along the phases, and survival as 
remaining in business. The results are also contrasted between B2B and B2C case firms.   
 
Research findings suggest that the commercial and global breakthrough of a PMINV is 
positively related to the industry growth rate, industry globalization drivers, the amount 
of firm resources and managerial experience, the existence of substantive dynamic, and 
networking capabilities, product scope optimization, product adaptation and a high-level 
of entrepreneurial orientation in decision making. The global rationalization of a 
PMINV, in turn, is found to be positively related to increased global seller 
concentration, the existence of networking capabilities, pressures for both resource 
alignment and product standardization as well as a lower level of both industry growth 
rate and entrepreneurial orientation in decision making.  
 
The  findings  also  imply  that  especially  the  early  PMINV  growth  phases  are  often  
mediated by survival crises. Management of the crises sees the firm progress along the 
phases, while severe mismanagement leads to non-survival. Consequently, the survival 
of a PMINV is found to be positively related to the industry growth rate, the amount of 
resources and managerial experience, the existence of substantive and dynamic 
capabilities, high networking capabilities, product scope optimization, and a lower level 
of both product adaptation and entrepreneurial orientation in decision making.  
 
In comparison, globalization drivers and the amount of marketing resources are found to 
be  more  influential  for  the  growth  and  survival  of  B2C PMINVs than  B2B PMINVs.  
Also, the growth of B2C PMINVs is found to be positively impacted by a brand-
oriented approach and the growth of B2B PMINVs by a market-oriented approach.  
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
 
International New Venture-ilmiö eli nuorten yritysten aikainen kansainvälistyminen 
haastaa perinteiset liiketalouden kansainvälistymisteoriat. Näiden yritysten kasvu ja 
selviytyminen ovat kuitenkin jääneet laajalti huomiotta. Tutkielman tavoite onkin 
havainnoida suomalaisten kuluttaja- (B2B) ja teollisuusmarkkinoilla (B2B) toimivien 
International New Venture-tuotevalmistajien (PMINV) kasvunvaiheita ja selviytymistä.   
 
Tutkielma perehtyy kasvuun kansainvälistymisen sekä yrityksen koon näkökulmista, 
korostaen että PMINV:lla on valittavanaan ”syntymästään kansainvälinen” tai 
”syntymästään globaali” kansainvälistymistie. Tutkielma myös luonnostelee neljä 
PMINV kasvunvaihetta, teoreettisen viitekehyksen ja väitelauselmia määritelläkseen 
toimialaan, resursseihin, kyvykkyyksiin, fyysiseen tuotteeseen, yrittäjyysorientaatioon, 
sivusuuntaisen jäykkyyteen ja markkinaorientaatioon liittyvien tekijöiden vaikutuksia 
PMINV:n kasvuun ja selviytymiseen.   
 
Tekijöiden vaikutuksen määrittelemiseksi, PMINV:lle luonnosteltujen (1) alkuvaiheen, 
(2) kaupallisen läpimurron, (3) globaalin läpimurron sekä (4) globaalin toiminnan 
tehostamisen ja kypsyyden osalta, tutkielma nojaa neljässä aktiivisessa ja yhdessä 
inaktiivisessa suomalaisessa PMINV-yrityksessä toteutettuun tapaustutkimukseen. 
Kasvuksi tulkitaan yrityksen eteneminen vaiheiden välillä, ja selviytymiseksi toiminnan 
jatkuminen. Tuloksia myös vertaillaan B2B ja B2C tapausyritysten välisesti.  
 
Tutkielman tulosten mukaan, toimialan kasvu, toimialan globalisaatiota edistävät 
tekijät, resurssien ja johdon kokemuksen määrä, substanssiiviset dynaamiset sekä 
verkostoitumiskyvykkyydet, tuotelaajuuden optimointi, tuoteadaptointi ja korostunut 
yrittäjyysorientaatio päätöksenteossa puoltavat PMINV:n kaupallista ja globaalia 
läpimurtoa. Toimialan kasvun taantuminen, verkostoitumiskyvykkyydet, globaalin 
kilpailun konsolidoituminen, ulkoiset paineet sekä tuotestandardoinnille että 
resurssikannan tehostamiselle ja verrattain alentunut yrittäjyysorientaatio 
päätöksenteossa, puolestaan puoltavat PMINV:n globaalin toiminnan tehostamista.     
 
Tulosten mukaan etenkin PMINV:n aikaisten kasvuvaiheiden välillä esiintyy usein 
selviytymiskriisejä joiden aikana tehdyt hallinnolliset toimenpiteet, joko saattavat 
yrityksen seuraavaan kasvunvaiheeseen, tai, pahimmillaan, johtavat toiminnan 
loppumiseen. Näin ollen, toimialan kasvu, resurssien ja johdon kokemuksen määrä, 
substanssiivisten-, dynaamisten sekä verkostoitumiskyvykkyyksien olemassaolo, 
tuotetarjonnan laajuuden optimointi ja verrattain alentunut sekä yrittäjyysorientaatio 
päätöksenteossa että tuoteadaptaatio edistävät PMINV:n selviytymistä.  
 
Tulokset myös korostavat, että toimialan globalisaatiota edistävät tekijät, ja 
markkinointiresurssien määrä vaikuttavat vahvemmin B2C- kuin B2B PMINV:n 
kasvuun ja selviytymiseen. Lisäksi, bändikeskeinen suuntautumisen todetaan edistävän 
B2C PMINV:n kasvua ja markkinakeskeinen suuntautuminen B2B PMINV:n kasvua.  
 
Avainsanat: Syntymästään Globaali Yritys, Kasvu, Selviytyminen, B2B, B2C 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Why do some firms internationalize like “rings in the water” gradually, in terms of 
country markets, foreign entry modes and product policy, while others make the jump to 
foreign countries as well as continents soon after inception? This question has been the 
motivation of many business scholars during the past few decades thereby greatly 
contributing to the emergence of the multi-disciplinary international entrepreneurship 
domain  of  research.  (Madsen  and  Servais  1997).  The  focal  point  of  the  domain  -  the  
International New Venture (INV) - continues to spark academic inquiries. Research of 
the INV has mainly focused on the attributes that distinguish the firm from ones that 
adhere to a more traditional, gradual pattern of foreign expansion (e.g. Rialp et al., 
2005) Yet, despite efforts to the contrary, scholars are yet to reach a consensus on the 
mere definition of an INV.  
 
In INV research, the “what?” seems to have received more academic attention than the 
“how?”. In other words, while the debate surrounding the determinants of an INV has 
been rife academically, studies have largely failed to address how the firm develops 
from inception to maturity. This is not to say that the factors behind INVs have not been 
studied. On the contrary, during some two decades of enquiry, the entrepreneurial 
foundations (e.g. Knight and Cavusgil, 2004), resources and capabilities (e.g. Sapienza 
et al., 2006) as well as operating environments (e.g. Moen, 2002) of INVs have all 
received attention. Yet, the way in which they impact INV performance over a period of 
time has not been explicitly addressed (e.g. Sapienza et al., 2006; Mudambi and Zahra 
2007). From the product perspective, some Finnish INVs have been noted for a 
propensity to achieve high international performance through  a wide range of outputs  
such as services, products know-how and systems (e.g. Luostarinen and Gabrielsson, 
2006), but the physical product manufacturing INVs (PMINV) exploits, in particular, 
are somewhat unaccounted for academically. 
 
The following Master’s Thesis research aims to contribute for this gap in contemporary 
awareness and offer insight into how select antecedent factors impact the outcomes of 
INV growth and survival. The novelty of the research extends into its specific focus: the 
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physical product manufacturing international new venture (PMINV), which draws the 
majority of revenues from tangible products. To further address the specific growth and 
survival factors native to different product markets, the study builds on the differences 
between PMINVs that supply for the consumer (B2C) and industrial (B2B) markets.  In 
doing so it takes a fresh approach as, to the writer’s knowledge; such manufacturers 
specifically have received very little attention in international entrepreneurship research.  
 
1.1 Background of the Study  
 
Research has yet to significantly substantiate the growth phases and survival challenges 
an International New Venture experiences before reaching resource maturity. In theory, 
the  organizational  development  of  an  INV  is  affected  by  a  wealth  of  growth  and  
survival factors (e.g. Gabrielsson and Kirpalani, 2004), yet very little is known 
regarding the nature and extent of their influence. Often the impact of such factors is 
studied in isolation (e.g. Mort and Weerawardeena, 2006; Mudambi and Zahra 2007) as 
opposed to studying organizational developments over a period of time. The lack of 
understanding is highlighted by the substantial academic interest garnered by the growth 
phases and survival challenges of the “conventional firm” or the Multinational 
Enterprise (MNE), topics that have received continued interest from scholars, as 
evidenced by the wealth of related conceptual models (see e.g. Greiner, 1972; Churchill 
and Lewis, 1983; Kazanjian and Drazin, 1990a). Despite addressing the organizational 
growth of the firm in length, these models are criticized for not taking into account 
situational variables, such as industry specifics, firm resources (Kazanjian and Drazin, 
1990b) and the dynamics of internationalization (Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009).    
 
The research project: “Born Globals: Growth Stages and Survival”, administered by the 
Aalto  University  School  of  Economics  together  with  the  University  of  Vaasa  seeks  to  
contribute for this gap in awareness within the multi-disciplinary field of international 
entrepreneurship. Whilst underlining the Born Global – type of International New 
Venture, the project builds on the work of Oviatt and McDougall (1994, p.49), whereby 
an INV equals “a business organization that, from inception, seeks to derive significant 
competitive advantage from the use of resources and the sale of outputs in multiple 
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countries”. The  definition  is  extended  with  performance  attributes  to  provide  a  more  
coherent picture in-line with the views of many European scholars of international 
entrepreneurship, whom posit, that a global vision alone may not suffice (e.g. 
Gabrielsson  and  Gabrielsson  2009,  pp.2-3).  Hence,  an  INV  whose  foreign  sales  
accumulate to 25% of the total sales within three years of commercial operations is 
considered a Born International, whereas an INV that accomplishes the same feat and 
additionally, is able to draw 25% of its sales revenue from outside the home continent 
within six years of commercial operations is considered a Born Global . 
 
The ca. two-year research project, initiated in April 2009 under the leadership of Dr. 
Mika Gabrielsson and Dr. Peter Gabrielsson, aims to address: 
 
“How innovative Born Globals can grow to become truly global firms, while also 
surviving, taking into consideration their limited resources to address the global market 
opportunities and required holistic management of the process.”  
 
The  primary  stakeholders  of  the  project,  whom  include  the  Finnish  National  
Technology Agency Tekes, Finnish Foreign Trade Association Finpro, a number of 
partner firms and Doctoral as well as Master’s Thesis researchers, seek to understand:  
 
“How Born Globals become adults and what factors impact their growth and 
survival?”.  
 
The Master’s Thesis researchers contributing to the research each take a distinct 
perspective on INV growth and survival. The present study concentrates the empirical 
focus towards the growth phases and survival challenges of select industrial and 
consumer market international new ventures that manufacture physical products,  in  a  
bid to contribute for the gap in international business literature, discussed next.      
 
1.2 Research Gap 
 
The stream of literature concentrating on the International New Venture has only 
recently started to receive more widespread interest across different disciplines of 
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business research. However, much of the contemporary fieldwork is focused on 
describing, understanding and interpreting the reasons underpinning the emergence of 
firms internationalizing at an accelerated pace. Contemporary INV studies often depict 
the behaviors exhibited by these firms and the elements that determine their accelerated 
internationalization in a comparative context with traditional internationalization 
perspectives. (Rialp et al., 2005). This leaves little in the way of studies examining the 
distinctions across different types of INVs. The contrast instead is set between the INV 
and firms internationalizing according to the more theoretically established stage-wise 
pattern of foreign expansion (e.g. Johanson and Vahlne 1977; Luostarinen, 1979), 
described in more detail in the next section (see e.g. Madsen and Servais, 1997).  
 
A  significant  amount  of  the  current  literature  on  INVs  deals  directly  with  high-tech  
businesses, usually considering the more critical globalization effects that are present in 
the type of sectors in which these firms compete. Relatively few researchers show a 
wider interest across sectors, without limiting themselves into studying high-
technological international start-ups but by adopting an overall or even low-
technological sector approach in their analysis (Rialp et al., 2005, pp.152). Also, 
industrial markets have been found to be more attractive for INVs, because they can 
generally be reached with more limited marketing budgets than business to consumer 
segments (e.g. Luostarinen & Gabrielsson, 2006).    
 
Against this academic backdrop it is easy to fathom the lack of cohesive investigations 
into models focusing on the growth and survival of INVs overall, let alone ones 
concentrating  on  those  INVs that  manufacture  tangible  products  for  either  the  B2B or  
B2C market. As long as scholars are undecided on the basic metrics of the INV, such as 
whether a global vision from inception suffices to distinguish them from “traditionally 
internationalizing” companies, research into the specifics of their behavior is likely to 
remain rather exploratory (Rialp et al., 2005).  
 
The  present  study,  while  exploratory,  aims  to  extend  the  conceptual  understanding  of  
the INV by focusing on growth and survival as  two  important  manifestations  and  
outcomes of its behavior and thereby help build the foundations for descriptive research. 
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Despite concentrating on INVs supplying high-tech products, the empirical focus of the 
study is narrowed down to Finnish firms whose revenues are mainly comprised from the 
sales of tangible products as opposed intangible ones, services or know-how. Perhaps 
owing to the high-manufacturing costs associated with their domestic market these 
firms are few in number and a study of their exploits is largely unprecedented.     
 
1.3 Research Problem and Objective(s)   
 
To crystallize the empirical focus of the Master’s Thesis, a research problem and 
objectives are comprised in-line with the goals of the “Born Globals: Growth Stages and 
Survival” - research project. 
 
Research Problem  
 
In contributing for the abovementioned gap in contemporary theoretical discourse, the 
present Master’s Thesis aims to address:   
 
“How can international new ventures from the physical product market survive and 
grow to become truly global companies considering their limited resources to address 
global market opportunities?”  
 
Research Objective(s)  
 
The research problem carries with it the assumption whereby international new ventures 
manufacturing physical products are subject to different factors of growth and survival 
than INVs in general, due to their output. Also, prior literature (e.g. Ford, 1980; 
Anderson  and  Narus,  2004;  Gummeson and  Polese,  2009)  implies  that  because  of  the  
differences in consumer and business markets, the growth and survival factors for firms 
may vary, pending on which market they cater for. Hence, a twofold research objective 
is drawn from the research problem as follows: 
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 (1)What factors impact the growth and survival of physical product manufacturing 
international new ventures on their way to adulthood and    
 
(2)How are the pathways to adulthood different between physical product 
manufacturing B2B and B2C international new ventures?  
 
For the benefit of reaching these objectives, it is useful to establish a solid foundation 
by defining some central terms as they are used in the context of the study, while the 
central limitations of the Master’s thesis work also merit attention. 
 
1.4 Definitions  
 
To overcome inconsistencies inherent to international entrepreneurship terminology, the 
following explains some central concepts as they are utilized in the present study. Note 
that, some of the definitions are set or influenced by “Born Globals: Growth Stages and 
Survival” project (=*). 
 
Born Global - “A business organization that, from inception, seeks to derive significant 
competitive advantage from the use of resources and the sale of outputs in multiple 
countries (Oviatt and McDougall 1994, p.49)”, and whose share of foreign sales reaches 
25% within the first three years of commercial operations* and whose  share  of  sales  
from outside the home continent reaches 25% within the first six years of commercial 
operations*. 
 
Born International -  “A business organization that, from inception, seeks to derive 
significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and the sale of outputs in 
multiple countries (Oviatt and McDougall 1994, p.49)”, and whose share of foreign 
sales reaches 25% within the first three years of commercial operations* and whose 
share of sales from outside the home continent does not reach 25% within the first six 
years of commercial operations (or is yet to do so, if the firm has been commercially 
active for less than six years)*.  
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Brand-driven Firm - a company that is brand-oriented (see below)  
 
Brand Orientation - a market orientation that builds on brands as strategic resources. 
The processes of a brand oriented firm revolve around the creation, development and 
protection of brand identity in a continuous interaction with customers, with the aim of 
achieving lasting competitive advantages through brands (Urde 1999). 
 
Customer Market - indicates whether a firm’s target market is comprised of businesses 
(B2B) or consumers (B2C) or both.  
 
Globalization Degree - the share of foreign sales from outside the home continent 
 
Internationalization Degree - the share of foreign sales from within the domestic 
continent. 
 
International New Venture -  “A business organization that, from inception, seeks to 
derive significant competitive advantage from the use of resources and the sale of 
outputs in multiple countries (Oviatt and McDougall 1994, p.49)”, and whose share of 
foreign sales reaches 25% within the first three years of commercial operations*. 
 
Market-driven firm - a company that is market-oriented (see below) 
 
Market Orientation - “the organization-wide generation of market intelligence 
pertaining to current and future customer needs, dissemination of the intelligence across 
departments, and organization-wide responsiveness to it (Hunt and Morgan and 1995, 
cited in Urde, 1999, p.120). 
 
(Physical) Product Manufacturing International New Venture - An International 
New Venture whose primary source of revenue is the supply of physical/tangible goods, 
as opposed to know-how, services, systems or intangible products.   
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Product Scope / Product Offering - The range (number) of product lines supplied by a 
company  
 
1.5 Research Limitations and Structure 
 
Due to the limits of Master’s Thesis work, the research scope is narrowed down from 
the holistic consensus of the International New Venture, shared by the “Born Globals: 
Growth Stages and Survival” research-project, to the Product Manufacturing 
International  New  Venture.  Nonetheless,  the  study  builds  on  a  shared  set  of  concepts  
whilst also adding to the collective research base. 
 
Research Limitations 
 
The study concentrates on PMINVs of Finnish origin. Finland, in turn, has been 
described as a comparatively small and open economy (SMOPEC). Prior research 
asserts that the smallness, openness and remote location of Finland “push” domestic 
firms to international markets, a dynamic enforced by the “pull” of large and open 
global markets. (Luostarinen, 1979; 1994). Accelerated internationalization, however, is 
an international phenomenon (see e.g. Rialp et al., 2005). Consequently, the starting 
grounds and operating environments of PMINVs may vary based on country of origin.  
 
In the vein of Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009), the growth and survival factors of 
PMINVs are studied along four projected organizational phases: (1) Introductory, (2) 
Commercial breakthrough and foreign growth, (3) Global breakthrough and expansion 
as well as (4) Global rationalization and maturity. The underlining rationale stems from 
the apparent lack of coherent INV growth frameworks overall and the attempt to build 
on a partly shared conceptual foundation with other research streams from the “Born 
Globals: Growth Phases and Survival” -project and thereby help ensure comparability 
of findings.  
 
Building on the same rationale, of the plethora of factors that potentially influence the 
growth and survival of PMINVs, the study focuses on industry growth rate, industry 
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globalization drivers, resource amount, managerial experience, substantive capabilities, 
dynamic capabilities, resource fungibility, networking capability, entrepreneurial 
orientation and lateral rigidity, also in accordance with Gabrielsson and Gabrilesson 
(2009). Additionally, factors pertaining to product scope and product adaptation as well 
as factors conditional to the market orientation (brand/market-driven) of the firm are 
included  to  direct  the  empirical  focus  towards  B2C  and  B2B  PMINVs.  Also,  the  
reviews of prior research and literature concentrate on the works available on INVs 
overall, rather than focusing solely on the very limited academic insight on the PMINV. 
Thus, unless implied otherwise by the original author(s), conceptual findings related to 
the INV are also applied to the PMINV.  
 
Document Structure  
 
The study commences from the current academic understanding of the International 
New Venture and proceeds to discuss contemporary models of firm growth and 
survival, in the first part of the literature review. The difference between the outcomes 
of firm survival and non-survival remains rather explicit empirically. However, firm 
growth in today’s globally integrated economy merits attention along at least two 
dimensions: organizational growth and expansion in international direction (e.g 
Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009). In the second part of the literature review, industry, 
firm and product factors that international business scholars have found to have an 
impact on firm performance in terms of growth and survival are discussed. The review 
is complete with a theoretical framework and propositions for empirical research. 
Following the literature review, the multiple-case study approach is discussed as the 
chosen method of data collection and structuring in the build up to the empirical 
analysis. The empirical analysis and research findings-section builds from five single-
case descriptions based on as many Finnish PMINVs, which are followed by a cross 
cross-case analysis, underlining the empirical findings of the study.  The section is 
complete after revisiting the research propositions and accounting for the differences 
between PMINVs that supply the industrial and consumer markets. The study concludes 
with a summary of the main findings, theoretical and managerial contributions as well 
as suggestions for further study.  
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The following review draws from two streams of literature. The first part of the review 
deals with firm growth, both in international direction and size, as well as firm survival. 
It builds on studies from the international business and strategic management arenas in 
order to forward a growth phases model for the benefit of empirically studying the 
growth and survival of product manufacturing international new ventures, since none of 
the contemporary models seem applicable. In doing so it lends from the International 
new venture growth phases and main paths introduced by Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson 
(2009, pp.4-7), whilst also extending it with elements conceptually specific to physical 
product manufacturers. The second part of the review discusses select firm, industry and 
product factors prior research has found to have an impact on firm growth and/or 
survival. The section is completed with a theoretical framework and propositions, 
grounded in the reviewed literature, and geared for empirical analysis of PMINV 
growth and survival.  
 
2.1 Models of Firm Internationalization, Growth and Survival 
 
The first part of the literature review discusses firm internationalization, while the 
second concentrates on organizational growth against the backdrop of survival. The 
division respects the views Garbrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009), whereby firm growth 
takes place in size as well as global direction size and survival is a constant 
consideration. 
 
In addressing firm growth, taxonomies often make use of quantifiable performance 
metrics  such  as  cumulative  sales  or  number  of  employees  (e.g.  Coad  and  Hölzl  2009;  
Delmar et  al.,  2003).  For instance,  the European Commission uses the combination of 
amount of employees and firm turnover to classify firm size. According to the 2005 
classification firms with zero to nine employees and less than 2M € are defined as 
micro-sized, 10-49 and less than 10M € are small, 50-250 and less than 50M € are 
medium-sized, while companies with more than 250 and over 50M € are considered 
large (Summaries of EU Legislation, 2007).  
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To provide a frame of reference for size-based metrics, expansion in foreign direction, 
can be measured by e.g. the level of internalized transactions, changes in governance 
structures, integration of resources across country borders (Oviatt & McDougall 1994), 
and sales from outside the home continent as well as foreign market commitment (e.g. 
Luostarinen & Gabrielsson 2006). These aspects are discussed in more detail next. 
 
2.1.1 Traditional Models of Internationalization  
 
Firm internationalization has been traditionally depicted through the emerging 
Multinational Enterprise (MNE) and the focus has inevitably been on large mature 
organizations. Empirical evidence has positioned the foundations of MNEs in large 
domestic corporations that have gradually developed their operations across countries 
and continents (e.g. Chandler, 1986). Subsequently, research streams originating from 
Scandinavia have also sought to substantiate the internationalization of firms as an 
incremental process ranging from no foreign market commitment(s) to establishing 
offshore production units via foreign direct investment (FDI). 
 
In what is often termed as the Uppsala or U-model, Johanson and Vahlne (1977) focus 
on the firm’s gradual acquirement, integration and utilization of knowledge about 
foreign markets as a pre-requisite for increasing commitment to foreign operations. 
They stipulate that since this knowledge is partially rooted in practice, it is often 
referred to as experiential knowledge, something that can only be accumulated through 
foreign market operations. The theory emphasizes the interdependence between foreign 
market commitment and experiential knowledge which leads to the firm 
internationalizing in a stage-oriented pattern where commitment, in the form of FDI, 
grows gradually.  
 
In simplified terms of foreign market servicing, the Uppsala-model argues that a given 
firm begins from a state of no regular export to a specific foreign market. The second 
stage sees the firm establish a direct export operation via an intermediary (e.g. agent or 
distributor) to cater for increased foreign demand. As experiential knowledge from the 
foreign market accumulates, at the third stage the firm establishes a sales subsidiary to 
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e.g. offset the opportunistic behavior of middlemen. In the fourth stage, the firm has 
acquired enough experiential knowledge to comfortably establish a production unit in 
the foreign market. (Johanson and Vahlne 1977, pp.23-28).           
 
In a study of Finnish firms, Luostarinen (1979) also found empirical evidence 
suggesting companies follow a gradual path in foreign market servicing. He states that 
an important reason for this is the lateral rigidity of decision makers, which refers to a 
managerial preference toward established patterns of action over experimental ones.  He 
further asserts that the internationalization of the firm is dependent on knowledge 
gained through international operations and, and similarly to the Uppsala model, the 
stock of knowledge is enhanced through organizational learning from foreign 
operations. Thus, the larger the stock, the less likely it is for decision making to be 
laterally rigid, which means foreign operations further increase foreign commitment.  
 
Luostarinen’s model argues that when catering for initial interest from a foreign market, 
a firm will firstly establish non-investment marketing operations (NIMOS) i.e. export 
ties. After successful export operations, the firm is inclined to pursue direct-investment 
marketing operations (DIMOS) in the form of a foreign sales subsidiary. Following this 
early presence, the firm will move to establish non-investment production operations 
(NIPOS) i.e. one or a combination of licensing/franchising, subcontracting and contract 
manufacturing. The fourth and final phase, in turn, sees the firm establish direct-
investment production operations (DIPOS), in the form of a foreign production facility. 
(Luostarinen, 1979).    
 
The common nominator of these two “traditional” models of internationalization resides 
in how they view the process as a pattern with distinct phases dictated by experiential 
knowledge. They remain rather effective in depicting foreign expansion when the focus 
is a large manufacturer, often the focal-point of earlier research (e.g. Buckley and 
Casson 1976; Dunning 1981). Some more recent macro-economical phenomena, 
however, provide stern challenges to their universal applicability and have thereby 
greatly influenced the growing body of literature on the International New Venture.  
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2.1.2 The International New Venture - A Challenge for Traditional Models  
 
The business landscape for the international entrepreneur has drastically changed during 
the past few decades, changing the entrepreneur in the process. Technological 
innovation, low-cost communications technologies and means of transport are among 
the main influences behind the changing foundations of the MNE. In addition to large 
established companies, foreign markets are increasingly within the grasp of SME’s and 
start-ups who from inception view the world as their marketplace i.e. international new 
ventures. Hence, it is not uncommon for them to jump over some of the traditionally 
defined stages in becoming an MNE. (e.g. Oviatt and McDougall, 1994). This behavior 
is common for companies grounded in small and open economies (SMOPECS) such as 
Finland where, due to the small domestic market, the pressure to internationalize and/or 
globalize the business is often high (e.g. Luostarinen and Gabrielsson, 2006, cited in 
Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, p.11).  
 
Different streams of literature have come up with varying criteria regarding the 
determinants that characterize an INV. Oviatt and McDougall (1994, pp.49) define it as 
“a business organization that, from inception, seeks to derive significant competitive 
advantage from the use of resources and the sale of outputs in multiple countries.” Here 
the allocation of resource and a global vision are the main determinants, whereas 
McKinsey (1993, cited in Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009 pp.3) calls for 75% export 
intensity within two years of inception, while Knight and Cavusgil (1996, cited in 
Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, pp.3) advocate that 25% export from total 
production within this time frame suffices for the INV label. Many European-based 
researchers have demanded for extended follow-up periods in examining whether the 
INV has realized its potential (e.g. Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, pp.3) but INV 
scholars have yet to reach a universal accord. However, some efforts have stood the test 
of time better than others while instigating a wealth of supportive research. 
 
Oviatt and McDougall (1994) categorize a total of four different types of INVs: (1) 
Export / Import Start-ups specialize in the age-old practice of moving goods from where 
they are into a foreign market where there is a demand for them. Where an Export / 
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Import Start-up focuses on a few foreign markets, the (2) Multinational Trader caters for 
a wide range of countries and constantly screens the market for opportunities from 
where their networks exist or can be established swiftly. (3) Geographically Focused 
Start-ups build on advantages by catering for the specialized needs of a particular region 
of the world (e.g. Europe) by utilizing foreign resources. Finally, (4) the Global Start-up 
draws significant competitive advantage by leveraging organizational activities across 
the globe to respond to globalizing markets. It also anticipatorily acts on opportunities 
to acquire resources and sell outputs wherever they have the greatest value.  
 
The  Global  Start  Up-type  of  INV  has  attracted  considerable  interest  from  researchers  
and is consequently often referred to as the “Born Global” (e.g Rennie 1993; Madsen 
and Servais 1997). It should be noted that International Entrepreneurship terminology is 
inconsistent and the terms International New Venture, Born International (Majkgård and 
Sharma, 1999, cited in Luostarinen and Gabrielsson, 2006) and Born Global are 
sometimes used interchangeably. For the definitions used in the present study see 1.4.  
 
Despite their apparent differences, INVs and MNEs have many similarities. Both strive 
to create competitive advantages(s) over domestic rivals, overcome financial shortfalls 
by applying alternative governance structures and are in possession of unique assets to 
defend (Mudambi and Zahra, 2007, pp.335). However, typifying an INV solely based 
on the extent and nature of foreign market commitments is problematic because 
infrequently size in foreign direction can be strikingly unparallel with growth in 
turnover and employees. Some INVs execute global operations whilst still micro-sized, 
based on employee count and/or turnover. Thus, an attempt to project INV growth and 
survival should be mindful of alternative metrics, such as those ingrained in firm 
lifecycles (Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009). 
 
2.1.3 Stage-wise Organizational Growth and the Dynamics of Survival  
 
A potent stream of literature concerned with firm growth utilizes identifiable stages of 
organizational change within a firm as an underlining rationale. Obviously the nature 
and amount of stages varies between respective frameworks of organizational change, 
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but some similarities across them are also evident. Whether implicitly or explicitly, all 
stage of growth models have an underpinning rationale according to which 
organizations experience gradual transformations in their characteristics as a function of 
growth.  These  transformations,  in  turn,  enable  them to  take  on  a  fresh  set  of  tasks  or  
challenges elicited by growth. In depicting growth as a stage-wise process, these models 
introduce survival as a constant, albeit unstable variable. The dynamic nature of growth 
means that the nature of survival challenges varies greatly. Sever mismanagement of the 
challenges, in turn prompts the risk of non-survival. (e.g. Greiner, 1972; Scott and 
Bruce 1987; Kazanjian and Drazin 1990a).    
  
Greiner (1972) argues that organizations grow through the phases of (1) Creativity, (2) 
Direction, (3) Delegation, (4) Coordination and (5) Collaboration. His model depicts 
growth via size as well as time and attributes each phase with a management crisis, 
which needs to be solved by modifying organizational practices accordingly to allow 
progress to the next phase. The crises are characterized as periods of “revolution” that 
mediate phases of stable growth or “evolution” and in failing to respond to 
organizational challenges, the firm risks regression to an earlier stage or non-survival. 
Churchill and Lewis (1983), in turn, address changes in SME structure that take place as 
the  firm  grows,  which  results  in  a  framework  of  SME  growth  stages,  labeled;  (1)  
Existence, (2) Survival, (3) Success-disengagement / Success-growth, (4) Take-off and 
(5) Resource maturity. Each stage of growth varies along the dimensions of firm size,  
diversity and complexity and is described via factors of managerial style, organizational 
structure, extent of formal systems, strategic goals and the extent of owner involvement.  
 
Scott and Bruce (1987) argue that SMEs encounters internal and external crises along 
the stages of (1) Inception, (2) Survival, (3) Growth, (4) Expansion and (5) Maturity. 
Their framework relies on a number of attributes in depicting the stage that a projected 
company is in at a given time. These include: nature of industry, key managerial 
concerns, the role of top management, organizational structure, the intensity of 
product/market research, the sophistication of systems/controls, the main source of 
financing, cash flow status (negative/positive), target of core investments as well as the 
state of the product-market. Kazanjian and Drazin (1990a), on the other hand, introduce 
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a model that relies on exemplifying stages in terms of a succession of problems that 
firms must resolve. The model consists of four stages: (1) Conception, (2) 
Commercialization, (3) Growth and (4) Stability all with defining problems. They 
stress, however, that the solution or the “fit” between structural features and the specific 
problems that define a given stage, only serves to forward a new set of problems  
 
In addressing firm growth as both an outcome and a pre-requisite of management 
challenges the above frameworks rely on organizational metrics. However, as e.g. 
Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009) argue, growth takes place also in the dimension of 
foreign expansion, as explained in the following.  
 
2.1.4 Growth and Survival of the International New Venture  
 
After the conceptual emergence of the INV, some more recent empirical work (e.g. 
Mudambi and Zahra, 2007) has sought to discuss the differences between incremental 
and accelerated internationalization in terms of a strategic choice. The argument is 
based on the understanding that the two approaches to internationalization are at the 
opposite ends of a strategic scale, centered on the choice of how a given firm chooses to 
tackle foreign markets and that the choice is based on the firm’s resources and 
capabilities and is primarily internal as opposed to being a sum of external factors. In 
simplified terms; within the constraints of its inherent operating environment, a firm is 
free to choose whether to pursue accelerated or incremental internationalization.  
 
When accelerated internationalization is viewed as a strategic choice, Gabrielsson and 
Gabrielsson (2009) find that an INV can pursue one of two growth strategies. (1) It can 
adhere to a Born Global strategy and target global markets from inception, also 
pursuing market opportunities outside the home continent or (2) it can choose to swiftly 
enter nearby markets without expanding to other continents, thereby leaning toward 
more of a Born International strategy (see e.g Kuivalainen et al., 2007). Of the typology 
of four kinds of INVs presented by Oviatt and McDougal (1994), these two strategic 
approaches adhere to a (4) Global Start-up or a (3) Geographically Focused Start-up 
respectively. While the growth and survival of (1) Export/Import Start-up and (2) 
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Multinational  Trader-types  of  INVs from the  typology are  well  documented  in  export  
and early internationalization research, born globals and born internationals have 
received less attention (Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson 2009, pp.2-3).  
 
Gabrielsson et al. (2008) find that born globals develop in three respective phases: (1) 
Introductory, (2) Growth and resource accumulation and  (3)  Break-out. This model, 
however, falls short in depicting how the INV reaches maturity or MNE status. 
(Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson 2009, pp.4). Moreover, focusing solely on growth would 
be optimistic as evidenced by the emphasis on survival in stage-wise organizational 
growth models (2.1.3). Hence, the following discusses survival in the context of INVs.     
 
International New Venture Survival 
 
In the vein of Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009), the present study aims to address 
liabilities and specific risks that potentially influence international new ventures. 
Following up on the earlier work of Oviatt and McDougall (1994), Zahra (2005, pp.23) 
points out that very little is known of the survival and operations of INVs after they are 
established. Previous studies indicate that at least three liabilities can be attributed to 
INVs relative to their more established competition. Also INVs seem to operate in 
inherently risky business landscape (Shrader et al., 2000). 
 
Liability of Foreignness: Building on theory of MNE behavior, the time sensitive nature 
of some influencing factors and costs analysis Zaheer and Mosakowski, (1997) identify 
a liability of foreignness in a commodity industry. In simplified terms, the study 
concludes that foreign firms are faced with lower rates of survival than local firms due 
to the advantage(s) the latter hold for being native to the market. The liability was found 
to  be  time sensitive:  After  an  initial  period  of  ca.  two years  the  exit  rate  of  exampled  
foreign firms grew in relation to domestic ones,  before returning to par after a time of 
16 years. The study also differentiates between the impacts of different factors that 
influence the environment dictating the extent of the liability of foreignness. For 
example, during a time of heavy deregulation and globalization, the liability was found 
to decrease, due to a more “level playing field” for domestic and foreign firms.  
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These findings are interesting for the present study, because they provide an idea of how 
long an INV is liable from being foreign to a market. This is accentuated when one 
considers that it must stretch its limited resources (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994) along a 
variety of diverse national markets. Furthermore, the notion that deregulation of the 
marketplace decreases the liability of foreignness provides empirically-based reasoning 
as to why the why the widespread emergence of INVs has coincided with the relatively 
recent integration and globalization of world trade.      
 
Liability of Newness: In studying how the society outside organizations influences the 
internal life of organizations Stinchcombe (1965) also informs the study of INVs. The 
finding that characterizes his work in the present context is based on the notion that 
young organizations are more prone to failure than established ones because of two 
underlining reasons. They need to learn new roles as social actors as well as create new 
organizational routines with matching roles at a time when scarce organizational 
resources are stretched to the limit (Clegg, 2006, pp.61). In the case of INVs this is 
perhaps emphasized as their foreign market commitments can take place in a variety of 
different environments. As new firms tend to be small, the liabilities of foreignness and 
newness are often applicable in unison.    
 
Liability of Smallness: Aldrich and Auster, (1986, cited in Clegg, 2006 p.62) capture 
some reasons for why small businesses are more likely to fail than large ones in 
identifying the liability of smallness. These include; difficulties in finding external 
funding, meeting relatively high interest rates as well as recruiting and training a 
workforce. The liability of smallness is enforced by the fact that potential customers 
tend to favor larger organizations (Hannan and Freeman, 1984, cited in Clegg p.62). As 
the liability of smallness is related to size, it seems safe to assume, that growth offsets it. 
 
Even  with  limited  description  of  the  different  liabilities  of  INVs,  it  is  evident  that  not  
only are these types of firms disadvantaged because of the range of liabilities but also 
because of their somewhat cumulative nature, evident in how the liabilities enforce each 
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other. For example, resource scarcity can accentuate the disparities present in foreign 
operations and extend the time it takes to get accustomed to the respective markets.   
 
In addition to accounts of inherent organizational liabilities, the international business 
landscape for INVs also merits attention. Upon identifying a number of risks specific to 
INVs, Shrader et al. (2000) also stipulate how these risks are managed by international 
entrepreneurs. They assert that, devoid of large networks and an abundance of 
resources, INV managers have to rely on trade-offs between risks specific to; some 
foreign locations, entry mode commitments and foreign revenue exposure(s).  
 
The actions a given INV can undertake in executing trade-offs can be limited to two 
broadly defined categories (1) financial and (2) strategic. The former entails purchasing 
insurance on property casualty as well as liability and the buying and selling of financial 
instruments, such as forward contracts. The latter can be divided into five generic types 
of  strategic  actions  that  define  the  available  responses  to  international  risks:  
(competitor) imitation, (risk) avoidance, (strategic) flexibility, cooperation (with other 
parties) and control. The role of the entrepreneur is highlighted in these actions as well 
as is his optimistic nature towards risks. In highlighting actual measures taken by INVs 
to manage risks the study provides proof that despite having to negotiate a variety of 
disadvantages in its operations an INV can rely on some inherent advantages, e.g. the 
experience of top management, high innovative capacity and a concentrated focus on a 
limited product line which decreases complexity of operations. (Shrader et al., 2000).        
 
Survival is not synonymous with success when determining whether a global vision 
from inception came to fruition.  Thus, a more thorough understanding of the growth 
phases of an international new venture is needed in order to conceptualize the 
developments  that  constitute  a  successful  Born  Global  or  Born  International.  
(Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, pp.4).   
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2.1.5 Growth Phases of a Product Manufacturing International New Venture  
 
By synthesizing the discussed works of literature on firm growth, internationalization 
and the International New Venture a framework for the growth phases and 
interconnected survival challenges for the INV can be forwarded to help bridge the gap 
in theory. The hereafter projected phases are dubbed (1) Introductory, (2) Commercial 
breakthrough & foreign growth, (3) Global breakthrough & expansion and (4) Global 
rationalization & maturity in-line with Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009, pp.4-7). 
Yet, in synthesizing earlier works, this study emphasizes the viewpoint of the Product 
Manufacturing International New Ventrue.  Figure 1. illustrates the projected phases. 
 
Figure 1. Phases and main paths of growth for PMINVs, modified from Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson 
(2009, pp.5) 
 
1. The Introductory Phase  
  
In a study of international French and Norwegian SME manufacturers, Moen (2002, 
pp.172) found that the “destiny” of the firms was often shaped already at introduction. 
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Thus, if a global vision is not taken from establishment, the PMINV is likely to remain 
a domestic operator, an aspect highlighted by the fact that the introductory phase is said 
to include very limited forward planning (Scott and Bruce, 1987, pp.49).  
 
International new Ventures are often characterized by their entrepreneurial founders 
(Shrader et al., 2000, pp.1230). Thus, the notion that the main values driving an SME 
start-up are those of the founders’ (Bridge et al., 1998, pp.199) is highlighted here. This 
means that management is done via direct supervision and the basic skills of the 
founder(s) will determine the functional emphasis of the firm. Greiner (1972, pp.42) 
identifies a common challenge in this setting. He argues that while the founder(s) are 
usually technologically oriented they may be burdened with the added managerial 
responsibilities infused by e.g. an increased number of employees. The solution he 
advocates is to install a business manager with administrative experience and 
knowledge of extended product runs.  
 
At this stage of operations, there is very little organizational structure to speak of, due to 
the focus being in technical development, which emphasizes the central role of the 
founder(s) and overall, structure and formality are non-existent. (Kazanjian and Drazin, 
1990a, pp.140). The operational focus is on creating a commercially viable product, 
developing a market for it and finding the required financing to fuel these activities. A 
single operating unit servicing a single (domestic) market is often the hub of all 
activities. (Scott and Bruce, 1987). Also, the company may have very limited, mainly 
export driven sales from abroad (Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, pp.5). Finding the 
required financing calls for the ability to convince potential financiers, sometimes when 
the product is still in development (Kazanjian and Drazin, 1990a, pp.140), which can be 
highly challenging (Luostarinen and Gabrielsson, 2006). Therefore, expanding on any 
pilot customer base is crucial (Churchill and Lewis, 1983, pp.32).   
 
An added concern for product manufacturers is finding the right channels to reach 
prospective customers (Moen, 2002, pp.5). Some creative channels utilized by Born 
Globals include: (1) contracting an MNE as a systems integrator, (2) contracting an 
MNE to act as distributor or licensee, (3) entering networks of supportive organizations 
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or business associates and (4) utilizing the Internet (sales/marketing) or a combination 
of these (Gabrielsson et al., 2008). Pending a failure in securing the required channels, 
managerial expertise, resources and capabilities, the survival of the INV is jeopardized. 
Successful management of the challenges, in turn, puts the firm on the verge of a 
commercial breakthrough. (Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, pp.5).  
 
2. The Commercial Breakthrough and Foreign Growth Phase 
 
This phase is characterized by a number of successful foreign market entries which lead 
to the company operating in a (potentially) global industry (Gabrielsson et al., 2008, 
pp.396). Subsidiaries are established to better cater for different markets in addition to 
export activities to other countries (Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, p.6). After 
securing preliminary financing and development of the product, the focus of the product 
manufacturer shifts to selling the first generation product in volumes (Kazanjian and 
Drazin, 1990a pp. 140). This obviously calls for attention in increasing production 
capacity (Scott & Bruce, 1989, pp.51).  
 
The organizational structure is still perhaps hierarchically more informal than formal 
(Kazanjian and Drazin, 1990b, p.1492), but due to job descriptions becoming 
increasingly specialized, a more functional approach is imminent (Greiner, 1972, 
pp.42). Therefore, to maintain organizational performance, capable functional managers 
are needed, to take over some of the responsibilities of the founder(s) (Churchill and 
Lewis, 1983, pp.34). Sustained growth is likely to incur functional “shocks” and 
“crises” when challenged with creating a function-specific task system, meaning the 
firm is in an almost constant state of change (Kazanjian and Drazin, 1990a, p.140).   
 
The focus here is on finding the closest match between the organizations current 
offering and foreign market conditions, so that minimal adaptation to the product 
strategy is required. The guiding principle is to broaden the geographic span of 
operations while avoiding major marketing or production costs. Securing adequate 
distribution channels remains a concern, while the company’s limited experience abroad 
means that it will focus on leveraging skill and product-related assets internationally. 
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(Douglas and Craig, 1989, pp.51). In addressing related shortcomings, the INV may 
attempt to collaborate with an MNE as in the previous phase. Yet, in doing so it runs the 
risk of becoming overly dependent on the relationship (Gabrielsson et al., 2008).  
 
There are also other options available. As a result of growing sales revenues and/or 
increased borrowing power, the firm is potentially in a position to invest a considerable 
amount of assets into fuelling growth. However, in case these investments fail to yield 
the desired results the company risks regression and in the worst case business survival 
is again jeopardized. Amid investments and resource endowments to fuel growth, 
making sure the basic business stays respectably profitable remains an operational 
priority.  Additionally,  specialist  recruitment  and  manager  development  become  key  
concerns).  The company may also look to install systems to aid management, 
budgeting and planning and the realities of operating in a niche segment become evident 
as competitive pressures increase internationally. (Chruchill and Lewis, 1983, pp.34).  
 
The strategic focus, (at least for the Born International), gradually swings from foreign 
opportunity assessment to further penetration of international markets. The underlying 
reason being a concern for more effective utilization of local operations i.e. marketing, 
production and distribution. (Douglas and Graig, 1989). Global high growth industries 
are often characterized by intense competition, which means INVs operating in these 
environments face considerable challenges in maintaining their competitive advantage. 
The  INVs  adhering  to  a  Born  Global  strategy  must  look  beyond  regional  markets  
irrespective of the resource demands and expand to other continents or entertain the idea 
of becoming Born Internationals. (Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, p.6).    
  
Irrespective of the geographic spread the key issues facing management in this phase 
relate to securing adequate financing for growth targets and maintaining control of 
operations. The increased strain on the organizational structure demands a move for a 
more decentralized format. This often marks a change from an entrepreneurial approach 
to a more professional one, which means that the founder(s) will have to relinquish 
some managerial power, which can be unpleasant. (Scott and Bruce, 1987, pp.50). 
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3. The Global Breakthrough and Expansion Phase 
 
As the previous phase constitutes the watershed separating the Born International and 
Born Global, the subsequent phases concern mainly the latter. The combination of a 
sustained global vision and commitment spur the Born Global (Gabrielsson et al., 2008, 
pp.387) as there is a need to pursue growth from new continents. Many such companies 
operate in niche segments that are not sufficiently large regionally or internationally 
(Laanti et al., 2006). The structure of the organization is now decentralized and, to an 
extent, divisionalized, while funding remains a concern. Formalized accounting systems 
and regular management reports, an increasing interest toward processualizing 
management functions are common characteristics of this phase. (Scott and Bruce, 
1987, pp.50-51). Despite an increase in functional expertise the company is still 
influenced by founder control. However, the executive expertise required for successful 
management measures in this phase, may call for a change in top management. 
(Churchill and Lewis, 1983, pp.40).     
 
The Born Globals that have thus far combined forces with MNEs for market access 
need to break free of their dependency or risk losing independence and becoming a 
small satellite in a network centered at the MNE. This calls for resource development or 
accumulation for channel management purposes. (Gabrielsson et al., 2008, pp.397).  
 
The operational focus is centered on market-specific product and strategy adaptations, 
which, once applied, will ideally broaden market bases and tap into new segments.  
Sustained independence means that scope economies as well as the ability to leverage 
assets and competencies become increasingly important in spreading administrative 
overheads across higher volumes market-specifically. Thus, efforts center on shared 
marketing expenses and a joint utilization of production and distribution facilities across 
product lines. (Douglas and Graig, 1989). If successful in these efforts the company will 
have more funds and resources available to pursue growth.   
  
For the product manufacturer, maintaining a competitive advantage during increased 
competitive pressures requires a greater focus on customer needs and product adaptation 
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(Scott and Bruce, 1987, pp.51), which may prompt the company to develop product 
variants and consider product line and/or scope extensions (Douglas and Graig, 1989, 
pp. 55.). But, the main focus is on further market penetration and expansions. Success in 
these efforts means that a considerable amount of sales will be generated from outside 
the home continent, which can lead to a wide range of value chain activities being 
spread across several continents. (Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, p.6.)  
 
Despite  consolidation,  signs  of  inefficiencies  from  growth  can  begin  to  emerge  
(Churchill and Lewis,1983) in the form of duplicate market specific activities and costs. 
The  potential  emergence  of  global  competition  is  an  added  concern.  (Douglas  and  
Graig, 1989) and therefore negotiating these challenges becomes a pre-requisite for 
growth and in some cases survival.    
 
4. The Global Rationalization and Maturity Phase  
 
Concerns over eliminating growth-based inefficiencies signal the Born Globals arrival 
to the fourth phase (Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009). Consequently, focus is placed 
on integrating strategy across different markets by implementing mechanisms for 
enhanced  transnational  coordination  of  operations  with  an  eye  on  global  synergies.  In  
negotiating these challenges, the company begins addressing strategy on a global, rather 
than a national or product market scale. (Douglas & Craig, 1989, pp.55).  
 
At this phase, structurally the company is ideally well-equipped for rationalization. 
Management is decentralized, well staffed and experienced, while systems are extensive 
and developed. Thus, the foundations for large-scale strategic maneuvers are in place 
and they are ideally enhanced by standard cost systems and budgeting tools. Individual 
and self-discipline prevail over formal controls in top management. (Greiner, 1972, 
pp.43). The founder(s) and business are now separate entities financially and 
operationally. Herein also lays a potential weakness since, despite increased 
organizational and operational complexity, the company needs to retain its 
entrepreneurial guile and responsiveness. (Churchill and Lewis, 1983, pp.40).  
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Upon arrival to this phase, the product manufacturer is focused on finalizing 
development of the second generation product and operational attention is set on its 
launch and release. Delivery efforts of the next generation product must not undermine 
efficient management of the 1st generation product line. (Kazanjian and Drazin, 1990a, 
pp.141). The challenge is accentuated as the product scope extension is distinctly 
different from previous produce (Kazanjian and Drazin, 1987), unlike country market 
adaptations and product line extensions of previous phases.  
 
Reaching the projected final phase does not mean that the company necessarily stops 
growing. More indicative is how the number of sales from global markets seizes to 
increase relative to total sales. In conceptual terms, this means that in many cases the 
company has become a MNE and a significant network node, both internally and 
externally (Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, pp.7). If the enterprise is successful in 
implementing global rationalization the potential benefits include: scope and scale 
economies from pooling activities, enhanced customer preferences (global availability), 
improved quality of outputs as well as increased competitive leverage. Yet, a failure in 
global integration puts the company at a disadvantage relative to global competitors and 
can threaten survival. (Yip, 1989).  
 
The phases model summarized in table 1, deals with potential managerial concerns 
during a projected development cycle of a product manufacturing international new 
venture. While the watershed between a Born International and Born Global can be 
positioned between phase two and three, it is not in-line with the objectives of this study 
to construct a detailed path development based on earlier publications. Instead, the 
model serves as a starting point for further analysis. As e.g. Sapienza et al. (2006) 
advocate, an enquiry into INV performance needs to be appreciative of the factors that 
influence growth and survival, discussed in more detail in the next chapter. 
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Table 1. The Projected growth phases of a Product Manufacturing International New Venture, 
modified from Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009, pp.7)   
  1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and foreign 
growth 
3. Global breakthrough 
and expansion  
4. Global rationalization 
and maturity  
Key strategic 
consideration(s) 
and operational 
focus  
Development of a 
commercially viable 
product, securing enough 
financing and receiving 
first sales revenues.  
Pursuit of additional 
foreign market entries and 
sale of products in 
volumes, which incur a 
large increase in 
production capacity and 
specialized job roles.  
Expansion to new 
continents and 
penetration in established 
markets.  Consolidation of 
sales/marketing and 
production internationally.  
Alignment of global 
operations across  
countries  to achieve 
synergies. Maintaining 
focus on “old “ product 
while launching “new” to 
sustain CA.  
Size and growth of 
the firm (sales / 
employees)  
Micro-sized firm with a 
few employees and a 
priority in building on first 
sales.  
Small/Medium-sized firm 
with high relative sales and 
employment growth.  
Medium-sized firm with 
composed relative sales 
and employment growth.  
Large firm with declining 
relative sales and 
employment growth.  
Foreign expansion 
(markets, share)  
Entry to foreign market(s), 
under 25% 
internationalization 
degree. Sales in fewer 
than six countries.  
Increased expansion to 
foreign markets, 25%-50% 
internationalization degree, 
sales in at least six 
countries.  
Expansion to other 
continents and growth in 
established country 
markets. Globalization 
degree 25%-50% with 
sales from at least three 
continents.  
Global presence with 
globalization degree over 
50% and sales from all 
major/triad  continents.  
Operational 
mode(s) (networks)   
Export and establishment 
of relations with key 
channel members /MNEs 
via  credible concept 
product.   
Export and foreign sales 
subsidiaries. Distribution in 
high volumes via MNEs / 
key channel 
members/providers.  
A variety of offshore 
operation modes. 
Independence from key 
channel providers and 
establishment of own 
channels.  
Adherence to global 
integration and local 
responsiveness.  
Products (range, 
adaptability)  
Focus on single product 
with limited adaptability.  
Focus on making single 
product slightly adaptable 
or choosing a product that 
requires only limited 
market specific-
adaptations.   
Focus on line extensions, 
considerable market-
specific adaptations and 
development of the 2nd 
generation product.  
Launch of 2nd generation 
product across markets.  
Organizational 
structure  
Founder centric, 
combined with direct 
supervision and informal 
communication.  
Founder still central, but 
development calls for a 
more functional/de-
centralized approach and 
formal communication.  
Decentralized/Divisional 
with increasingly 
specialized job roles. 
Formal communication, 
planning and business 
processes supported by 
systems.  
Decentralized with many 
experienced managers, 
highly developed 
processes and support 
systems.  
Survival crisis in 
transition period 
preceding the 
following phase  
Failure in developing a 
credible product and/or 
obtaining management  
expertise,  
network/channel 
partners, resources as 
well as capabilities.  
Failure in increasing 
production capacity, 
professionalizing 
management, re-
structuring the 
organization and 
safeguarding growth.  
Failure to consolidate 
activities and avoid cost, 
inefficiencies, 
multiplication of efforts, 
inability to respond to 
competitors and global 
customers.  
MNE specific challenges-
outside the scope of this 
study.  
 
2.2 Factors of Firm Growth and Survival 
 
International business literature forwards a number of factors that reportedly influence 
firm growth and survival. Prior international new venture-research, has grouped them 
under industry factors and firm factors (Mudambi and Zahra, (2007, p.336). In the vein 
of Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009) the industry factors assessed next include: 
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industry growth rate, industry penetration by foreign firms/seller concentration and 
industry globalization drivers, while firm factors include resources and capabilities as 
well as entrepreneurial orientation and lateral rigidity in decision making. To direct the 
focus towards PMINVs product scope and product adaptation are also discussed. 
Market orientation factors are also discussed to address how the growth paths of 
PMINVs differ in industrial and consumer markets.  
 
2.2.1 Industry Factors  
 
Building on earlier research, Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009) stress that, the 
industry growth rate, the rate of industry penetration of foreign firms and global seller 
concentration within an industry as well as the extent the industry is globally integrated 
potentially have an impact on the growth and survival of an international new venture.  
 
Industry Growth Rate 
 
Vernon (1966, pp.197-201) finds that industry growth is related to the rate of firm 
internationalization, whereas Greiner (1972, pp.40), states that the pace at which a 
company experiences different phases of evolution is closely tied to the market 
environment of the industry it operates in. Recent studies have posted contradictory 
results over the matter.  
 
Mudambi and Zahra, (2007, pp.343-347) conclude that industry growth increases the 
probability of INV survival. They also find evidence of technological competence in 
terms of R&D intensity, improving a company’s survival prospects in a foreign market.  
However, in a statistical study of small business lifecycles, Headd and Kirchhoff 
(2009,) find no evidence of growth industries having a greater percentage of growing 
small firms. Hence, over-reliance on industry growth rate to offset the liabilities of 
smallness newness and foreignness (2.1.4) may be detrimental to the INV.  
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Industry Penetration by Foreign Firms and Seller Concentration  
 
In a UK-based study, Driffield and Munday (2000) find that the penetration rate of 
foreign firms and seller agglomeration influence the comparative advantage of an 
industry. The comparative advantage of an industry, determines how firms within the 
industry are likely to perform well relative to firms in other industries. Mudambi and 
Zahra, (2007, pp.336) build on this understanding and state that the rate of industry 
penetration by foreign firms and seller concentration can greatly influence a firms 
survival in international markets, in that the entry of foreign competitors often increases 
rivalry in an industry (Porter, 1986, cited in Mudambi and Zahra, 2007, pp336) thereby 
reducing new foreign entrants’ ability to acquire the required market share to survive.  
 
Industry concentration (agglomeration), on the other hand, can limit new entrants´ 
ability to penetrate foreign markets (Porter 1980, cited in Mudambi and Zahra, 2007, 
pp.336) and therefore reduce their odds of survival. This is due to the notion that, in a 
highly concentrated industry, foreign entrants have to acquire market share from more 
established and resource-laden companies (Scherer, 1984, cited in Mudambi and Zahra, 
2007, pp.336), which possibly reduces the odds for survival. In simplified terms, a low 
level of industry concentration and penetration of foreign competitors have a positive 
impact on the survival of the International New Venture.      
 
The studies underline the complex relationship between firm growth and survival by 
showing that the outcomes are not synonymous, yet many of the factors impacting 
survival in a positive manner can be expected to have a similar influence on growth 
(Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009). This is accentuated by some macro-economical 
industry factors.       
 
Industry Globalization Drivers 
 
Yip, (1989) argues that industry globalization drivers, such as homogenous customer 
needs, global customers and channels, transferable marketing practices, favorable trade 
policies, compatible technical standards as well as common marketing regulations can 
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have an enabling influence on firm growth. Luostarinen (1994, pp.166-171) echoes the 
idea and exemplifies from the perspective of small, open and peripheral economies. 
Based on analysis of Finnish firms, he advocates that, the removal and liberalization of 
trade barriers, common market regulations and technical standards inaugurate the global 
market for competition in many industries and thus enable the existence of INVs. He 
also states that, the peripheral location, smallness and openness of the home market 
constitute a domestic market “push”, prompting firms to globalize. The motion is 
enforced by the “pull” of large and open global markets.   
 
While the mentioned industry factors are useful in examining how the competitive 
dynamic between suppliers influences PMINV growth and survival, an additional group 
of factors needs to be considered when assessing the impact of the customer market. 
Market orientation (e.g. Day, 1994) is an effective way to contrast between consumer 
and industrial markets, as further explained in the following.      
 
2.2.2 Market Orientation Factors 
 
Literature recognizes a number of differences between industrial and consumer markets. 
When discussing these differences, the present study builds on the views of Anderson 
and Narus (2004, pp. 12) in elaborating on marketing processes to make a distinction, 
because they seem to cut across other functional areas and thereby provide an idea on 
the specifics of B2C and B2B markets as growth and survival platforms.  
 
The Industrial Market 
 
Industrial markets are characterized by buyer-seller interdependencies. The operations 
of a B2B supplier build on buyer relationships which are frequently close, complex and 
long-term. They are further defined by the product and process technologies of the two 
parties as well as the surrounding market structures, which dictate the availability of 
alternative buyers and sellers. Thus, producers try to develop close relationships rather 
than play the market with a view on opportunistic short-term gain. Instead, benefits 
stem from tailoring resources to dealings with a buyer. (Ford 1980, pp.339-340). 
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Adaptations to the relationship require resource investments from both buyer and seller. 
By definition the value of the resulting output is less in other transactions than in the 
specific use it was intended for. Thus adaptations mark a commitment to the 
relationship by a company and can be seen in e.g. a supplier’s development of a specific 
product for a customer or a buyer’s adjustment of a production process to accommodate 
the seller’s product. (Ford 1980, pp.339-340). In general, the business market is more 
internationally integrated, meaning that customers from country markets in different 
regions such as the Americas, Asia and Europe are essentially after the same product 
functionality and performance (Anderson and Narus, 2004, pp.15).   
 
A B2B manufacturer cannot cater for the market by manipulating a generalized 
marketing mix and hope to generate large country-specific segments (Lipson and 
Darling, 1971). The industrial market must therefore be analyzed according to the 
different requirements of buyers and the market as a network of relationships. Each 
current and potential relationship must be assessed according to inherent opportunities 
and development possibilities. Hence, allocating resources across different relationships 
according to likely return is important. Also, the B2B supplier’s customer approach 
should be appreciative of the requirements of the end-user, who is often different from 
the buyer. (Håkansson & Snehota, 2000, pp.45).  The B2B manufacturer must question 
whether the needed product adaptations are outweighed by the potential revenues from a 
relationship (Ford 1980, pp.339-340). Some authors (e.g Anderson and Narus, 2004, 
pp.7) refer to such a relationship management focus as a market-driven approach. 
 
On the operational level a B2B vendor emphasizes on personal selling rather than 
advertising to reach buyers, as promotion is done via e.g. trade journals or direct mails. 
Because of the tailored nature of the product, price is often negotiated customer-
specifically. The industrial vendor’s product often includes a service component. Direct 
distribution to larger customers is usual as it can strengthen respective relationships, 
while smaller customers can be serviced via intermediaries. The organizational buying 
process often involves many individuals, which means the B2B supplier should 
understand the organizational buying process and the people involved. If the B2B 
supplier becomes an important partner in the value creation activities of the buyer via 
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information sharing, joint planning, shared technology and benefits; the joint focus 
shifts from price to value and from goods to solutions. (Hutt and Speh, 2007, pp.15-17).  
 
Marketing communications literature sometimes refers to the B2B supplier as more 
inclined to utilize “push” promotion than B2C suppliers. This means that personal/direct 
selling is relied upon in each stage of the value delivery process to “push” the product 
forward  i.e.  manufacturers  sell  to  wholesalers  who  sell  to  retailers  who  sell  to  
consumers.  (Webster,  2000).  Hence,  the  channel  member  who  owns  the  product  at  a  
given also assumes the main responsibility in marketing it downstream in the channel.  
 
The Consumer Market 
 
In  contrast  to  the  relationship  driven  character  of  the  B2B market,  the  B2C market  is  
often characterized by its more product-driven nature. Based on information over 
consumer needs, a product idea is developed and pitted against customer perceptions 
and purchase decisions. (Von Hippel, 1978, pp.40). The B2C acronym itself indicates 
that the marketing function for producers operating on the marker is essentially supplier 
centric. In comparison to the relationship-driven industrial, customers in the consumer 
market take a more passive than participatory role in the production process. 
(Gummesson and Polese, 2009).  
 
Because the aesthetics and tastes of consumers tend to differ from one country to 
another, B2C suppliers are generally less inclined to do business across borders than 
their B2B counterparts (Anderson and Narus, 2004, pp.15). Here, at least in academic 
principal, customers are approached by manipulating a generic marketing mix (Ford, 
1980), and by carving out and serving for a specific consumer segment or segments. 
Note that, this generalization lends from the roots of consumer marketing literature, 
reaching back to the United States of 1950s and 1960s (see e.g. Grönroos, 1994, pp.323) 
and is used here for reasons of conceptualization rather than detail. The contents of the 
marketing mix have been widely contested, but can include elements of product, 
distribution, communication and terms of sale decisions (Lipson and Darling, 1971).  
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On the operational level a B2C supplier must recognize the importance of retailers and 
their relatively high channel power. As such retailers can be regarded by the B2C 
suppliers as customers and as buying agents of the consumer, rather than just 
distribution points. In contrast to the industrial market, here the importance of 
manufacturer brands and own labels are accentuated both in dealing with consumers as 
well as retailers. The end-user associates the manufacturer brand with the product, while 
the retailer provides the access point to the market. (Jenkins and Knox, 1994, pp.15-16).  
When the suppliers emphasizes a brand or brands in market dealings it can be seen to 
assume a brand-driven approach as opposed market-driven one (see Urde, 1999). In 
addition to the pull of proprietary brands, consumer buying behavior is influenced 
increasingly by retailer loyalty (King, 1991, cited in Jenkins and Knox, 1994, pp.119). 
The relatively higher volume of targeted customers is reflected in B2C promotion. Mass 
media is utilized more often as a promotional channel whilst pricing tends to be more 
fixed and market specific than flexible (Hutt and Speh, 2007, pp.15-17).  
 
As opposed to the B2B supplier’s preference toward push promotion, a B2C supplier is 
sometimes quoted for a preference toward “pull” promotion. Here the marketing mix 
makes extensive use of mass communication (e.g. television and print) in a bid to create 
product  awareness  and  consumer  demand.  The  objective  of  promotion  is  for  the  end-
user to pull the product through the channel. Thus, the B2C supplier is more 
accountable for getting the product through the channel than the B2B supplier and 
sometimes has to execute both push and pull promotion. (Webster, 2000). Table 2 
summarizes the discussed differences between B2B and B2C markets   
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Table 2. Differences between industrial and consumer markets, adopted from Lipson and Darling 
(1971); Ford (1980); Jenkins and Knox (1994); Webster, (2000); Anderson and Narus (2004); Hutt and 
Speh (2007) as well as Gummesson and Polese (2009). 
 Business to Business 
Markets 
Business to Consumer 
Markets 
Sales Channel 
Character  
 
Relationship-driven; based 
on resource commitments 
of both buyer and seller.  
Supplier-driven; based on 
functionality & price of 
product and/or brand 
value 
Marketing 
Communications   
Mostly “Push” oriented,  
personal selling with an 
additional service element  
“Push” toward re-sellers  
via personal selling & 
Create “Pull” among end- 
users via (mass) marketing 
mix manipulation 
Product Pricing 
and Adaptation  
Customer specific  Market/Segment specific  
Level of  
International 
Integration 
between 
Markets  
High, due to the 
standardized nature of 
ingredient products 
Varied, due to the diverse 
nature of demand across 
country markets and 
consumer groups.  
Partnering  Value-driven Price and/or brand-driven 
Distribution 
  
Direct to Large Customers 
Indirect to Small Customers 
Predominantly Indirect 
 
After generic difference between consumer and industrial markets have been 
established, the following discusses them on the grounds of market orientation 
 
Market Orientation 
 
A useful way of elaborating on how the customer market influences a firm’s delivery of 
products  is  to  consider  the  role  of  the  brand,  whereby  the  mentioned  set  of  core  
differences summarized in table 2 can be used without the risk of oversimplification. 
However, it is neither within the interest nor scope of the present research to study the 
marketing and branding efforts of product manufacturing international new ventures in-
detail and go in-depth as to how they differ from more established companies etc. Due 
to the very limited amount of prior works contrasting INVs based on customer market, a 
focus on the differing role of branding is a choice of necessity as much as practicality. 
In-line with Webster (2000), the following discusses the manufacturer brand as a key 
facet of the relationship between reseller and customer. See figure 2. 
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Brand
Reseller Consumer
Value
 
Figure 2. Relationships among brands, consumers and re-sellers, adopted from Webster (2000). 
 
As mentioned above, B2B suppliers can be seen to adhere to market-driven approach 
and B2C suppliers to a brand-driven approach. The following discusses what the 
respective approaches mean, in terms of market orientation.  
 
Brand orientation is defined by Urde (1999) as a market approach that builds on brands 
as strategic resources. He stresses that the processes of a brand oriented organization 
revolve around the creation, development and protection of brand identity in a 
continuous interaction with customers, with the aim of achieving lasting competitive 
advantages through brands. Thus, brand building is seen as an interaction via symbols 
between the firm and its customers, which somewhat echoes with Webster (2003), as 
evidence by Figure 2. For reasons of conceptual clarity it should be noted that the 
present study uses the terms brand-oriented firm and brand-driven firm synonymously  
 
A company adheres to a brand-driven approach if brand identity represents a starting 
point and the strategic platform. This affects the use and interpretation of market 
intelligence. In principle, the brand is made superior to the wants and needs of the 
customer. This does not mean that the needs of customers are ignored, but they are not 
allowed to unilaterally steer brand development and determine brand identity. On the 
contrary, the brand combined with other assets and competencies within the company 
can be braided together into a brand identity via a process of value and meaning 
creation. Ideally, customers attribute the resulting brand identity as valuable and unique, 
and it becomes difficult for competitors to imitate. As a potential result, the brand 
becomes a competitive advantage and an expression of intent, difficult for competitors 
to imitate. Thus, brand orientation shifts firm focus from external market factors, into 
internal ones. (Urde, 1999). 
 36 
 
 
Market orientation is defined as “the organization-wide generation of market 
intelligence pertaining to current and future customer needs, dissemination of the 
intelligence across departments, and organization-wide responsiveness to it (Hunt and 
Morgan and 1995, cited in Urde, 1999, p.120). Thus, it assumes a mainly external focus 
on customers and competitors and brand questions are reduced to secondary issues or 
deemed unimportant. In generic terms, the brand is viewed as an unconditional response 
to customer’s needs and wants and the focus shifts to a deeper understanding of the 
customer and the overall goal of satisfying the needs and wants of the customer by e.g. 
product development, segmentation and positioning. (Urde, 1999, pp.120). For reasons 
of conceptual clarity it should be noted that the present study uses the terms market-
oriented firm and market-driven firm synonymously (see e.g. Day, 1994)   
 
Based on the discussed differences consumer market firms seem more likely to adopt a 
brand-oriented approach, while industrial market firms a market-oriented approach. 
Figure 3 exemplifies by synthesizing the discussed differences of brand and market 
orientation, channel intermediaries and primary customer market 
 
 
Figure 3. Market and brand orientation conditional to customer market, adopted from Day (1994); 
Urde (1999) and Webster (2000).  
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Luostarinen and Gabrielsson (2006) find that born globals from Finland tend to focus on 
a global niche segment, as large customer segments are exceedingly difficult to reach 
due  to  resource  constraints.  They  conclude  that  resource  constraints  make  the  B2B  
market more appealing for these INVs. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that mass 
media communications, common to pull promotion is relatively resource consuming, 
especially when one considers the demand for country market promotional adaptations.  
 
The Market-driven B2B Product Manufacturing International New Venture  
 
Luostarinen and Gabrielsson (2006, pp.786-791) find that B2B born globals from 
Finland tend to build on private label or original equipment manufacturer brands 
(OEM), while efforts to build on an “own” brand and marketing mix manipulation are 
uncommon. This highlights the importance of, key customers, OEM channels or other 
large channel members as well as customer relationship management efforts. In a 
preceding  study  contrasting  the  branding  strategies  of  B2B  and  B2C  born  globals,  
Gabrielsson (2005, pp.216) found that the former tend to have very varied and even 
customer-specific branding strategies. Thus, there are multiple brands and less focus on 
creating a standard manufacturer brand across markets. Additionally he finds that B2B 
born globals prefer the push approach in marketing.  
 
Building on the differentiation by Urde (1999), B2B PMINVs seem better equipped for 
growth and survival through a market-oriented approach, where individual customer 
relationships and synergies in value are considered over the manufacturer brand. As 
mentioned, the industrial market is inherently more internationally integrated and sales 
based on relationship with a few, rather than many customers. Thus, resources can be 
dedicated into developing those relationships and pushing products through the channel  
 
The Brand-driven B2C Product Manufacturing International New Venture  
 
Luostarinen and Gabrielsson (2006) find that Finnish B2C born globals tend to build on 
a manufacturer brand from establishment, in contrast with the diverse and more 
inconsistent branding efforts of their B2B counterparts. They also discover that B2C 
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born globals are inclined to utilize a combination of push and pull promotional efforts to 
assist the re-seller in sales efforts, since channel middlemen can be unwilling to invest 
enough into marketing the novel and often unknown products of these firms. Again 
building on the differentiation by Urde (1999) B2C PMINVs seem better equipped 
when subscribing to a predominantly brand-oriented approach. If the brand is made the 
epitome of the relationship between reseller and consumer, the firm can better focus its 
promotional efforts and direct them to brand management instead of solely focusing on 
“pushing” the product to a fixed number of key customers. This is not to say that the 
key channel providers: resellers/retailers are not central in marketing efforts. Yet, while 
focusing solely on them via a market-driven approach might get the product to the 
shelves of the re-seller, it will do little in terms of generating pull among the consumers.   
 
Whether examined on a micro-economical, macro-economical or the customer market 
level,  the  industry  factors  that  seemingly  impact  the  growth  and  survival  of  PMINVs  
cover a broad range. Yet, a holistic model examining the phenomenon would not be 
complete without an account of some of the firm factors involved (Gabrielsson and 
Gabrielsson, 2009). 
 
2.2.3 Physical Product Factors 
 
Physical product factors are essential in differentiating the focal points of this study 
from international  new ventures  with  a  different  output.  In  discussing  the  growth  and  
survival of product manufacturing international new ventures, product scope and 
product adaptation merit attention based on prior discoveries (Boter and Holmquist, 
1996; Calantone et al., 2004). For the following, it is important to distinguish between 
the width of the product scope and the length of a product line. In the present study, the 
width of the scope refers to the number of product lines supplied by a firm. Products 
within a line, in turn, are closely related in terms of e.g. functionality, customer group, 
sales outlets and/or price, while products between lines are not (e.g. Kotler 2003).  
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Product Scope 
 
Based on a multiple case study, Boter and Holmquist (1996) find that a narrow product 
scope is positively related to high international business performance in innovative 
small product manufacturers. The firms were found to have a very concentrated and 
well-defined product scope, in which alterations over time could accommodate new 
designs, colors and materials with relatively modest resource commitments. 
Maintaining a very limited product scope enabled these companies to gain efficiency in 
all functions of their respective value chains and carve a niche from global markets. In 
addition, a narrow product offering enabled a functional business management structure. 
In the case of these studied innovative small companies, this meant that research and 
development, the flow of organization of the production, marketing etc. consisted of 
separate functions with separate personnel, management and equipment. A clear 
distinction between business functions resulting in a functional management structure 
became an important facilitator of high international business performance. Maintaining 
a  narrow  product  scope  was  also  found  to  be  a  pre-requisite  for  the  ability  to  re-
construct business activities in R&D, production, marketing etc. abroad. 
 
Based on the above findings, it could be argued that while the PMINV’s resources 
remain relatively scarce and it adheres to an SME stature, it will benefit from having a 
narrow product scope. However, as the company grows and competitive pressures 
increase, it may have to start considering extensions to the offering in the form of new 
products to offset the increasing pressures (see Douglas and Craig, 1989). Kazanjian 
and Drazin (1990a, pp.141), advocate that as a firm reaches maturity it needs to launch a 
2nd generation product to alleviate dependence on the 1st generation offering. Yet, owing 
to the resource poverty associated with PMINVs (e.g Oviatt and McDougall, pp.1994) it 
seems doubtful that they can branch out to entirely unrelated product and/or service 
domains whilst also negotiating the challenges of accelerated internationalization. Thus, 
it seems probable that extensions to the product offering come in the form of related 
products and/or services.  
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Product Adaptation  
 
Calantone et al. (2004) stress that whilst the standardization-adaptation debate has 
lasted for over three decades there has been insufficient empirical inquiry into the 
specific area of product adaptation, and attempt to fill this void in their study aimed at 
the relationship between international business performance and product adaptation. 
Targeted at large Korean and US exporters, the study considers the product as a stand-
alone element of the marketing mix adaptation as a special case of product line 
extension to foreign markets, since adapting a physical product to an international 
market often equals an extension to the product line. Country-market adaptation is 
perceived risky, as it is done to expand into a new unfamiliar country market as opposed 
to penetrating an existing familiar market further (Hisrich and Peters, 1991, cited in 
Calantone et al., 2004, pp.188).  
 
Some studies imply that firm growth in size and international direction is conditional to 
country-market product adaptation. In a study of large U.S exporters Cavusgil and Zou 
(1994) found that product adaptation was positively related to high export market 
performance. Also, in a study focused on experimental, active and committed exporters 
(depending on the amount of sales derived from the export markets), Cavusgil, (1984) 
concludes  that  the  active  exporters  relied  more  on  product  adaptations  than  the  more  
reserved ones. Calantone et al. (2004) also provide evidence of a similar trend.  
 
Luostarinen and Gabrielsson (2006, pp.791) stress that born globals should make 
modular products from the outset, to ensure future adaptations are less resource 
consuming. Indeed, country specific product adaptations can prove costly despite 
flexible manufacturing systems, rapid prototyping and just-in-time methods (Calantone 
et al., 2004, pp.198).  However, as the INV starts to expand to foreign markets also a 
higher level of adaptation may be called for, to answer increasingly diverse 
product/country market demands. Douglas and Graig (1989) stress that with increased 
stature and resources, a firm is indeed better equipped to answer these demands.  
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Furthermore, upon arriving to a stage of resource maturity, opportunities for the 
rationalization of production, sourcing and logistical systems are enhanced by product 
standardization and (Douglas and Craig, 1989). Table 3 illustrates how product scope 
and product adaptation can be expected to feature in the projected PMINV growth 
phases (2.1.5), while accounting for the notion whereby consumer market products, 
require less country-market adaptation in general (Anderson and Narus, 2004, pp.15).  
 
Table 3. Projected developments in product scope and product adaptation  
 1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough 
and expansion  
4. Global 
rationalization 
and maturity  
Country-
market 
product  
adaptation(s)
* 
B2C 
 
few several many few 
B2B few  few several few 
Width of  
product scope** 
tiny small intermediate diverse (but 
related) 
*Scale: few ? several ? many | **Scale: tiny?small ? intermediate ? diverse 
 
Following an emphasis on industry, market orientation and product factors, the study 
concerns itself with resources and capabilities as determinants of growth and survival. 
 
2.2.4 Firm Resources  
 
The academic field of business strategy is dominated by two distinct schools of thought. 
The industrial organization perspective (e.g. Porter, 1981) suggests that the “fit” 
between company strategy and the environment it operates in, has significant 
implications for performance. Here, the focus is firmly on external industry factors as 
the determinants of performance. The other substantial school of thought is the 
resource-based view of the firm (RBV),  which  sees  the  differential  endowment  of  
strategic resources as the determinant of performance. (Akoorie and Scott-Kennel, 
2005). Grant (1991, pp.116) argues that, not only do firm resources and capabilities 
provide the underlying direction for firm strategy; they also constitute the primary 
source of profit for the firm. Therefore, when discussing the factors internal to the firm 
that impact growth and survival, the RBV offers insight. In the vein of Gabrielsson and 
Gabrielsson (2009), the impact the amount of resources, governmental support, 
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managerial  experience  and  resource  fungibility  have  on  the  outcomes  of  INV  growth  
and survival is considered important also for the present study.  
 
Resource Amount and Governmental Support 
 
Wernerfelt (1984, pp.172) defines a resource as anything that constitutes a strength or a 
weakness for a firm. He further specifies that a firm’s resources at a given moment can 
be defined as those tangible and intangible assets which are tied semi-permanently to 
the  firm,  e.g.  in-house  knowledge  of  technology,  brand  names,  employment  of  skilled  
personnel, trade contracts, machinery, efficient processes and capital. Thus, resources 
can be broadly grouped into e.g. physical, human, intangible and financial by nature.  
 
The debate between resource abundance and resource scarcity as a determinant of 
growth and survival has largely characterized resource based research to-date 
(Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, pp.9). Some researchers argue that resource 
abundance can be a disadvantage by diluting focus (Sapienza et al., 2006 pp.916), while 
others name it as a pre-requisite for growth and survival (Laanti et al., 2006, pp.9-10).  
 
The amount of resources a given firm can build on when negotiating the challenges of 
accelerated internationalization is potentially influenced by the degree of financial and 
operational assistance made available by government(s) and policy makers. Wren 
(1996, cited in Mudambi and Zahra, 2007, pp.337) and Mudambi (1998, cited in 
Mudambi and Zahra, 2007, pp.337) assert that the extent of governmental support 
received by the INV mediates the survival challenge presented by foreign markets. 
Hence, INVs that receive subsidies and other types of governmental assistance seem 
better positioned than their competitors to overcome liabilities (2.1.4) and thereby 
increase their chances of survival on foreign markets (Mudambi, 1998, cited in 
Mudambi and Zahra, 2007, pp.337). 
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Resource Fungibility and Managerial Experience 
 
Barney (1991, pp.105-112) argues that in order for a resource to hold the potential of 
building sustained competitive advantage, it must meet four conditions. (1) It must be 
valuable, meaning that it neutralizes threats and/or exploits opportunities in the firms 
operating environment. (2) It has to be rare in the context of the firm’s current and 
potential competitors. (3) It cannot be fully imitated by the competition. (4) It must be 
unique, in the sense that there is no strategically equivalent substitute for it. 
Consequently, the extent to which a resource can be relied on to be a source of sustained 
competitive advantage can be addressed as to how well it adheres to these criteria.  
 
Hannan (1998, cited in Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson 2009, pp.10) stipulates that 
because of the volatility of the international business environment resources must be 
continuously enhanced and re-deployed for them to retain their worth for the 
organization. On a related note, Sapienza et al. (2006, pp.924-925) argue that resource 
fungibility (the extent to which resources can be deployed into alternate uses cost 
effectively) moderates the effects of initiation of internationalization activity on new 
firm survival and growth. In other words, it is not essential as to how much resources an 
INV has at its disposal, but what ultimately determines growth and survival relates to 
how interchangeable key resources are between alternate uses. They further assert that 
resource fungibility (1) increases the adaptability of INV strategies and reduces the 
impact  of  failed  trial  attempts  as  well  as  (2)  provides  the  flexibility  to  create  new  
capabilities with existing resources.  
 
Madsen and Servais (1997, pp.577) as well as Laanti et al. (2006, pp.4) emphasize the 
managerial experience of the entrepreneur(s) and the founding team as a central 
resource in the case of international new ventures. Reuber and Fischer (1999) examine 
the impact managerial experience has on success and further divide it into stock and 
stream experience. The former refers to the experience the founder or manager holds 
when establishing/entering the company, while the latter refers to the experience that 
ensues from post-establishment/entry activities and thereby benefits the firm. The 
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breadth and depth of experience is further captured under concept of variety (Eriksson 
et al., 2000) which explains the unique nature of individual managerial experience.  
 
In the context of INVs, it is interesting to examine the above-stated findings from the 
perspective of early international business researches who stipulate that knowledge can 
be extended across markets (e.g. Johanson & Vahlne 1977; Luostarinen, 1979). 
Eriksson et al. (2000) build on this understanding by introducing the concept of 
internationalization knowledge or business knowledge i.e. knowledge specific to a 
certain market. In other words, the process of internationalization carries with it certain 
challenges, whose level of demand decrease as the amount of internationalization 
experience increases. This implies that internationalization knowledge can be a key 
resource factor for INV growth and survival.  
 
Despite resources sometimes being conceptually used almost interchangeably with 
capabilities (see e.g. Barney, 1991), there is a growing body of literature which sees the 
two concepts as distinct and to a certain extent complimentary.   
 
2.2.5 Firm Capabilities  
 
In accordance with Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009), the impact (substantive) 
marketing, technological as well as management capabilities, networking capability and 
dynamic capabilities have on the outcomes of international new venture growth and 
survival is considered important also for the present study.   
 
Verona (1999, pp.133) builds on earlier RBV research when advocating that: 
“capabilities aim at deploying and coordinating resources”. This is based on the 
foundation whereby capabilities reside in intangible routines and are composed of 
knowledge. Barney (1991, pp.99), on the other hand,  finds that sustained competitive 
advantage relies on the capabilities of the firm to implement strategies that utilize 
internal strengths by responding to external opportunities, while simultaneously 
neutralizing external threats and avoiding internal weaknesses. In other words, firm 
performance is based on its inherent capabilities to strategically endow its unique set of 
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resources within the constraints of the operating environment. Zahra et al. (2006, 
pp.918), in turn, characterize dynamic capabilities as the abilities to reconfigure a firms 
resources and routines in the manner envisioned and deemed appropriate by its primary 
decision maker(s). As such they are near synonymous with resource fungibilitiy (2.2.4), 
but different from substantive capabilities, as explained next.    
 
Substantive and Dynamic Capabilities 
 
The present study builds on earlier research (Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, in 
separating dynamic capabilities from substantive capabilities. Substantive or “ordinary” 
capabilities are more apt in solving a specific problem or achieving an outcome (Winter, 
2003, pp.992), whereas dynamic capabilities oversee the rate of change of ordinary 
capabilities (Collis, 1994, cited in Winter, 2003, pp.992) The difference can be 
exemplified as follows: A novel routine for product development represents a 
substantive capability, but the ability to renew and re-assign organizational proficiencies 
across a variety of business requirements constitutes dynamic capability (Winter, 2003).  
 
A categorization by Verona, (1999, pp.135) supplements the above-stated: Substantive 
capabilities can include: (A) technological capabilities, e.g. R&D (product development 
expertise), manufacturing (process innovation), design, technological knowledge, (B) 
marketing capabilities, e.g. market research, strategic marketing management, product 
launch knowledge, and (C) management capabilities, e.g. managerial processes 
(communication, socialization) as well as managerial systems expertise (training, 
rewarding, brainstorming, employee empowerment). Dynamic capabilities, on the other 
hand, translate into the firm’s ability to renew competences and achieve congruence 
with the changing environment (Winter, 2003). This involves strategic management in 
appropriately adapting, integrating and reconfiguring internal and external 
organizational skills, resources, and functional competences (i.e. substantive 
capabilities) to match the requirements of a changing business environment. (Teece et 
al., 1997, pp.515).  
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Zott (2003) argues that firm-specific differences in dynamic capabilities are the reason 
why firms in the same industry experience differences in performance. He further 
advocates that despite having similar dynamic capabilities, firms may still perform to 
varying degrees. This is due to the firm-specific costs associated with dynamic 
capabilities as well as the differential timing in which they are utilized. His research 
also suggests that dynamic capabilities are central as a firm adapts to environmental 
(market) differences and that the costs associated with imitative and experimental 
adaptation promote the sustainability of differential intra-industry firm performance. In 
other words, adaptation to a business environment via dynamic capabilities incurs costs 
and coordinated investments can help create and sustain a competitive advantage.  
 
Some prior studies have outlined that the existence of capabilities has an impact on INV 
performance (e.g. Knight and Cavusgil, 2004), while others have noted the same on part 
of networking capability in particular (e.g. Mort and Weerawardena, 2006).    
 
Networking Capability 
 
For resource impoverished firms, an alternative to ownership based asset control is 
developing relationships with international network actors and through collaborative 
efforts exploiting and enhancing the firm’s own resource base as well as the resources 
of other network members (Ford et al., 1998, p.46). Business relationships consist of 
three different layers of substance: activity, resource and actor. Such a relationship is 
built on joint activities and inherently links together different activities. Consequently, 
as it develops, it connects various resource elements needed and controlled by the 
parties  which  results  in  resource  ties  between them.  A result  of  this  is  a  joint  pool  of  
resources or a “new resource”. An added result of the development of the relationship is 
the growing connectedness of the two actors. The resulting actor bonds have an impact 
on how the actors perceive, evaluate and treat each other. (Håkansson and Snehota, 
1995). Thus, network embedded business relationships can provide added leverage for 
the INV for growing and globalizing its activities (e.g. Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 
2009), provided of course that the firm has the required networking capability (Mort 
and Weerawardena, 2006) to navigate these relationships.  
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Building on the understanding that INVs suffer from resource poverty and strive to 
reach foreign markets swiftly (e.g. Oviatt and McDougall, 1994), Gabrielsson and 
Kirpalani (2004, pp.562) find that born globals must often engage in networks with 
more established companies. Because of resource shortages, INVs are unable to rely on 
wealth of assets through direct ownership and thus must utilize alternative modes of 
controlling many important assets (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994 pp.54). Oviatt and 
McDougall (2005) also define networks and knowledge as important factors in 
determining the speed of internationalization and characterize the networks’ capacity to 
moderate accelerated internationalization as a function of network size, network density 
and the strength of the ties between the actors. 
 
The  present  study  stresses  that  B2B  PMINVs  benefit  from  a  market-driven  approach,  
whereas B2C PMINVs from a brand-driven approach, when it comes to growth and 
survival (see 2.2.2). To establish a conceptual difference between the two approaches, it 
is useful to assess the capabilities prior research has attributed to them.    
    
Capabilities Conditional to Market Orientation  
 
Day (1994) identifies market sensing and customer-linking as distinctive capabilities 
and key performance drivers of market-oriented organizations whereas Urde (1999) 
argues that the underpinning performance driver for brand-oriented companies resides 
in brand competence. These concepts can be further supplemented from prior studies, 
for reasons of compatibility with the resource-based view of the firm.  
 
According to Day (1994, pp.43), market sensing captures the essence of market 
orientation and as defined by Kohli and Jaworski (1990, cited in Day, 1994, pp.43) is 
“the organization-wide generation of market intelligence dissemination of its 
intelligence across departments, and organization-wide responsiveness to it.” 
Additionally, it carries three behavioral components: customer orientation - the firm’s 
comprehension of the of the target market; competitor orientation - the firm’s 
understanding of the long-term capabilities of present and potential competitors; and 
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inter-functional coordination - the coordinated utilization of company resources to 
create greater customer value. (Narver and Slater, 1990 cited in Day, 1994 pp.43).  
 
Day defines customer linking (1994, pp.44-45) as the capability to create and manage 
close customer relationships. He explains that these relationships take a collaborative 
form based on a high level of coordination, participation in joint programs, and close 
communication links and are defined by their objective of joint problem solving.  
 
Urde (1999) argues that brand competence is the reflection of a brand-driven approach 
to the market and as such is related to the organization’s ability to create, develop and 
protect brands. He further stresses that, brand competence is reflected in how working 
with brands is an ongoing process of the creation of value and meaning for the firm. He 
concludes that it measures how the corporate brand expresses strategic intent and how 
well long-term resource development is aimed at strengthening brand identity and 
gaining brand equity. A prior study on global brand leaders has identified the capability 
of brand supportive dominant logic (Beverland et al., 2007) which effectively 
encompasses the notion of brand competence. The study concludes that brand 
supportive dominant logic is linked to a tendency to use a strong corporate brand, 
instead of a single or   product brands 
 
Brand supportive dominant logic means focusing the firm’s culture and structures 
around the corporate brand. These structures enable subtle adaptation and reinforcement 
of the brand and protect it from internal cost cutting and abuse. Central to this logic is to 
promote internal ownership of the brand, by e.g. aligning reward, training and hiring 
policies with the brand’s desired positioning, providing continuous ongoing 
communications about the brand and its customers and creating systems to ensure 
consistency in representation. (Beverland et al., 2007).  
 
In addition to the discussed firm factors, entrepreneurial orientation should also be 
assessed for its reported impact on growth and survival (Knight and Cavusgil, 2004)   
 
 49 
 
 
2.2.6 Entrepreneurial Orientation and Lateral Rigidity in Decision Making 
 
Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009) underline the trade-off between entrepreneurial 
orientation and lateral rigidity in decision making or the entrepreneurial “agility” for its 
potential impact on INV growth and survival. Thus, it also merits attention in the 
present study. Knight and Cavusgil (2004) posit that the growth and survival of an 
International  New  Venture  is  closely  related  to  the  entrepreneurial orientation of  the  
firm. The key firm-level characteristics that constitute entrepreneurial orientation 
include autonomy, innovativeness, risk taking, pro-activeness and competitive 
aggressiveness. How these traits influence firm performance through organizational 
practices, process and decision making activities is dependent on a variety of 
organizational factors as well as industry factors. (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). Thus, the 
extent a firm is entrepreneurially oriented is dependent on its environmental context and 
individual characteristics.  
 
Vaivio (1963) characterizes lateral rigidity as a company’s inherent knack of “sticking 
to the original plan”. When faced with a shock or impulse firms tend to make only 
minor adjustments to their behavior. Luostarinen (1979) expands and argues that a 
firm’s internationalization efforts are characterized by lateral rigidity toward new 
alternatives, but forward elasticity towards known alternatives. Thus, lateral rigidity 
should increase the probability of INV survival through risk aversion, but eventually 
decreases growth in foreign direction due to a lack of commitment toward 
internationalization (Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, pp.11).  
 
In a study examining the relationship between entrepreneurial orientation and export 
performance, Kuivalainen et al. (2007, pp. 263) find that, within the domain of 
entrepreneurial orientation, a higher degree of competitive aggressiveness was the only 
factor separating Born Global and Born International firms. Furthernore, INV 
entrepreneurs may be less laterally rigid in decision making due to their previous 
international experience and/or innovativeness which entail a more entrepreneurial 
orientation towards foreign markets. Therefore, the younger a company is at the stage of 
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its first international entry, the more entrepreneurial its orientation and “agile” its 
decision making. This translates into higher growth prospects but also increases the risk 
of non-survival. (Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, pp.12).  
 
Autio et al. (2000, pp.919) find that the earlier in their development firms enter 
international competition, the more rapidly they expand internationally. They label the 
trait; “the learning advantage of newness”, referring to the notion whereby young 
organizations adopt more original approaches to internationalization. They conclude 
that this relative flexibility over more established firms enables them to rapidly learn the 
competencies needed for sustained international expansion, albeit “the learning 
advantage of newness” loses its novelty as the firm ages. This is due to the learning 
impediments the firm develops when aging, which hamper the ability to successfully 
grow in new environments. Conceptually this behavior seems to resemble the laterally 
rigid decision making of more established firms, explained earlier. Thus, the learning 
advantage of newness has a tendency to “wear off “ with age. 
 
Lateral rigidity is a central concept in the traditional models of internationalization 
(2.1.1), and its mention brings the second part of the literature review into a conclusion 
near the starting point of the first. The next chapter introduces a theoretical framework, 
which synthesizes the discussed conceptual works for the benefit of empirical research. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework and Propositions 
 
While a conceptual tool for contrasting the growth phases and survival of consumer as 
well as industrial market product manufacturing international new ventures does not yet 
exist, prior findings and literature can be geared for this purpose. In the following, a 
theoretical framework and propositions, grounded in the reviewed literature, are 
forwarded to assist in the collection, structuring and analysis of empirical data.  
 
2.3.1 Theoretical Framework  
 
The theoretical framework of the study consists of antecedent factors and the outcomes 
of PMINV growth as well as survival i.e. the dependent factors, as depicted by Figure 4. 
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Prior research has found the outcomes of growth and survival to be conceptually 
distinct,  identified  their  relationship  as  complex  (e.g.  Sapienza  et  al.,  2006;  Delmar  et  
al., 2003; Romanelli, 1989), whilst recognizing a number of factors that potentially 
mediate a firm’s performance toward either outcome. The discussed growth and 
survival factors can be divided under industry factors (group 1 in Figure 4) and firm 
factors (groups 2, 3 and 4) in Figure 4. For reasons of comparability between different 
studies within the “Born Globals: Growth Stages and Survival”-research project (see 
1.1), factors from groups 1 to 3 and their division draw from a shared conceptual base 
(see Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, pp.8) Additionally, as the present study aims to 
supplement the research project from the perspective of product manufacturing 
international new ventures, a set of additional performance factors is included under 
group (4) in Figure 4. These include product factors, exclusive to INVs manufacturing 
physical products as opposed to services or intangibles, and market orientation factors 
to assess the potential differences between product manufacturing international new 
ventures from B2B and B2C markets.   
 
 
Figure 4. Framework for the growth and survival factors of PMINVs, modified from Gabrielsson and 
Gabrielsson (2009, pp.8).  
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It should be noted that the anteceding factors are not expected to impact growth and 
survival  to  an  equal  extent,  because  of  the  complex  relationship  of  the  two  outcomes  
(e.g. Sapienza et al., 2006; Delmar et al., 2003; Romanelli, 1989). Firm growth is 
synonymous with advancement along the projected PMINV growth phases (2.1.5) and 
survival with remaining in business. The following revisits the antecedent factors. 
 
(1) Industry factors (2.2.1) outline how aspects external to the firm such as industry 
growth (Vernon, 1966), industry penetration by foreign firms and seller concentration 
(Driffield and Munday, 2000) can be expected to influence the survival of a PMINV 
(Mudambi and Zahra, 2007, p.337). Additionally, the extent the industry is globally 
integrated as well the existence of global business enablers can be expected to have a 
positive influence on opportunities for global growth (Oviatt and McDougall, 1994; 
Shrader et al., 2000; Yip, 1989). They may also have a positive impact on survival 
(Mudambi and Zahra, 2007).  
 
(2) Previous studies indicate that firm resources and capabilities (2.2.4; 2.2.5) may 
influence the survival and growth of PMINVs. They include: age at initiation of foreign 
business (Autio et al., 2000), managerial experience (Reuber and Fischer, 1999; 
Eriksson et al., 2000), resource fungibility (Sapienza et al., 2006) and different 
substantive as well as dynamic capabilities (Winter, 2003; Teece et al., 1997). Network 
embedded business relationships (Ford et al., 1998), in turn, provide means for a 
PMINV to overcome some of its relative resource shortcomings when expanding 
internationally (Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, pp.11), albeit not without the 
required networking capability (Mort and Weerawardena, 2006). Finally, government 
support has also been noted for a potentially positive influence on survival (Mudambi 
and Zahra, 2007) and the same has been asserted of the relationship between the amount 
of firm resources and growth (Laanti et al., 2006). 
 
(3) The trade-off between entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996) and 
lateral rigidity (e.g. Vaivio, 1963; Luostarinen, 1979) as a growth and survival factor 
(2.2.6) also merits attention due to prior discoveries. Knight and Cavusgil (2004) find 
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that entrepreneurial orientation is an enabler of internationalization and high business 
performance. Autio et al., (2000, pp.919) conclude that the organizational flexibility of 
new firms enables them to rapidly learn the competencies needed for sustained growth 
in international direction. Thus, the younger a company is at the stage of its first 
international entry, the more entrepreneurial its orientation and “agile” its decision 
making. A high level of entrepreneurial orientation might translate into higher growth 
prospects but it can also increase the risk of non-survival, owing to an elevated 
willingness to take risks, whereas increased lateral rigidity can raise survival chances at 
the expense of growth prospects. (Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, pp.12).  
 
 (4) In reference to physical product factors (2.2.3), country market product adaptation  
has been credited with a positive influence on firm growth in international markets 
(Calantone et al., 2004) whereas product scope optimization has been found to have a 
positive impact on innovative small manufacturer survival and growth (Boter and 
Holmquist, 1996). Regarding market orientation factors (2.2.2) in prior research, B2B 
INVs have exhibited traits attributable to market-oriented firms whereas B2C INV have 
exhibited traits attributable to a brand-oriented firms (Luostarinen and Gabrielsson, 
2006). Thus, capabilities inherent to market-oriented organizations i.e. market sensing 
and customer linking (Day, 1994) potentially influence growth and survival of B2B 
PMINVs positively. Moreover, brand supportive dominant logic (Beverland et al., 
2007), attributable to brand-oriented firms (Urde, 1999) potentially influences growth 
and survival of B2C PMINVs positively.  
 
2.3.2 Propositions for Empirical Study 
 
The  synthesis  of  prior  works  that  is  synonymous  with  the  study  thus  far  serves  as  a  
platform for making propositions that are expected to emerge from the empirical 
research to follow. Propositions one to three are based on those of Gabrielsson and 
Gabrielsson (2009, pp.12-14) and the novelty of the present study is in concentrating the 
empirical focus of the propositions toward product manufacturing international new 
ventures. Proposition four, in-turn, specifically builds on how earlier research reflects 
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the growth and survival of PMINVS. All four should prove a useful base for contrasting 
empirical data between PMINVs from consumer and industrial markets.  
 
Product Manufacturing International New Venture Growth   
 
Prior works seem to be fairly unanimous in stressing that (PM)INVs are disadvantaged 
due to resource limitations (e.g. Oviatt and McDougall, 1994). Therefore, the amount of 
resources (Laanti, 2006), their interchangeability (fungibility) between alternate 
uses/environments (Sapienza et al., 2006) as well as stock and stream managerial 
experience (Reuber and Fischer 1999) and their variety (Eriksson et al., 2000) are in 
demand. It should be noted that, resources in themselves do not provide growth for the 
(PM)INV, unless it possesses the capabilities for deploying and coordinating them 
(Verona, 1999). Earlier research stipulates that long-term growth can be obtained only if 
these capabilities are of substantive (technology, marketing, management) and dynamic 
nature (Zahra et al., 2006). Also, the firm should be entrepreneurially oriented (Knight 
and Cavusgil, 2004) and have a sufficient amount of managerial experience to shun 
lateral rigidity in decision making (Luostarinen, 1979), which can limit the search for 
novel growth opportunities and refer the firm towards known alternatives.  
 
If the firm internationalizes early on, it may benefit from the learning advantage of 
newness and straightforward decision making, smooth information flow and novel 
approaches to foreign expansion (Autio et al., 2000). Industries characterized by high 
growth and a relatively high level of globalization drivers are expected to offer greater 
opportunities for the (PM)INV (Yip, 1989; Oviatt and McDougall, 1994). These 
industry and firm factors are expected to be crucial mediators of the commercial and 
global breakthrough (2.1.5). They can also be expected to prompt the start of global 
rationalization (2.1.5), but in a reverse manner. In other words, as industry growth 
decreases, the need for firms to rationalize activities globally is enhanced. Additionally, 
global rationalization is also driven by the growing needs for resource alignment 
(Douglas and Graig, 1989) and greater global seller concentration (Driffield and 
Munday, 2000). Consequently, the following may be postulated:  
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Proposition 1a: The commercial and global breakthrough of a Product Manufacturing 
International New Venture is positively related to the industry growth rate, the 
globalizing enablers in the industry, the amount of resources and managerial 
experience, the existence of substantive and dynamic capabilities and a high level of 
entrepreneurial orientation in decision making (Adopted from Gabrielsson and 
Gabrielsson, 2009, pp.13).  
 
Proposition 1b: The global rationalization of a Product Manufacturing International 
New Venture is positively related to higher global seller concentration in the industry, 
pressures for resource alignment, and a low level of both industry growth rate and 
entrepreneurial orientation in decision making (Adopted from Gabrielsson and 
Gabrielsson, 2009, pp.13).  
 
Product Manufacturing International New Venture Survival  
 
Upon entering foreign markets, the (PM)INV needs to adapt (Sapienza et al., 2006) this 
calls for substantial resource commitments (Zott, 2003). These investments are likely to 
be particularly high for (PM)INVs, because of the liabilities of newness (Stinchcombe, 
1965) and foreignness (Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997). Sapienza et al. (2006) advocate, 
that for INVs, internationalization decreases the probability of survival after 
international market entry. Resource and Capabilities are also crucial for survival. For 
instance, in the short-term, international new ventures can secure survival if they have 
the capabilities needed to obtain financing such as venture capital (Gabrielsson et al., 
2004) or other outlays from e.g. the government (Mudambi and Zahra, 2007). In the 
long-term, however, accelerated internationalization involves substantial risks of a 
diverse nature (Shrader et al., 2000). This is in-line with how the traditional 
internationalization models depict foreign expansion (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; 
Luostarinen, 1979). Consequently, it is less risky to follow an incremental path to 
multinational operations than to jump over the advocated stages and internationalize 
with an accelerated pace.  
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It also seems reasonable to assert that with regards to the (PM)INV, the lower the 
entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996) and the more lateral rigidity 
(Luostarinen, 1979) influences decision making, the higher the probability of survival. 
The impact aging has in changing decision making, noted by Autio et al. (2000) 
suggests that lateral rigidity increases with age and thus international new ventures face 
the greatest risk of failure in their initial internationalization efforts (Scott and Bruce, 
1987). Also, Mudambi and Zahra (2007) suggest that a positive relation exists between 
industry growth rate and the survival of (PM)INVs. Thus, the following is proposed:      
 
Proposition 2: The survival of a Product Manufacturing International New Venture is 
positively related to the industry growth rate, the amount of resources and managerial 
experience, the existence of substantive and dynamic capabilities, and a lower level of 
entrepreneurial orientation (Adopted from Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009, pp.13).  
 
Product Manufacturing International New Venture Survival and Growth 
 
Judging by propositions one and two it seems difficult to determine under what 
conditions do (PM)INVs have the highest probability of both rapid growth and survival, 
since the two ends seem to require different means, in terms of decision making. Prior 
research notes the central role of capabilities in this regard and in particular that of 
networking capability (Mort and Weerawardena, 2006). Networks have been found to 
enhance the growth rate of international new ventures by accentuating opportunities and 
helping  them  establish  credibility,  which  can  lead  to  strategic  alliances  and  other  co-
operative strategies (Oviatt and McDougall, 2005). Moreover, INVs are better able to 
globalize  their  activities  without  making  substantial  endowments  and  facing  
unnecessary risk, by utilizing their activity links, resource ties and actor bonds (e.g. 
Håkanson and Snehota, 1995, pp.26). Thus, for the INV, networking capability is 
integral in exploiting as well as enhancing its own set of resources (Ford et al., 1998 pp. 
46; Gabrielsson and Kirpalani, 2004). Not only has networking been underlined for its 
importance to the INV along various stages (Laanti et al., 2006), but also for more 
established MNEs where, in addition to external networks, networks within the firm 
exist (Andersson et al., 2007). Thus, it seems reasonable to postulate:  
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Proposition 3: The commercial breakthrough, global breakthrough, global 
rationalization and survival of a Product Manufacturing International New Venture are 
positively related to high networking capabilities (Adopted from Gabrielsson and 
Gabrielsson, 2009, pp.14). 
 
Boter and Holmquist (1996) conclude that a narrow product scope facilitates the high 
performance of innovative SME manufacturers that operate internationally. They assert 
that, a niche focus enables e.g. a functional management structure, as well as the re-
construction of production in more cost-efficient locations when required. On the other 
hand, according to e.g. Kazanjian and Drazin (1990a, pp.141) a firm must diversify its 
product offering as it approaches resource maturity in order to offset increasingly global 
competition. Yet, owing to the resource constraints of an INV (e.g. Oviatt and 
McDougall, 1994), it is doubtful that a PMINV could diversify its product offering to 
entirely unrelated product or service domains whilst negotiating the challenges of 
accelerated internationalization. This leads the present study to postulate:  
 
Proposition 4a: A Product Manufacturing International New Venture provides a 
narrow product offering during the early phases of growth and a wider but related 
product offering during the latter phases of growth.   
 
Calantone et al. (2004) find evidence that the level of product adaptation has a positive 
impact on international business performance for small and medium-sized 
organizations, whereas Douglas and Craig (1989) argue that as the company reaches 
resource maturity, excess product adaptations become a hindrance, mainly due to 
increased costs from duplicate country-market functions.  A generic division between 
B2B and B2C markets draws from the idea whereby the former calls for predominantly 
customer-specific product adaptations and the former predominantly country market-
specific adaptations (e.g. Anderson and Narus, 2004). While the tastes and preferences 
of consumers vary across countries, the country of origin of an industrial customer has 
little bearing on the extent of required product adaptation. Instead, product adaptations 
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in industrial markets are made in response to the differences in manufacturing processes 
across buyers (Ford 1980, 339-340). Thus, the following can be proposed:  
 
Proposition 4b: A B2C Product Manufacturing International New Venture does 
considerable country market product adaptation during early growth phases, but offers 
more standardized products in latter stages, whereas a B2B Product Manufacturing 
International New Venture does less country market product adaptation throughout.   
 
Finally, due to the inherent differences of industrial and consumer markets (e.g. 
Anderson and Narus, 2004; Ford, 1980; Gummeson and Polese, 2009; Von Hippel, 
1978), a brand-driven market orientation for consumer market PMINVs can be expected 
to yield a positive influence on growth and survival for whereas a market-driven market 
orientation on part of industrial market PMINVs can be expected to hold the same 
outcome (Urde, 1999). Consequently, for B2B PMINVs market sensing and customer 
linking constitute central capabilities (Day, 1994). For B2C PMINVs in turn, brand 
supportive dominant logic (Beverland et al., 2007) is an important capability. As a 
result, the following can be proposed:    
 
Proposition 4c: The growth and survival of a B2B Product Manufacturing International 
New Venture are positively influenced by a predominantly market-driven approach, 
while the growth and survival of a B2C Product Manufacturing International New 
Venture are positively influenced by a predominantly brand-driven approach.    
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3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The build up to the empirical part of the study suggests that theory itself is something 
that guides and influences the collection of data i.e. research is geared to answer 
questions that are posed by theoretical considerations. In this type of inquiry the 
investigator deduces hypotheses or propositions from existing works of literature, and 
subjects them to empirical scrutiny in a process often referred to as deduction. (Ghauri 
and Gronhaug, 2005, pp.16). Deductive theory represents the most common 
understanding of the relationship between research and theory. Alternatively, one can 
view theory as something that occurs after the collection of data associated with a given 
research problem. A thought process where theory is the outcome of research is often 
referred to as induction. Despite their apparent polarity induction and deduction are not 
mutually exclusive. In fact, research in social sciences can benefit from a consensus of 
inductive and deductive thinking (Bryman and Bell 2003, pp.11-12), which is precisely 
what the present study aims for. 
 
The following section outlines the rationale behind the choice of a qualitative multiple-
case study approach as the most opportune method of research. The assessment firstly 
argues the methodological approach by contrasting the contemporary relationship 
between research and theory in the relevant realm of research. This leads to the 
selection of the multiple-case study method for data collection. The section is complete 
with an account of the sources used to draw empirical data and the quality of research.     
 
3.1 Research Design  
 
Qualitative methods enable study of issues in depth and detail. More importantly, 
considering the objectives of the present research (see 1.3), they are useful in examining 
a phenomenon about which little is known. (Marcshan-Piekkari and Welch, 2004). An 
inquiry into an emergent field of study where few definitive hypotheses exist and little 
is known about the nature of the phenomenon, is often considered exploratory research 
and it is generally argued that qualitative methods are most useful for this type of 
inquiry (Ghauri and Kronhaug, 2005, pp.111), where findings emerge from three kinds 
of data collection (1) in-depth open-ended interviews (2) direct observation, and (3) 
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written documents. (Patton, 2002). The qualitative researcher can choose from a number 
of methods for collection data, including: historical review, focus groups and case 
studies (Ghauri and Kronhaug, 2005). To ensure the most opportune choice, the 
following assesses the relationship between research and theory in the research setting. 
 
3.1.1 Method of Analysis - Analytic Induction  
 
The early advocates of INV growth and survival frameworks (e.g. Gabrielsson and 
Gabrielsson, 2009) stress the importance to construct theory where none exists, which 
suggests an inductive approach. However, as the theoretical discourse related to the 
research problem lends itself to a conceptual framework and one has been synthesized 
from literature to assist in data examination, the approach of the study is deductive at 
first. But because the investigator sets out to test the framework and set of propositions 
deduced from theory, whilst allowing empirically based restructuring of the preliminary 
theoretical stance in order to contribute theoretically, the analytical approach is referred 
to as analytic induction (e.g. Taylor and Bogdan, 1984, cited in, Patton 2002, pp.454).    
 
In contrast to grounded theory (see e.g. Glaser and Strauss, 1967, cited in Patton 2002, 
pp.454) analytic induction, commences with a researcher’s deduced propositions or 
theory-derived hypotheses and is a method for verifying these propositions and theories 
based on qualitative data. The process, which is often associated with a case study 
method  of  qualitative  data  collection,  is  exemplary  of  qualitative  analysis  that  is  first  
deductive and then inductive. For example, the researcher starts by examining the data 
in terms of theory-derived sensitizing concepts or applying a theoretical framework 
developed by someone else. During or after the deductive analysis the researcher 
attempts to look at the data anew for undiscovered patterns and newly emergent 
understandings (inductive analysis) (Patton 2002).  
 
To accommodate any themes emerging from the empirical data, the research 
propositions of the present study are revised and the main findings inserted back into 
relevant  contemporary  theoretical  discourse.  However,  before  the  potential  of  analytic  
induction can be fully realized, the investigator needs to collect and structure empirical 
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data. The case study method (see e.g. Yin, 2003), often associated with analytic 
induction (e.g. Patton, 2002) seems the most opportune method here.                
 
3.1.2 Method of Data Collection - Multiple-case Study    
 
Yin (2003) identifies characteristics of a research setting that is apt for a case study 
approach. He argues that a researcher can make good use of a case-study method when: 
(a) the focus of the study is to answer (axiological) “how” and “why” questions, the (b) 
researcher(s) cannot manipulate the behavior of those involved in the study and the (c) 
boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and the context. The research 
problem and setting of the present study echo these principles rather strongly:  
 
“How can International New Ventures from the physical product market survive and 
grow to become truly global companies considering their limited resources to address 
global market opportunities?”  
 
Addressing the research problem is essentially a macro-economical query. It calls for 
scrutiny over certain types of firms within the loosely defined global market 
environment and draws from a presumed difference between organizations, which also 
speaks for a case study method (Miles and Hubermann, 1994). The focus is on a 
complex social phenomenon in its real-time context. There is some evidence of the 
phenomenon, as witnessed by related works, but the boundaries between the 
phenomenon and its context are not clear. Boyd et al. (1985, cited in Ghauri and 
Kronhaug, 2005, pp.214) stress that one way to analyse data collected through case 
study methods, is to search for commonalities across multiple cases, whereas Baxter 
and Jack (2008, pp.550) argue that whenever a study contains more than a single case, a 
multiple-case study approach is required.  
 
The research setting (see 1.3) implies that international new ventures are different from 
“mainstream” firms when it comes to growth and survival. Additionally, product 
manufacturing international new ventures are supposedly subject to different variables 
of growth and survival than INVs in general, whereas consumer and industrial market 
PMINVs also potentially differ in this aspect. Consequently, the research is geared to 
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explain why this is  the case and how it manifests into reality through the behaviour of 
the studied group of PMINV case firms. The environment where this takes place 
provides firms with certain prospects and restrictions. International new ventures are 
presumably disadvantaged in making use of these opportunities in relation to their more 
established (MNE) competition because of their inherent liabilities (2.1.4). Yet, they 
also carry some advantages over more established firms due to the specific nature of 
their resources (2.2.4), capabilities (2.2.5) and entrepreneurial agility (2.2.6) which 
potentially enable rapid internationalization and growth.  
 
Considering the above, the method of research needs to build on differences between 
groups of firms and limiting the focus to an analysis of one case firm and focusing on 
internal factors as units of analysis seems insufficient. The scope needs to be broadened 
into the relationships between firms that share enough characteristics to be grouped 
under banners relevant for contrasting purposes. As the scope of research needs to 
include several firms and their behaviour in the set environment, the internal, external 
and output factors that presumably mediate growth and survival are the units of 
analysis. Thus, multiple cases need to be constructed around shared units of analysis to 
enable comparison between the cases. Campell (1975, cited in Ghauri and Kronhaug, 
2005, pp.215) and Yin (2003, pp.26-27) refers to such an approach as pattern matching, 
where information from several cases can be related to a priori assumptions. That is to 
say, theoretical assumptions and propositions can be confirmed by systematic patterns 
found from the data and statistical testing is not a pre-requisite for conclusions.     
 
3.2 Data Collection and Quality of Research  
 
In order to adhere to the principles of pattern matching, four currently active case firms 
were selected for analysis. Two of them supply industrial markets, namely IonPhasE 
LTD and Vacon PLC. Avant Tecno LTD caters for both the industrial and consumer 
markets, whereas Innohome LTD supplies the consumer market. The number of case 
firms is brought to five with the addition of Audibit LTD, a B2B/B2C manufacturer 
inactive since 2004. Table 4 provides a summary of the case firms. The firms were 
selected from a pre-defined population based on the following criteria, partly shared by 
the “Born Globals: Growth Stages and Survival” research (shared criteria =*):  
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(a) The firm is a Born International (at least 25% of total sales accumulated from 
foreign markets within the first three years of commercial operation*), or  
(b) The  firm  is  a  Born  Global  (same  as  above  and  at  least  25%  of  total  sales  
accumulated from markets outside the home continent within the first six years 
of commercial operation*), and 
(c) The firm manufactures physical products for industrial or consumer markets as 
its main source of revenue (at least two cases from each category), and 
(d) The firm is based in Finland, and 
(e) The firm is an independent entity i.e. not a subsidiary of another company*, and 
(f) The firm is active or inactive (at least one case from the latter category) 
 
Table 4. Description of case firms  
 Innohome IonPhasE Avant Tecno Vacon Audibit 
Primary Customer 
Market(s) 
Consumer Industrial Consumer and 
industrial  
Industrial Consumer and 
industrial 
Operational Span 
and year of initial 
sales.* 
Active since  
2005 
First sales: 
2007   
Active since 
 2001 
First sales: 
2005 
Active since 
1991 
First sales: 
1991 
Active since 
1993 
First sales: 
1995   
Active between  
1998  - 2003 
First sales:  
1999 
Vision Global from 
Inception  
Global from 
Inception 
Global from 
Inception 
Global from 
Inception 
Global from 
Inception 
Product(s) Appliances for 
home safety 
Conductive 
polymers 
Wheeled 
loaders 
Frequency 
Converters 
VoIP handsets 
Size Micro Small Large Large - 
Internationalization 
Degree** 
2009: ca. 50%  2009: ca. 50%   2009 : 52% 2009: 45% 2002: 85% 
Globalization 
Degree***  
2009: 0%  2009: ca. 50%  2009: 15% 2009: 35% 2002: 5% 
International new 
venture path 
Born 
International 
Born Global  Born 
International 
Born Global Born 
International 
*Active since = registration year **share of foreign sales within Europe ***share of sales outside Europe 
 
Semi-structured open-ended interviews (see e.g. Ghauri and Kronhaug, 2005, pp.132) 
conducted with case firm founders and/or executives, were chosen as the sources of 
primary data (see e.g. Ghauri and Kronhaug, 2005, pp. 102-106) for reasons of 
practicality and availability. For the case questionnaire utilized in the interviews see 
Appendix A. A total of nine interviews between eight executives were conducted and 
recorded between 02.06.2009 and 12.4.2010 resulting in ca. 17h of raw data. Secondary 
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data (see e.g. Ghauri and Kronhaug, 2005, pp. 91-101) for the study were drawn from a 
variety of sources. For a detailed account of source material refer to Appendix B. 
 
The conventional case study approach (e.g. Yin, 2003; Stake, 1995 cited in Baxter and 
Jack, 2008, pp.545) is primarily based on a constructivist paradigm, which claims that 
truth is relative and that it is dependent on one’s perspective. The paradigm “recognizes 
the importance of the subjective human creation of meaning, but does not reject outright 
some notion of objectivity”.(Baxter and Jack, 2008, pp.545). The present study also 
adheres to a combination of subjectivist and objectivist views. Its view of the social 
world lends from the objectivist perspective whereby there exists a universal truth of the 
relationship between the outcomes of INV growth and survival and their antecedent 
factors, but also recognizes that empirical evidence of the phenomenon is prone to 
subjective influence (see e.g. Morgan and Smircich 1980, pp.492-495).  In taking this 
view the researcher assumes that the relationship between the outcomes of growth and 
survival  as  well  as  their  antecedent  factors,  can  to  an  extent,  be  depicted  through  the  
subjective experiences and words of firm executives whom continuously adapt to 
changes in their environment, as explained in more detail in the following.  
 
Executive Interviews as Primary Data Sources 
 
In relying on executive interviews as the primary sources of data, the present study 
assumes a view of the empirical world resembling that which Morgan and Smircich 
(1980, pp.495) term: “Humans as Adaptive Agents”. That is to say, the interviewed 
case-firm managers are considered the archetypes of the companies they represent and 
they are thought to exist in an interactive relationship with their world - the “global 
economic environment”. The case-firms interact with their environment by way of the 
managers’ actions and insights and the environment, in turn, exerts its influence on the 
firms. The nature of this exchange is a competitive one as the setting assumes that case-
firms seek to interpret and exploit the economic environment as best they can in order to 
fuel growth and survive amid e.g. competitive pressure from other firms and 
environmental threats. By studying these firms’ responses to environmental constraints 
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and enablers one can better understand how the select antecedent factors influence 
PMINV growth and survival.  
 
Generalizability Validity and Reliability of the Study    
 
Yin (2003) underlines three commonly used tests that have been found effective in 
ensuring the quality of exploratory case study research.   
 
Construct validity is achieved by ensuring that the correct operational measures are 
utilized for the studied concepts (Yin, 2003, pp.34). As the qualitative investigator often 
collects and interprets data according to his self-reference criteria when operating in an 
unfamiliar setting (Cateora and Ghauri, 2000, cited in Ghauri and Kronhaug, 2005, 
pp.112) there are risks of subjectivity in interpretation. Yin (2003, pp.36) stresses that 
by using multiple sources of evidence and submitting drafts of the case reports to key 
informants for review, construct validity can be enhanced. Thus, the case reports of the 
present study make use of extensive secondary data (see Appendix B) and upon 
completion were sent to the interviewees for verification of accuracy.    
 
External validity is enhanced by identifying a domain to which the study’s findings can 
be generalized (Yin, 2003, pp.34). In case studies overall one should exert caution when 
generalizing the results beyond the studied cases (Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp.224-228). 
However, the popular notion whereby case study results are inept for statistical 
generalization does not hold for analytical generalization. In analytical generalization, 
the investigator attempts to generalize a specific set of results to some broader theory 
and in multiple case studies can make use of replication, thereby enhancing external 
validity. An inquiry into the differences and similarities between cases can either predict 
similar results between the cases i.e. literal replication or contrasting results but for 
predictable reasons i.e. theoretical replication (Yin 2003).  
 
Based  on  its  relationship  with  extant  theory,  the  present  study  adheres  more  to  
theoretical replication. The growth and survival factors for case firms are expected to 
vary pending on whether a given case firm operates on the industrial or consumer 
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market.  Yin  (2003,  pp.48)  also  stresses  that  in  multiple-case  studies  the  theoretical  
framework becomes the vehicle for generalizing to additional cases and if some 
empirical  cases  do  not  function  as  predicted,  modifications  need  to  be  made  to  it  
accordingly. Therefore, in the present study the research propositions are revised after 
empirical scrutiny for later empirical compliance and to ensure external validity.  
 
A threat for external validity resides in the fact  that  for a study aiming to contrast  the 
difference a firms customer market has on growth and survival, the research population 
is somewhat weighted in favor of industrial market firms. Of the active case firms, only 
Innohome supplies solely the consumer market. Avant Tecno supplies both B2C and 
B2B markets. However, despite providing for e.g. agricultural segments, Avant Tecno’s 
produce is not of “ingredient” nature nor do intermediaries make any modifications to 
the  products  before  sale  and  their  primary  function  in  the  channel  is  that  of  a  sales  
outlet. Furthermore, inactive case firm Avant Tecno also catered for both the consumer 
and industrial markets during its time in operation.  
 
Reliability stems from ensuring that upon repeating the operations of the study, any 
subsequent investigator would arrive at the same results as the original investigator. 
Thus, detailed procedural documentation is essential. (Yin, 2003). In compliance with 
good practice all of the interviews conducted for the case reports of the present study 
were transcribed for the benefit of coherence. Secondary data are largely drawn from 
publicly available transparent (and accounted for) sources such as financial statements 
and annual reports. Photocopies were made of any hard copy research documentation 
such as interview notes and material received from case firms, and stored separate from 
the originals. All electronic research documentation was also backed-up and stored in 
multiple locations. Appendices A and B provide the reader with the general interview 
questionnaire and a source material index respectively.   
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4 EMPIRICAL CASES, ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
The first part of the section forwards five individual case descriptions, based on 
Innohome LTD IonPhasE LTD, Avant Tecno LTD, Vacon PLC and Audibit LTD 
respectively, and is followed by a cross-case analysis detailing differences and 
similarities between the single-cases. The empirical part of the study is completed with 
a summary of how the differences between consumer and industrial markets effected 
growth and survival as well as a revision of the research propositions.   
 
4.1 Single-case Descriptions 
 
The following details the five individual cases subject to empirical analysis. The single-
case descriptions provide the grounds for pattern matching (see 3.1.2) between the 
cases. The chosen format of case reporting is story-based (see e.g. Baxter and Jack, 
2008), where emphasis is placed on outlining the different phases of organizational 
development the case firms have experienced. Each case report follows a chronological 
timeline and the antecedent factors for growth and survival, drawn from theory, are 
discussed in relation to the different phases of organizational development. Appendix C 
provides definitions of the governmental organizations mentioned in the case reports.   
 
4.1.1 Case Innohome - B2C Born International 
 
Espoo-based Innohome Ltd was registered in 2005 by innovator Matti Myllymäki. After 
an initial planning and product development period of some two years Myllymäki 
recruited former colleague Pertti Haavisto as Managing Director in order to assume the 
position of Technical Director himself. Following a successful commercialization of the 
founder’s innovation, based on increasing household safety, domestic sales started in 
2007. The company produces stand-alone high-tech safety add-ons or “guards” for 
hazard-prone home appliances such as stoves and washing machines. These safety add-
ons are powered by smart adapters, which reduce energy consumption, protect 
household appliances against misuse and prevent fires and water damage.   
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Innohome customers reside in the consumer market, which is catered through a variety 
of re-sellers including agents, distributors and major retailers. The firm employs four 
people and everything but the core functions of product development, partnering, 
strategic management and marketing are outsourced. Manufacturing is done by a Polish 
subcontractor, while an Estonian partner handles logistics and a Finnish service-
provider takes care of helpdesk and after-sales services domestically. The vision to 
globalize operations has served as a guideline since the inception of the firm, with the 
recognition that the niche market of high-tech home safety appliances would prove too 
small locally and even regionally. The company adheres to a Born International status.  
 
The Development of Innohome in Phases 
 
Scrutiny over the developmental milestones of Innohome suggests that the company’s 
developments to date can be attributed to two phases: the introductory phase, fuelled by 
domestic sales and a commercial breakthrough, achieved through growth in the Swedish 
market.  The firm has also experienced two survival crises. 
 
Figure 5. Growth path and survival crises of Innohome 
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The Introductory Phase: Prior to registering the company in 2005, the founder spent 
some two years developing product ideas. When Pertti Haavisto, a former colleague of 
the founder, joined the company in 2007, the first products were being finalized and the 
rest of the current portfolio followed in quick succession. The strategic aim since has 
been to keep the organization thin and focused on sales, marketing and product 
development: “So everything is outsourced, except ourselves. So, factoring, customer 
service, logistics, even some part of development.”- MD, Innohome.  Before deciding 
on the product line, the company did considerable market research, which prompted a 
focus on fire and water damage prevention. The first sales were made to various Finnish 
retailers in 2007. Innohome was quick to build on the commercial potential of the 
products and invested heavily in marketing early on.   
 
The aim in the introductory phase was to utilize the relatively large production capacity 
of a domestic subcontractor, and thereby maintain a comprehensive stock of products. A 
key objective of the domestic push was to learn the market of home-safety appliances 
and use it  as a frame of reference in the upcoming expansion to foreign countries.  To 
support this “learning by doing” approach, Innohome began partnering efforts with 
public organizations, such as government subsidized financial institutions and business 
support agencies. The acquired benefits ranged from market data to legal assistance in 
drawing up contracts. Public financiers also provided some start-up grants.  
 
During the introductory phase, the firm realized that convincing re-sellers of the 
products’ potential was not difficult but because of their unprecedented nature, the end-
users needed to be educated of the products’ functionality. Innohome racked up total 
sales of ca. 85 000 € within the first two months of commercial operation, drawing the 
year 2007 to a close. The sales were facilitated by an intensive marketing campaign, 
featuring both a TV advert and personal selling to domestic re-sellers and retailers. 
Consequently, Innohome was able to contract a considerable amount of retailers and re-
sellers with a large overall coverage of the Finnish market, but sales remained relatively 
composed.  Re-sellers  were  not  able  to  move  the  product  off  the  shelf  as  quickly  as  
expected, which resulted in a delay to the follow-up for the first batch of deliveries.  
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After a promising start to commercial operations, disaster struck for Innohome as its 
manufacturer went into severe financial difficulties and was unable to continue 
production, resulting in a halt for business in early 2008. As the firm failed to reach pre-
meditated sales targets due to a shortage of products, investors were unimpressed and 
cut off financial support. The resulting financial crisis severely dug into the firm’s 
capability to finance much needed further mass marketing campaigns.  
 
The resulting survival crisis is one the company is still to fully negotiate. However, due 
to some corrective measures made in 2008, it was able to stay in business. Replacing the 
operationally strapped contract manufacturer, based in Finland, became a priority and 
Innohome turned to a firm with a manufacturing site in Poland. Innohome executives 
were convinced by the capacity and quality of the Polish facility and a re-location of 
manufacturing soon followed. 2008 produced year-end sales of some 60 000 € a 33% 
decrease from the year before, which pronounced by the fact that Innhome was active 
for only two months in 2007. Yet, it was the managerial actions taken to secure the 
business more than yearly returns that were to prove decisive for Innohome. 
 
Commercial Breakthrough and Foreign Growth: The  difficulties  ensuing  from  the  
incident with the initial manufacturer meant the company had very limited finances to 
pursue foreign markets with. Finland was meant to be the spring board for not only 
testing the market, but financially as well. The domestic experience had demonstrated 
the considerable expenses that went into marketing the products and the financially 
strapped company decided to look for support in going international. This resulted in 
the  formulation  of  an  export  group  with  a  few  other  domestic  SMEs  in  a  bid  to  pool  
resources for the joint objective of internationalization. Consequently, a governmentally 
subsidized organization appointed an experienced sales manager to promote the 
interests of the six members of the group. For a resource constrained SME this had the 
benefit of risk sharing albeit with the disadvantages of having to make due with only a 
share of the commercial push. For Innohome, the pros quickly outweighed the cons.  
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The firm scrapped an initial interest towards the German market in favour of the 
Swedish market as the export group manager was able to open up opportunities there. 
From an array of products, Stove Alarm and Stove Guard were eventually selected to 
spearhead the foray to Sweden. Business leads from the export group helped Innohome 
establish ties with a number of medium to large-sized distributors in the Swedish market 
towards the end of 2008 and fund the recruitment of a sales staff. With Swedish 
distributors in-place some required product adaptations were made and export 
commenced in early 2009. In addition to making country-specific adjustments to the 
packaging and other product peripherals, the company released Swedish and English 
versions of the web-pages and product information therein.  
 
The early experiences from Sweden proved so promising, that the company decided to 
(re-) position its strategy to focus on the Swedish market more fundamentally and 
search for agent-type of representation from other countries and continents. While 
customer service in Finland was outsourced to a service provider, the Swedish 
distributors were able to provide customer service for Swedish consumers.   
  
The results of these manoeuvres have been mixed but predominantly positive. The 
export to Sweden in 2008 accounted for ca. 50% of revenues and is largely responsible 
for a considerable improvement from the year before in overall sales. In 2009 Innohome 
is expecting to double the total sales tally of 2008. Despite promising inquiries and 
leads from other countries in Europe such as the UK, Austria and Belgium and countries 
from other  continents  such  as  the  US,  Canada,  China,  Australia  and  South  Africa,  the  
company remains rooted to Finland and Sweden. Representation in Finland was in-fact 
solidified because of the Swedish expansion, as some of the foreign distributors also 
cater for the Finnish market. The Norwegian and UK market were added to the array of 
foreign markets also due to the international coverage of the Swedish distributors.  
 
Despite the promising advances, Innohome executives stress that the company is “not 
out of the woods yet” as they had been caught off-guard by how much even the nearby 
markets differ in characteristics such as installation standards and vocabulary. The 
original plan of learning an export market primarily through domestic operations has 
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been revised based on the Swedish experience:“...in Sweden we found that we, 
originally thought that it's possible that we have only one product there and it's plug 
and play and everything is fine, but we found that the market was much more, colourful, 
much more different, so it was, some kind of crisis that this was not so easy, and 
meaning that we got bad reaction from customers because we were, our product was 
not ready actually, and we, we didn't have time to make it.” - MD, Innohome.    
 
The  repercussions  of  the  failure  of  the  initial  contract  manufacturer  continue  to  deter  
additional capital investments to the company. This obviously severely limits the means 
available to pursue further growth and the company currently has to re-invest sales 
revenues for this purpose. Financial constraints continue to be accentuated by a global 
economic downturn, which has set a negative financial undertone for most of the time 
Innohome has been commercially active.     
 
Overall, Innohome stands at the very early stages of commercial breakthrough. This is 
underlined by the acquisition of several accounts from Sweden, whom have helped 
secure the business financially and are largely responsible for the considerable upturn in 
revenues from the year before. Furthermore, they have provided additional coverage in 
Finland and potentially Norway and the UK. However, the firm continues to be saddled 
with the burdens of the first survival crisis. The resulting delays in delivery eventually 
led to financial difficulty and inability to attract investments. The unexpectedly different 
nature of the Swedish market also slowed the pace of internationalization. 
 
Foreign Operations Mode Development: Due to the outsourcing-driven business 
model, some key upstream activities of the Innohome value chain are done outside the 
domestic market. Since dropping the original contract manufacturer in late 2007, the 
company established ties with another Finnish sub-contractor whose production facility 
is located in Poland. Key to the decision was the site’s ability to scale up production 
volumes if need be.  In early 2009, Innohome outsourced the logistics function to an 
Estonian-based provider. Thus, the primary foreign operations modes for upstream 
activities are contract-based. For downstream activities, export to Sweden since 2009 
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has been the solitary mode of foreign operation. Swedish distributors are also set to 
provide the after-sales and helpdesk services to Norway and partly the UK. 
 
Development of the Product Offering: The domestic range of Innohome products has 
contained three different product lines, guards for stoves, washing machines and small 
electric appliances, since 2007. Innohome has also included a service element to the 
offering from the start via helpdesk, assistance in installation and use related queries.  
  
In the beginning of expansion efforts to Sweden in late 2008 and early 2009, Innohome 
was presented with challenges stemming from country standards. In preventing 
potential malfunctions and hazards, smart adapter technology partly relies on 
controlling the electric current that powers domestic appliances. The differing voltage 
and electrical outlet connection standards within the Nordic countries came as a surprise 
to Innhome executives and resulted in unforeseen re-design and adaptation efforts. To 
maintain operations and finance the necessary adaptations, the firm chose to limit the 
array of products for the Swedish market to the Stove Alarm and the battery powered 
Stove Guard. Thus, the international scope only contains products from one line.  
 
Survival Crises: Despite the challenges ensuing from country-specific product 
adaptation requirements, the consequences stemming from the bankruptcy of the 
original contract manufacturer in the introductory phase were more substantial. Had the 
partnership continued to the expected degree, Innohome would have had the less risky 
opportunity to grow the business domestically before embarking toward other Nordic 
countries. Foreign expansion was facilitated by a necessity to obtain revenues to re-
invest in the business in the absence of equity investment. Despite the revenues from 
Sweden keeping the company in business, they came at a price of decreased good-will.  
 
The international product launch needed to be rushed to keep the company afloat and as 
the products were not as applicable as initially thought, adaptations were needed. Some 
of the products had to be withdrawn and eventually the international portfolio of 
products was trimmed down. The resulting bad reception is something the company has 
still not fully recovered from, even with the success of the current product portfolio in 
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Sweden. Despite recent positive developments and a substantial growth in revenue, 
Innohome is still reeling from the first survival crisis both financially and operationally. 
Table 5 provides a summary of the growth phases of Innohome. 
 
Table 5. The growth phases of Innohome 
Phase 1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough and 
expansion  
4. Global 
rationalization and 
maturity  
Key strategy  Develop safety guard 
product portfolio 
and secure re-sellers 
domestically. 
Leverage sales 
channels provided by 
international 
distributors.  
N/A N/A 
Size of the firm 
(employees/ 
sales ? € ) 
2007 -2008 
Employees : 2 
Sales: 85K – 60K 
2009 - 
Employees: 4 
Sales: 120K - 
N/A N/A 
Global division 
of sales 
(approx.)* 
DOM: 100% (2007)  DOM:50% (2009) 
EUR: 50%  (2009) 
N/A N/A 
Evolution of  
foreign 
operation 
mode(s)  
Contractual: 
Polish manufacturer 
and  Estonian 
logistics partner 
Export to Sweden 
Norway and the UK  
N/A N/A 
Products Safety Guards  for 
stoves, washing 
machines and small 
appliances  
Export markets: Stove 
Guard and Stove 
Alarm  
N/A N/A 
Networks MNEs: 
-channels 
 Trade Support: 
Institutions 
-financing  
Export Circle: 
-customers  
-channels 
Education 
-market data 
N/A N/A 
Survival crisis 
in end of phase  
Bankruptcy of 
contract 
manufacturer leads 
to delivery delays 
and financial crisis 
Product adaptation 
challenges in Nordic 
markets detract some 
distributors and deter 
growth 
N/A N/A 
*DOM = domestic sales, EUR = foreign sales within Europe  
 
Factors Influencing the Growth and Survival of Innohome  
 
Industry Development since Establishment: Based on extensive market research either 
conducted or contracted by Innohome, the market of home-safety add-ons or is an 
emergent one internationally, operated mainly by small companies with a domestic 
focus. Despite rivaling or surpassing Innohome in size, these competitors operate on a 
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smaller portfolio and few have similar ambitions regarding international expansion. 
Thus, Innohome welcomes the increase in product awareness brought by competitors 
 
Internal estimates position industrial growth at an annual level of 20% for the duration 
of operations and the short-term future. These predictions are based on statistics 
available for appliance-based domestic accidents, which indicate an increase in fire and 
water related hazards. Thus, there is a well documented need for appliance safety guards 
at least among western households. However, making the customer known of the 
problem let alone the solution is an altogether different story. In fact, the need to create 
an end-user pull has left Innohome in-search of resourceful partners to take care of part 
of the demand generation activities.  
 
Even if the need for the products is more or less universal among the target markets, 
country-specific standards and regulations subject the bulk of the Innohome product 
offering to market specific adaptations prior to extensive foreign market entry. Yet, 
trade is not heavily regulated in this type of electronics industry.  
 
Innohome can credit the industry for its enabling influence for growth and survival. It is 
growing at a pace set by small suppliers, dependant on their effectiveness in generating 
end-user pull either independently or with the help of re-sellers or other partners. The 
case company is as much creating a market than it is providing for an existing one. The 
initial foray to the Finnish market showed that sales efforts to resellers need to be 
coupled with mass marketing in-order to facilitate demand. When the company was able 
to  exert  this  combination  for  the  first  couple  of  months  of  commercial  operations,  the  
results in terms of sales were very positive. When financial difficulties started, there 
was a shortage of funds to sustain mass marketing as well as branding and growth 
stalled. This suggests that in an emergent industry, such as that of Innohome’s, the 
manufacturer needs to facilitate both the push and pull aspects of marketing.   
 
As a result of the survival crisis, the company reached out to the Swedish market in a 
bid to stay in business. The Swedish end-customers showed more awareness towards 
the Innohome products from the outset as the market was more mature. This, coupled 
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with  the  promotional  efforts  of  the  Swedish  distributors  (including  the  provision  of  
after-sales services), ensured that Innohome could concentrate on sales directed at 
resellers and order fulfilment at the expense of consumer marketing efforts. The 
revenues were quick to follow and it can be argued that expansion to a more mature 
market largely kept the company in business.     
  
Development of Most Critical Resources and Capabilities since Establishment: 
Arguably the most crucial resource for Innohome spurs from the innovative capacity of 
Founder/entrepreneur Myllymäki, a trait that has received recognition e.g. in the form of 
the annual presidential InnoFinland inventor award. Innohome is part of a long list of 
high-tech companies based on Myllymäki’s innovations, most of which he has helped 
steer into commercial achievements during his career as an entrepreneur. According to 
the Founder’s philosophy, a company’s success on a high-tech consumer products 
market  is  often  dictated  by  the  ownership  of  patents  and  Innohome  boasts  several  of  
these key resources.  Only four people are directly employed by Innohome, which 
means that there is very little in the way of administrative tasks. Managing Director 
Haavisto is responsible for much of the partnering efforts, at least domestically, leaving 
the technical responsibilities to the founder.  
 
The MD and Founder have a combined total of some 60 years of managerial experience, 
albeit most of it comes from predominantly domestic operations despite both enjoying 
lengthy terms and colleagueship in a Finnish multinational communications 
corporation.  From a capabilities perspective the managerial experience of the pair of 
Innohome executives has facilitated an organization centred on the core competencies 
of partnering, product development and marketing whilst outsourcing the peripheral 
functions. In addition to enhancing strategic flexibility and organizational 
responsiveness to growth opportunities, the business model balances risks via 
partnering. From a technological capabilities perspective, the company has been 
constructed on sophisticated and self-tailored information systems from the outset.   
 
From a marketing viewpoint, innovative capability is again required to offset resource 
constraints. In order to push the product to retailers and re-sellers, partnering and co-
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branding efforts are exerted. The approach to a given market differs based on the 
capacity of partners. Because of insufficient funds to actively take part in creating an 
end-user pull to help resellers in their sales efforts e.g. via mass marketing, Innohome is 
left to concentrate on cost efficient, demand generation and reseller support. Although, 
the firm mostly promotes to resellers, the Innohome brand is central to the marketing 
philosophy and there are plans for consistency of representation in the long term.  
 
Marketing in the short-term is concentrated on using a partner’s umbrella brand; OEM 
agreements and private labelling. The long-term strategy relies on making the corporate 
brand global and does not stress the importance of individual product brands: “I don't 
know if it's a problem but a challenge, to make our, brand to see worldwide, world 
brand, as we discussed…To make so that when you see our web-pages, everything, you 
see that this is a global company, not actually a company from Finland, but a global 
company…” - Founder, Innohome. In addition to social media visibility, (unsolicited) 
editorial publicity, re-seller seminars and e-marketing in the form of a global e-
newsletter are emerging as means of innovative marketing.   
 
In dealing with the resource constraints common for INVs, Innohome has made 
extensive use of the organizational networking capability personified in the two key 
executives. In addition to leveraging networked resources by playing an important role 
in creating an export group, Innnohome managers also undertake partnering efforts 
based on the network potential of the partner. Both vertical and horizontal value chain 
partners are reviewed for their network equity. Thus, in addition to an ability to provide 
sales channels (horizontal support), partners are approached e.g. based on their ability to 
develop and co-manufacture the planned second generation product (vertical support). 
 
Additionally, Innohome has successfully reached out to institutional partners i.e. 
government subsidized financial institutions, non-profit organizations and more recently 
universities, for market information as well as financial and managerial support. The 
consensus at Innohome, stresses that owing to a thin organization and well selected core 
competencies, the company has been able to better respond accordingly to the changes 
in its environment. Also, the substantive capabilities and resources in technology, 
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marketing and management are enforced by the existence of dynamic capabilities. As 
organizational demands have evolved, the company has been able to respond to them 
without greatly altering or adding to the extant resource/capability base. 
 
Entrepreneurial Orientation and Lateral Rigidity: The term “entrepreneurial” 
summarizes the organizational culture of Innohome, due to the backgrounds of the 
Founder and MD both of whom are no strangers to managing a start-up, having started a 
series of companies each. The entrepreneurial backgrounds of the executives have 
helped instil a culture where new initiatives and pro-activeness are encouraged. Due to 
the small size of the organization, there is a high level of autonomy and very little in 
terms of routines and established practices as everyone goes about their business self-
reliantly. The combination of innovativeness and autonomy fosters an environment 
where fresh ideas, especially for products are often acted upon very quickly, sometimes 
to the detriment of long-term plans: “If we get new ideas, we are really fast, and I think 
a little bit too fast. And now actually, almost when we have good new ideas, or new 
product, I'm always saying that now we must be cool now we must stay in these and 
make this work, and this is the, core business at the moment.” - MD, Innohome.  
 
The rapid expansion to the Swedish market is perhaps the best evidence of the 
organizational willingness to take risks at Innohome. When faced with severe 
challenges compromising survival, it opted to take on a new foreign market in the hope 
of tapping into its potential sufficiently to keep the firm in business as opposed 
safeguarding the Finnish market. The majority of development initiatives spur from 
monitoring the market and customer dialogue. Innohome executives are satisfied with 
the market potential and limit the number of pursued initiatives and innovations to the 
boundaries of the home-safety appliance niche, despite having an eye on developing the 
completeness of the offering by adding a service element. Competition is not viewed 
upon as a threat at the moment and Innohome would in fact welcome the added product 
awareness that often stems from a more contested market instead of “going at it alone”. 
 
Innohome is organizationally very agile in adapting to changes in the environment; not 
least due to the thin organization and flexible outsourcing based business model. 
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Organizational agility enabled the company to quickly react to the failure of the initial 
contract manufacturer and pursue revenues from the Swedish market, a move that 
arguably saved it from bankruptcy. The executives make it a priority to act on outside 
impulses, something that has had a tendency to yield mixed results. On the one hand, 
organizational agility and responsiveness have provided the company with an 
abundance of market information and an understanding of the global customer base. On 
the other hand, it has led the company to pursue some unfruitful initiatives, which have 
had an adverse effect on growth due to misplaced resources. Overall, the entrepreneurial 
culture of Innohome has had a diverse impact on growth and survival. It enables an 
organization that is quick to respond to opportunities and gear resources towards 
pursuing them. In retrospect, not all of these opportunities would have merited attention 
and the mis-deployment of resources has stalled growth. After all, only a highly focused 
set of products facilitated the company’s transition to a commercial breakthrough.  
 
Governmental Support: The consensus over regulatory support is two-fold, at 
Innohome as the firm has benefited from assistance that goes into subsidizing product 
development efforts, yet according to executives, more could have been put to use in the 
domains of commercialization and marketing. “You can get money for example in 
Finland for research and development, but when you start marketing, it's absolutely 
difficult to get money” - Founder, Innohome. The firm is currently looking to boost its 
resource base to support internationalization efforts and finds the current support system 
lacking. The demands are not so much driven by financial imperatives than by a need to 
add certain competences to facilitate expansion. According to Innohome, support should 
take the form of operational and personnel assistance, while additional forums bringing 
together public agencies and like-minded SME’s would also be welcomed. 
    
4.1.2 Case IonPhasE - B2B Born Global 
 
IonPhasE Ltd was registered in 2001. Before commercial operations started in late 
2005, the primary focus of the founding group of three chemical engineers was on 
R&D. The group consisted of founder Tech Lic. Jyri Nieminen and two Ph.D students, 
all specialists in the field of polymer chemistry. After inviting his fellow students to the 
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project, Nieminen wanted to build on some promising results for a solution he had 
developed as part of his licentiate degree. Its novelty was in processing ion conductive 
polymeric materials’ by neutralizing static electricity from the surface of plastic. The 
concept proved interesting for public financiers Finnvera and Tekes, whom were 
convinced of its prospects and extended low interest loans for IonPhasE. The start-up 
was based near the University of Tampere, where the founders had graduated from.  
 
In 2009 IonPhasE employs 17 people, caters for the global industry of plastics 
processing and supplies high-end dissipative polymers to a variety of plastics 
manufacturers whom need to control the surface levels of static electricity native to their 
produce. The firm’s core competencies reside in application-specific product 
development and sales. The products, also called granulates, are utilized as ingredients 
in a wide range of plastics applications in industries including, chemical and food 
packaging, automotive, telecommunications as well as electronics. The diminutive size 
of the Finnish market fostered a global business vision early on and sales have 
predominantly come from Asia, underlining the firm’s stature as a Born Global.  
 
The employees of IonPhasE are split between four locations and two countries. The 
company is headquartered from Espoo, Finland since 2007, while the initial lab-like 
facility at Tampere relocated into a nearby factory in 2003. IonPhasE has also 
established sales and distribution subsidiaries in Hong Kong and Guangzhou, China. 
Growth in sales has been relatively swift when the total of ca. 18 000 € from 2005, is 
taken as a reference. Towards the end of the decade, the firm has been able to draw 
annual revenues around the 500 000 € mark consistently.  
 
The Development of IonPhasE in Phases 
 
IonPhasE resides in a phase best dubbed as commercial breakthrough and foreign 
growth, whilst also exhibiting signs of a tentative global breakthrough owing to the 
relative importance and potential of Asian markets. Followed by a lengthy introductory 
phase, underpinned by product development efforts, the company was able to expand to 
global markets rapidly after the start of commercial activities in 2005. Yet, the firm 
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continues to be offset by survival crises stemming from managerial volatilities and 
over-extended product development runs. Figure 6 shows the growth path of IonPhasE. 
 
Figure 6. Growth path and survival crises of IonPhasE 
 
The Introductory Phase: The influence of founder Nieminen was substantial in the 
early stages of IonPhasE. Nestled in the incubating area of the University of Tampere, 
the operational focus was almost entirely on developing a promising chemical solution 
further.  The company was very much internally focused: “I think that the guys, they 
were just realizing that there's a need for this type of product but, they were more into 
developing this granulate in various ways and mainly concerning the antistatic 
properties as to a fully suitable form thinking of sales and end-customer requirement 
battery. A lot of these starter companies, as they don't have the sales mentality, have the 
product focus mentality, and they are scientists more than businessmen. Their love is in 
the product and the technology, not in the commercial side of it.” - CEO, IonPhasE.  
 
The platform for development and production was enhanced as the company relocated 
into a bigger Tampere-based factory in 2003. Another step towards commercialization 
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was the recruitment of six Master’s students in chemical engineering from the 
University of Tampere going into 2005. Yet, this did not exactly increase the 
heterogeneity  of  the  human  resource  base  of  the  company,  the  core  of  which  now  
consisted of ca. ten chemical engineers. The sales of ca. 18 000 € in 2005,  did little to 
convince investors of the commercial potential of the firm.  
 
During the first two years of commercial operations, in addition to granulates, the firm 
sold permanently antistatic plastics film, which in itself is a more evolved stage of 
plastics produce than pure granulate. This meant that some peripheral parts of the 
manufacturing process had to be outsourced to subcontractors. After a disappointing 
start, the loan finances from governmental organizations Finnvera and Tekes were 
running thin and the company was under increasing pressure to find accounts 
 
In early 2006 negotiations with a Finnish-German network conglomerate provided 
IonPhasE with its first major account, a Chinese manufacturing subsidiary of the MNE 
in Suzhou, China, whom can be credited with establishing IonPhasE as a commercial 
firm. The deal helped increase overall sales to ca. 320 000 € for 2006, with the Chinese 
market accounting for over 85% of total sales. Yet, a somewhat of an ad-hoc approach 
to expand the product portfolio to fit other potential end-user applications meant that 
persistently long product runs were undermining further expansion efforts.  
 
The founder/MD, despite his contribution in developing the core product, was found 
wanting in certain managerial aspects: The plastics processing industry develops with 
the continuously improving functionality of product ingredients that make up for the 
building blocks of the end-user applications. A company aiming to provide for this 
market of ingredients needs to focus on, not only innovative capacity, but also the 
environment comprised of customer needs and evolving standards. Thus, the 
importance of the product development process in reaching commercial goals is 
accentuated, an issue which was overlooked at IonPhasE. An over-emphasis on R&D 
was evident and due largely to the founder’s heavy involvement in operational control, 
and a management style best described as authoritarian: “Yeah, it was one man-one 
voice and the whole culture was based on that everything had to go his way. He wanted 
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the other people to do a lot of things, but nobody was allowed to do anything without 
his detailed acceptances. Which meant that things got very much slowed down and the 
founder was involved in issues he actually wanted to get away from. But then again, and 
there was no real planning of especially the R&D work…”- CEO, IonPhasE 
 
Commercial Breakthrough and Foreign Growth: Until very late 2006, IonPhasE was a 
company established and managed primarily by chemical engineers. This changed in 
2007 as a Finnish venture capitalist firm acquired a controlling stake of IonPhasE, 
initiating a series of organizational changes. 
 
Managing Director, Tage Johansson was instilled midway through 2007 to add 
international business and managerial experience to the executive level, whilst holding 
on to the talent of founder Nieminen. Johansson’s arrival coincided with the recruitment 
of  a  Sales  Director,  and  a  Product  Director  both  with  mid-  to  long  term  international  
business experience. From a strategic perspective, finishing product testing faster and 
expanding the portfolio of granulate solutions increased in priority. The company also 
began to strategically narrow down its product range. The increase in pure granulate 
design and production was made at the expense of of ready-made plastic film and 
thereby the use of subcontractors.  
 
In 2007 the company established its headquarters in a high-tech cluster in Espoo. The 
new owner invested into increasing the productivity and R&D capacity of the 
manufacturing facility. The firm also established its first foreign sales subsidiary in 
Hong Kong in 2007. However, a clash between the old and new way of doing things 
was to follow the rapid-fire changes:“…the founder very often is the maker of the 
company, but he's also unfortunately very often the biggest obstacle for the company's 
further success. Because of his methods, his stubborn ways to operate (processes), the 
company will hit the wall time after time making always the same mistakes and not 
learning from the mistakes - as the prior experience of making things work is missing. 
But on the other hand, the company would have never been born without his basic idea. 
So you are, in the first real crisis of the company where you have to finance the 
company, which means that the founder group - or one founder in our case – is going to 
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get heavily diluted, and he gets so (in)furiated about that. But on the other hand, the 
company badly also needs maybe people who have international business experience. 
And it means that the founder's, grounding business ideas have to be reshaped… a lot of 
conflicts ahead” - CEO, IonPhasE. 
 
Despite entering a cycle of regular deliveries to the Chinese account and continuously 
securing some contracts in Central Europe during 2007 and 2008, the firm’s sales 
operations over this period are perhaps better described more sporadic than account-
based. The year 2007 saw an increase in Central European volumes as ca. 130 000 
revenues from therein combined with ca. 400 000 from China brought the annual total 
to ca. 530 000 €. Percentage-wise, sales to China made up for ca. 75% of the total for 
the  year.  Echoing  the  global  undertone  set  by  an  economic  downturn,  the  year  2008  
brought a reverse to the growth trend as total sales declined to ca. 475 000, with the 
Chinese market accounting for ca. 73% of total sales 
 
The organizational changes paid dividends in 2009 as IonPhasE achieved its second 
major account in the form of a German chemical giant in a deal that concluded a 
proofing period of some two years. During the same year founder Nieminen 
relinquished his operational position in the company in favor of an equity stake, 
signaling the end of the conflict between the two management cultures.  
 
Global Breakthrough and Expansion: In early 2009, the product range of IonPhasE 
was limited to granulates, after the discontinuing of all film production. With an 
expanded line of granulate versions, the company hopes to initiate concept proofing 
with a wide array of potential customers and increase sales into current MNE accounts.  
 
Despite recently negotiating a survival crisis of sorts caused by the clash of the old and 
new management styles and obtaining a key client in the German Chemical Giant, 
IonPhasE has not secured stable business growth. In 2009, the company is struggling to 
finance further advances.  In a bid to succeed in global expansion and growth, long-term 
plans are in place to invest in an additional sales subsidiary, located in Central Europe, 
as well as in a foreign production facility with a substantially higher production capacity 
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than  the  current  Tampere  plant.  However,  these  projects  are  subject  to  finding  an  
additional investor. If the company fails to attract one, there exist concerns as to 
whether the current scale of operation is sufficient to keep the company in business.   
 
Foreign Operation Mode Development: IonPhasE’s foreign operations overall 
predominantly consist of downstream activities, while sales have been international 
from the outset. The firm began export to German and French subcontractors in 2005. 
Regular sales started more or less during 2007 and 2008 when deliveries to China 
commenced on a fixed basis. During 2007-2009 export deliveries to Central Europe also 
intensified either via foreign distributors or on-site deliveries. In addition to export, the 
company has also FDI vested in the two Chinese sales and distribution subsidiaries, the 
first of which was established in Hong Kong in 2007. A later addition is the sales and 
distribution center established in Guangzhou in 2009. 
 
Development of the Product Offering: IonPhasE supplies three granulate solutions. A 
film blowing solution for polyethylene film, used mainly in the electronics industry, a 
film solution apt for use in a variety of applications in the chemical & food packaging 
and other antistatic packaging industries as well as a granulate solution designed for 
plastic trays, employed in the electronics manufacturing industry.  The firm started with 
a broader product scope than it operates with in 2009. Between 2005 and 2008 the 
company often utilized the services of a third party plastics film blower in supplying its 
end-customers with a more advanced stage of plastics produce. It was common for up to 
80% of the actual processing to be done by an external subcontractor, with IonPhasE 
supplying granulate and outsourcing the rest of the production process to an outside 
contractor.  The  firm  also  sold  pure  granulates  to  various  end-customers.  A  change  to  
this approach came in 2009 as the firm narrowed its product scope down to solely 
granulates, thereby leaving the rest of the production process to the customer.  
 
Product development is on-going to expand the array of granulate versions to be 
applicable for an increasing number of plastics applications within an industry. 
Different granulate versions are either requested or promoted by the company. In either 
case, the product; a granulate version, is subject to a lengthy proofing phase. Thus, the 
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product always carries a service element as proofing is done in cooperation with the 
customer.  
 
Product  adaptation  for  IonPhasE is  always  customer  or  application  specific  where  the  
county of origin of the customer is largely ineffectual. Thus, the need for product 
adaptation increases somewhat with every addition to the customer portfolio. Plastics 
processing is a diverse industry characterized by standards which evolve in parallel with 
plastic ingredients. The pace of this development is partly set by the ingredient 
suppliers, but also dependent on their customers, the manufacturers, whom provide the 
final approval for the ingredient by utilizing it in their production process. For a supplier 
such as IonPhasE, an approval from a large manufacturer is an important reference as 
well as a market opener, since the same form of granulate solution can be utilized by a 
variety of manufacturers with relatively limited or no adaptation. 
 
Survival Crises: The involvement of the new venture capitalist owner in 2006 ushered 
in a time of incremental change. As a result founder Nieminen was soon accompanied 
by three new executives whose ideas of running the firm conflicted with his. The 
company remained in a state of flux for the best part of two years, a time perhaps best 
described as a conflict of managerial styles. Underpinning the crisis was an inability to 
finish granulates, meaning that there were few results to show investors. The firm 
needed to make changes or risk going out of business.      
 
The newly installed management prioritized the faster finalization of product 
development cycles in an attempt to reach out to the market proactively with a variety 
of granulate versions. Despite obtaining some quick wins, in 2009 the company is still 
suffering  the  effects  of  the  prolonged  introductory  phase.  Furthermore,  as  it  hopes  to  
facilitate a global breakthrough, resources are stretched across a variety of product 
versions in the hopes of expanding the portfolio of granulate solutions. Table 6 
summarizes the discussed developments of IonPhasE. 
 
 
 87 
 
Table 6. The growth phases of IonPhasE 
Phase 1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough and 
expansion  
4. Global 
rationalization and 
maturity  
Key strategy  Develop plastic film 
and granulate 
solutions for a 
variety of industrial 
applications.  
Shorten product 
development cycles 
and undertake a 
proactive market 
approach. 
Expand globally and 
leverage current and 
potential MNE 
accounts. 
N/A 
Size of the firm 
(employees/ 
sales ? € ) 
2005-2006 
Employees:  4-11 
Sales: 18K- 320K  
2007-2008 
Employees:  11- 17 
Sales: 475K-530K 
N/A N/A 
Global division 
of sales 
(approx.)* 
DOM: 0% (2006) 
EUR: 10% (2006) 
GLOB: 90% (2006) 
DOM:0% (2008)  
EUR: 27% (2008) 
GLOB: 73% (2008) 
N/A N/A 
Evolution of  
foreign 
operation 
mode(s)  
Sales:  
-export; 
Central Europe, Asia  
Sales:  
-subsidiaries; 
Honk Kong, China 
(mainland) 
N/A N/A 
Products Plastics Film and 
Granulates  
Granulates (various 
versions) 
N/A N/A 
Networks Education: 
-student recruits 
MNEs: 
-customers 
-channels 
N/A N/A 
Survival crisis 
in end of phase  
Long product 
development cycles 
lead to a clash of 
management styles. 
The inability to 
convert concept 
proofing into 
revenues results in 
financial difficulty 
N/A N/A 
*DOM = domestic sales, EUR = foreign sales within Europe, GLOB = sales outside Europe  
 
Factors Influencing the Growth and Survival of IonPhasE  
 
Industry Development since Establishment: Upon request form IonPhasE, an 
independent agency estimated an annual growth rate of 25% from 2007 to 2010 for the 
inherently dissipative polymer (IDP) market. Trade in the industry is not regulated 
heavily as suppliers operate largely based on global trade regulations. The country of 
origin of the customer has little significance and the same ingredient can be utilized on a 
variety of manufacturing sites in different countries if need be.  
 
Partly owing to the high entry barriers i.e. the required level of technical expertise, there 
are only a few companies active in the industry, most of who do not specialize in the 
area of IDP. All of them operate more or less on a global basis, but despite racking up 
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annual overall sales in the billions, their IDP sales volumes do not greatly surpass the 
current potential annual capacity held by IonPhasE of ca. 1200 tons.  
 
At IonPhasE, the largely global and MNE-driven nature of the competition is not 
viewed  upon  as  a  threat  but  an  enabler: “Because, as I said, competitors are always 
good, because if you're alone, you have to fight the whole world alone. If you have 
competitors, everybody is singing the same message, and it helps you as well. So, from 
this point of view, the more global players there is in this market to certain extent, it of 
course helps everybody, and then it really helps the market to get accustomed with the 
new product and gets the growth coming.” –MD,  IonPhasE.  The  global  and  dynamic  
nature of the industry has functioned as an enabler for IonPhasE. It is seen as sufficient 
to meet and exceed short to mid-term expectations and a failure to build on its potential 
is pinned down to internal factors.  
 
Development of Most Critical Resources and Capabilities since Establishment: 
Perhaps the most critical resource of IonPhasE resides in innovative technical capacity. 
It is behind a total of six patents geared for the IDP industry. Despite the founder and 
main innovator leaving his operative post, executives are confident that IonPhasE has 
retained an adequate amount of this ability.    
 
As evidenced by the relatively long introductory phase of IonPhasE, innovative 
competence and resources count for little unless they can be efficiently geared towards 
commercial objectives. When investing in a controlling stake of the company in late 
2006, the owner wanted to make sure that the technological capabilities of IonPhasE are 
focused on growth, which also meant re-staffing the board of directors. Current MD 
Johansson highlights the role of the owner and a board that understands the business as 
key resources when setting the right managerial and strategic course for the firm.  
 
The MD himself is one of the three managers hired in quick succession in 2007 in a bid 
to balance the managerial and innovative pools of talent quickly after the arrival of the 
new owner. Between them the new executives had a combined total of ca. 30 years of 
international business experience in management positions. Yet they all joined from 
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international SMEs, which means that the stock of entrepreneurial experience at 
IonPhasE is also rather limited as the firm also represented the first for founder 
Nieminen. In a bid to decrease the time spent on product development, the firm also 
invested heavily in R&D equipment in early 2009. The idea was to improve the R&D 
infrastructure thereby having the ability to do more testing work in-house.  
 
From a substantive capabilities perspective, technological capability in product 
development and managerial capability underpinned by strategic intent, business 
intelligence and clear business objectives are named as central by management. Also, a 
customer-driven sales approach underpinned by market sensing merits attention: “The 
sales force is the best business intelligence, because any time you get involved with 
potential client or clients, you get new ideas about what it really is, because on the 
other side you have a person that is not fully aware of this miracle stuff, and from our 
side we are not fully aware of this potential client's needs..” - CEO, IonPhasE. 
  
Equating business intelligence and the sales force illustrates that success in the IDP 
market is partly dependant on customer linking. References are crucial in promoting the 
firm within and across customers. Despite playing a central part in obtaining the firms 
major accounts and recruits from universities, current management sees poor 
networking capability as one of the reasons for the firms stunted growth so far. 
    
When it comes to adapting and renewing resources and capabilities based on changes in 
the environment, the company has so far operated under financial restraints alike many 
start-ups. In terms of interchangeability, the resource base of IonPhasE remains rather 
static. With a relatively polarized (engineers/business managers) pool of talent, current 
management has to look outside the company to e.g. boost the sales force. Resource 
renewal  at  present  is  done  on  a  financially  driven  outside-in  basis  overall  instead  of  
developing the current resources and capabilities.  
 
For growth, the most critical resource and capabilities have been in the technical areas 
of product and the managerial capabilities brought by the executives recruited in 2007. 
While it is too early to judge the executive groups influence conclusively in 2009, it can 
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be argued as to whether IonPhasE would even exist today had it proceeded under the 
authoritarian management of the founder. Networking capability, while perhaps lacking 
early on, helped the company on its way in an inherently complex market environment, 
which is underlined by the two major accounts. It also helped the company in recruiting 
able hands from university more than once. Also, the financial prowess vested in the 
company by governmental institutions as well as the owner, mainly based on its 
potential not performance should not be overlooked.  
 
Entrepreneurial Orientation and Lateral Rigidity: The current company culture of 
IonPhasE is a juxtaposition of the two very opposite managerial philosophies of the two 
respective MDs, Nieminen and Johansson. The introductory phase of IonPhasE is 
described as being personified in the authoritarian leadership of Nieminen devoid of 
employee empowerment and autonomy, where risk taking was encouraged mainly in 
R&D at the expense of process and administration development. During this time, the 
company did not prioritize a proactive approach to the market. Thus, supplementing 
areas that were found lacking in the introductory phase is central to the philosophy of 
the executive group that followed as it hopes to rely on structure and measurement for 
the benefit of steering and motivation.   
 
While comparatively low operating costs and laterally rigid decision making kept the 
company running, progress towards commercial success was only made after substantial 
investments into the managerial personnel in 2007, a move that effectively initiated a 
change of culture. Investments continued by way of FDI to China as well as new R&D 
equipment and facilities. The second directorate is clearly more entrepreneurially 
oriented than its predecessors. Current management is working to reverse old routines 
and the firm has started to proactively approach the market by basing operations on 
business intelligence accumulated through internal (the sales force) and external sources 
(consultancies). The company is working on expanding the market by introducing 
ingredient products to new industries and applications as well as penetrating the current 
market further by intensifying operations with current and potential customers. The 
underlining belief is that there is no need to aggressively conquer market share from 
competitors, but create market space.  
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Governmental Support: The main public financiers behind IonPhasE are Finnvera and 
Tekes, who financed the company through the introductory phase. The discontinuance 
of Finnvera’s financial support coincided with the venture capitalist firm’s entry to the 
frame in 2006, while Tekes’ funding ends in 2009. Additionally, Finpro provided some 
assistance to the company when establishing the first Chinese subsidiary. The firm also 
underwent a small bilateral product development project with Tekes in 2009, which as a 
support organization, receives a vote of confidence from the managing director.   
 
Despite welcoming the continued support from Tekes, IonPhasE believes that more 
could be done on the governmental level to assist internationalizing SME and that 
support should be both monetary and operational. In effect, shortening the “runway” to 
international commercialization for SMEs should be the governmental strategy for 
advancing the Finnish economy, according to the IonPhasE perspective. This includes 
more than handing out money as some SME’s also struggle with the operational 
practicalities and strategic considerations of internationalization.  
  
4.1.3 Case Avant Tecno - B2C/B2B Born International  
 
Ylöjärvi-based Avant Tecno LTD, established in 1991, supplies compact multi-purpose 
wheeled loaders and related attachments to a variety of resellers and end-users. The 
firm’s main sales channels include an international network of distributors active in 40 
countries and two international sales and distribution subsidiaries in Germany and the 
UK. The family enterprise, and world market leader in loaders with an operating weight 
limit of 2000kg, was founded on the remains of YLÖ-tehtaat a manufacturer 
specializing in the production of loaders and tractor supplies. Predecessor YLÖ-tehtaat, 
active since 1948, had endured a steep decline in sales owing mostly to the feigning 
Soviet trade in early 1990 and filed for bankruptcy the same year. Avant Tecno founder 
and former YLÖ-tehtaat executive Risto Käkelä saw promise in a portion of its product 
portfolio and bought the rights for sections of the wheeled loader and tractor supply 
businesses.  
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Avant Tecno was established in the old YLÖ-tehtaat premise and around 40 employees 
also opted to join from the bankrupt manufacturer. The start-up also secured an 
agreement with a local mining and construction conglomerate for the manufacture of 
self-propelled drill rig foundation units. Consequently, Avant Tecno could quite 
seamlessly continue the remaining two product lines of YLÖ-tehtaat directly after 
establishment, whilst also receiving additional revenues from the drill rig units. 
 
In the early 1990s Finland was reeling from an economic depression and Avant Tecno 
was founded on the promise of international markets and pursued an international vision 
from the start. Avant Tecno subscribes to the Born International label by drawing ca. 
one third of total revenues from international markets already during the first three years 
operations. Yet, sales outside the home continent have yet to surpass the 25% mark. 
Over time the company has grown from a 40 person SME manufacturer with sales of 
3.3M € to a world leading supplier of multifunctional loaders, employing some 140 
people and with sales totaling near the 40M € mark in 2009.    
 
The Development of Avant Tecno in Phases 
 
The major expansions to the Avant Tecno loader range are an effective way to outline 
the transitions between the developmental phases of Avant Tecno. “…we see them 
(growth phases), you can see quite well when we brought new machines and machine 
types into the market, and that has helped us with the existing sales network so that they 
got a better machine that they can sell now to, either better to the existing customer 
groups or they can find new customer groups completely. Or then, for the new ones to 
get more excited about wanting to be aboard of this sales network.“ - PM, Avant Tecno. 
 
The time-span between the transitions has been some five years, where introduction to 
the international market began with a revised edition of one of the loader prototypes 
bought from Ylötehtaat. Commercial breakthrough and international expansion 
intensified in 1995, owing to the release of articulated wheeled loaders. Another 
decisive  point  was  the  release  of  the  “mini”  -  loader,  directed  mostly  at  the  consumer  
markets in 2000, an event that coincided with global expansion and growth. While 
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pursuing growth via the release of yet another model in 2009, the company has also 
exhibited some signs of regional or international rationalization. Figure 7 illustrates. 
 
Figure 7. Growth path and survival crisis of Avant Tecno 
 
The Introductory Phase: In 1991, the wheeled loaders were considered the future of the 
business as development efforts were concentrated on a new loader version for 
agricultural end-use. The other two lines were maintained largely to keep the business 
afloat and provide revenues to re-invest in the loader business. Considerable revisions 
were made to a loader prototype bought from Ylötehtaat. The product was apt for use in 
farming activities and introduced to a variety of markets, concentrating to nearby 
Scandinavian ones i.e. Norway and Denmark as well as select Central-European ones, 
such as France and Germany.  
 
The loader, dubbed 300 series, proved attractive for resellers and end-users after its 
release in 1992. It was able to undertake some of the chores traditionally reserved for 
heavier machinery with a lower price. It could also be fitted with a range of separately 
sold attachments for different purposes. These attributes backed up by generally 
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favorable reviews helped Avant Tecno carve out a niche devoid of direct competition 
domestically and internationally and contract foreign dealers.   
 
From the early days of Avant Tecno, it was evident to the management that a domestic 
focus would not suffice in the niche wheeled loader market. Central Europe was 
subsequently identified as the center of the loader industry and the company was quick 
to establish a sales and distribution subsidiary in Frankfurt in 1992. The investment was 
made in the aftermath of a successful showing in the 1992 iteration of the Germany-
based Bauma trade and construction fair, which proved central in a series of decisive 
events that prompted the company to trim down the product range into solely loaders.  
 
Since internationalization began the firm has approached each foreign distributor with a 
long-term perspective and emphasizes mutual gains in business relations: “Of course we 
are always working on long-term basis with the importer, and we're trying to make sure 
that they get all the tools necessary for the sales.” - PM, Avant Tecno 
 
Midway through the 1990s, a cash-strapped domestic economy, a high-interest 
commercial loan and continued investments in product development had taken their 
financial toll on the firm and prompted efforts to further penetrate international markets 
with the loader business. But, the company was hesitant to discontinue the profitable 
tractor supply and drill rig unit lines, at least before solidifying the loader business.  
 
Commercial Breakthrough and Foreign Growth: Avant Tecno’s commercial 
breakthrough commenced around 1995, courtesy of the next generation of loaders, the 
500 series. The enhancements to the previous generation were considerable, and 
extended the customer range beyond the agricultural segment to small scale landscaping 
and more demanding do-it-yourself (DIY) work. Further additions to the attachments 
range, in turn, provided additional customizability.    
 
With the 500 series, Avant Tecno was able to further penetrate into the foreign markets 
obtained in the introductory phase. The new product also gave distributors the option of 
renting out the loaders. The firm gradually adopted a similar mutual gains approach 
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with select suppliers than it emphasized in with distributors and began building strategic 
relationships on both sides of the value chain: “Well, with the core suppliers we have of 
course very tight relations too, and we are in daily contact with them. And not only 
suppliers, but they are a little level higher than that. Then there are suppliers that 
supply just their standard products to us, and normally with that you have very little 
problems with. And so, also there tight relations is the key, and also there we have been 
establishing very long lifespan commitments to that.” - PM, Avant Tecno.  
 
To further advance foreign expansion efforts, the company established its second sales 
subsidiary, in Norwich, England in 1998. A distributor was also contracted soon after, 
from Ireland to strengthen the firm’s geographical presence in the area. Meanwhile, the 
biggest increase in export volumes took place in markets where Avant Tecno had 
already established a firm foothold on during the introductory phase i.e. Scandinavia 
and Germany. Towards the end of the 90s it strengthened its push for European markets 
and enacted a policy whereby each foreign country is catered via one local distributor.  
 
During the mid to late 1990s, Southern European countries such as Greece, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and Turkey were added to the portfolio of markets along with a host of Central 
European countries including Belgium, Austria, Poland, Hungary, Luxemburg and 
Switzerland. Towards the end of the 1990s, expansion efforts were also intensified in 
Eastern Europe and dealers contracted from the likes of Russia, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. During the turn of the century the 
array of Scandinavian markets was complemented by Sweden and Iceland. The strategic 
intent behind the wide-scale expansion was to balance out the market trends within each 
individual market or market area and thereby draw economies of geographical scale.  
 
Global Breakthrough and Expansion: The turn of the century coincided with Avant 
Tecno’s  expansion  in  volume  to  markets  outside  of  Europe,  fueled  mainly  by  the  2nd 
edition  of  the  series  500  loader,  which  was  able  to  attract  a  wider  group of  end-users  
from increasingly diverse country markets. The year 2000 brought a change in strategy 
as Avant Tecno began to deploy more sophisticated monitoring efforts to determine 
whether it was feasible to continue with additional country market expansions or further 
 96 
 
penetrate extant markets by intensifying sales efforts. This included reviews of macro-
economical data and global trends in strategic planning.  
 
In 2000 the company contracted an US.-based partner to start supply on a private label 
basis to spearhead North American operations. The distributor sold Avant Tecno 
loaders under its own brand name for some five years. Despite initial success in the 
North American markets, the exchange rate fluctuations between the Euro and Dollar 
considerably cut in Avant Tecno’s margins and U.S.-based profits diminished by 2005.  
Amidst penetration difficulties into the North American market, Avant Tecno had 
success in other global markets during the early 2000s. Middle East provided an initial 
foray to the east and importer-dealers were contracted from the likes of, United Arab 
Emirates, Oman and Qatar, whilst South Korea, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand and 
South Africa were also added to the fore soon after. 
   
With  a  global  dealer  network  Avant  Tecno  was  better  able  to  balance  out  demand  
decreases in certain country markets or economic areas with ones that showed opposite 
trends:“… we have a very good feeling about which countries is doing well compared 
to, well, the GDP and all of that, and you can draw pretty clear lines from there where 
to go to.” - PM, Avan Tecno. Consequently, as sales decreased in the U.S. market the 
company gradually shifted its strategic focus to Europe and those markets external to 
the home continent, that were showing promise, such as Australia, Middle East and 
South Africa. The strategic manoeuvres paid dividends as the four years running from 
2004 showed unprecedented growth of ca. 30% per year, a trend that was finally 
reversed partly due to the global economic downturn commencing as of late 2008. The 
growth was partly due to the 2003 release of the 200 model “mini” loader which was 
well received, especially in Scandinavia and parts of Europe   
 
Global Rationalization and Maturity: In 2009, all Avant Tecno manufacturing is done 
in the Ylöjärvi facility, much like other primary activities such as marketing, product 
development etc. The emphasis is on preventing country-market duplications which is 
evident in the one dealer per country-market ideology. This notion transcends into other 
functions as well, as the firm is able to respond to the current demand with the present 
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establishment, while the leftover capacity means that even a considerable increase in 
demand is manageable. The avoidance of further expansion by way of foreign 
subsidiaries is considered risk management. Dealers are viewed upon as strategic 
partners who share the responsibility for sales. Replacing them with subsidiaries would 
require considerable investments in localized operations and staff as well as additional 
administration in the company headquarters, which the firm is keen to avoid.  
 
Avant  Tecno  perhaps  adheres  most  to  a  stage  of  global  growth  and  expansion  where  
Europe remains the focal point of business but global markets, most notably those in 
Australia and Middle East are invariably increasing in importance. Yet, the emphasis is 
avoiding country market duplications can be considered a means of international or 
regional rationalization.   
 
Foreign Operations Mode Development: Avant Tecno undertook direct export already 
in 1991 as commercial operations were international from the outset. The first sales and 
distribution subsidiary was established in 1992 in Frankfurt Germany and a second one 
followed some six years later in 1998, in Norwich the UK. The private-label partnership 
with the U.S.-based importer-distributor constitutes the solitary downstream 
strategic/co-operational mode of foreign operation. Additionally, the company utilizes a 
number of foreign suppliers in upstream activities. 
 
Development of the Product Offering: In 1991 Avant Tecno started commercial 
operations with three product lines: drill rig foundation units, tractor parts and wheeled 
loaders. The two product lines mentioned first were maintained mostly in order to fuel 
loader business development. As sales of the loader business proved a success 
internationally, the other two product lines were gradually discontinued.  
 
Despite the overall portfolio growing to include a total of six different models or series 
of loaders, the first 300 series loader already epitomizes much of the novelty the 
company has introduced to the industry. The products include a service element, 
meaning that the company only distributes via certified dealers whom are able to 
provide after-sales services, assistance in maintenance, spare parts as well as help with 
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other related enquiries. Owing to the possibility to fit the loader with a variety of 
separately sold, attachments most of which are applicable across models, the product is 
highly modular and customizable pending on the intended use.  
 
The launch of the 500 series in 1995, and especially its second iteration some five years 
later played a large role in facilitating the international expansion and foreign growth of 
Avant Tecno, owing to upgrades in performance and functionality. The 500 series is 
designed for private do-it-yourself construction, farming and small-scale landscaping 
segments and it was followed by the 2003 release of the 200 series “mini-loader”, 
targeted at private end-users.  
 
The 200 series can be seen as a separate product line for the company, not only due to 
its target segment(s), but also the fact that it comes with its own separate set of 
attachments, whereas previous and subsequent models can make use of a large joint 
pool of attachments.  For the development effort related to the model, Avant Tecno 
enlisted the help of the Institute of Hydraulics and Automation at the Tampere 
University of Technology.  The more recent introductions to the Avant Tecno product 
portfolio include the 600 series, released in 2006. An increased operating range from the 
500 series, both in load and power meant that its target segments include more heavy-
duty users. The 700 series, released in 2008 further stresses on increased performance 
metrics, such as drive speed and lift capacity.  
 
With the 2009 introduction of the 400 series, the company stresses coming full circle 
with the range of loaders available in terms of price and performance. Also, the range of 
attachments, increasing with each new loader, provides additional end-user options. 
Having released six models of loaders, Avant Tecno in 2009 caters for a variety of 
global customer segments including: landscaping, property maintenance, construction 
and farming as well as private do-it-yourself builders. Due to individual performance 
and specifications, each new model has increased the amount of segments upon release.  
 
Product  adaptation  within,  and  to  an  extent  across,  segments  is  done  via  the  different  
attachments that are available for the loaders. The core functionality that comes with a 
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certain model of loader remains relatively standard across country markets while the 
country-specific demand from individual segments varies greatly i.e. cheaper models 
with lower performance and less optional “extras” are more in demand in developing 
economies. “There's basically only few optional things as in, for example in a car, you 
can choose some comfort elements like different caps on the machine, or you can 
choose some functional elements to the loader itself, or something else. But it's, maybe, 
you could say so the richer countries order more complete machines, or more 
expensive, more user friendly machines than the poorer countries.” - PM, Avant Tecno. 
Thus, the firm can draw manufacturing economies from standardized design and 
product platforms. 
 
Certain country market traits such as performance regulations and extreme weather 
conditions have presented requirements for product adaptation. Examples can be taken 
from South Africa and Australia where high ambient temperatures prompted changes to 
the cooling solutions etc. Yet, most of the country-based adaptations, once implemented 
have become a fixed part of the product. Overall, growth in international direction has 
increased the need for country market-based product adaptation. However, arrival to the 
latter stages has coincided with product standardization as the loader models have been 
made more standard across country-markets. Customization across segments, in turn, is 
left for the customer via the range of attachments available.    
 
Survival Crises: During the establishment of Avant Tecno, Finland was in the midst of 
a recession, which severely limited the firm’s possibilities in relying on the domestic 
market for sustained growth and survival. The fact that the company was mostly 
financed by a bank loan (in a declining currency) and sweat capital contributed to an 
extended financial struggle, which the company negotiated with the successful 
international release of the 300 series. The decision to internationalize was made as 
much out of necessity than a bid to capitalize on growth opportunities. The push for 
international markets proved crucial as the company emerged from its first and only 
survival crisis to-date: “Well, just, basically then, just had the sales guy going a little bit 
in, especially, say Germany, and establishing of the German company back then helped 
to get us at least going through that period. The next period was already a little bit 
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better, and so there onwards it has been good…”-PM,  Avant  Tecno.  Table  7  
summarizes the discussed growth phases. 
 
Table 7. The growth phases of Avant Tecno 
Phase 1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough and 
expansion  
4. Global 
rationalization and 
maturity  
Key strategy  Develop loader 
business at the 
expense of 
secondary lines. 
Obtain a foothold in 
Central Europe via 
subsidiary and 
distributors.   
Expand to additional 
European markets 
and leverage strategic 
dealer partnerships to 
further penetrate 
current markets.   
Expand to global 
markets via 
distributors and 
private label supply. 
Pool country-market 
data for strategic 
coordination . 
Avoid country market 
duplication of 
activities and 
emphasize home 
continent. 
Size of the firm 
(employees/ 
sales ? € ) 
1991-1996 
Employees: 40-61 
Sales:  3,3M-7,3M  
1997-2003 
Employees: 67-84  
Sales: 10,7M- 19,1M 
2004-2009 
Employees:70 -145 
Sales: 21,6M-58M  
N/A 
Global division 
of sales 
(approx.)* 
DOM: 64% (1993) 
EUR:  36% (1993) 
 
DOM: 46% (1997)  
EUR: 42%  (1997) 
GLOB: 12% (1997) 
DOM: 38% (2009) 
EUR: 42%  (2009) 
GLOB: 20% (2009)  
N/A  
 
Evolution of  
foreign 
operation 
mode(s)  
Sales: 
-Distributors; 
Central Europe, 
Scandinavia. 
-Subsidiary; 
Germany  
Sales: 
-Distributors; 
Southern/Eastern 
Europe 
-Subsidiary The U.K. 
Sales: 
-Distributors; ME, 
Asia, SA, South Africa 
and Australia 
Strategic/ co-op: 
-Private label (the  
US.) 
N/A 
Products Drill rig units 
Tractor supplies 
Wheeled loaders: 
300 series  
Wheeled loaders: 
300 and 500 series  
 
Wheeled loaders: 
300, 500, 600, and  
700 series 
Mini-loader:  
200 series 
Wheeled loaders: 
300, 400,500, 600,  
and  700 series 
Mini-loader: 
200 series  
Networks Ylötehtaat-based: 
-customers  
Trade fairs: 
-re-sellers  
 Suppliers: 
-networked sourcing 
Education: 
-product 
development. 
N/A 
Survival crisis 
in end of phase  
Financial, due to a 
high debt-to-equity 
ratio and small 
domestic market, 
depleted by 
recession.  
- - N/A 
*DOM = domestic sales, EUR = foreign sales within Europe, GLOB = sales outside Europe  
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Factors Influencing the Growth and Survival of Avant Tecno 
 
Industry Development since Establishment: Although statistics are hard to come by, 
internal estimates position industrial growth around the 20% mark on annual average 
for Avant Tecno’s industry of operation. It is important to note that the company created 
a niche for itself by being the first to manufacture and market multipurpose small-sized 
wheeled loaders. Thus, the industry has grown together with the company. 
 
Avant Tecno only has one direct competitor; an Italian manufacturer that provides a 
similar portfolio of products. Because the business extends from consumer use into 
heavy industry, Avant Tecno meets different indirect competitors pending on customer 
segment. Thus, segment and country-specific competitors range from small local 
players into large Multinationals such as Schaefer and Bobcat. 
  
Operating across global markets in a vehicular industry means having to negotiate 
challenges  presented  by  country  and  trade  area  specific  policy  makers.  In  the  case  of  
Avant Tecno this is most apparent in the variable customs regulations of Russia as well 
as similar protectionist policies exerted by some South American economies. Such 
factors obviously make certain markets less attractive and in extreme cases unfeasible 
altogether due to e.g. difficulties in pricing the products accordingly. Despite country -
specific differences in the operating environment customer demand with regards to the 
basic functionality of the loader remains relatively static across country markets, while 
customers in some countries want to cut down on some of the optional “extras”. 
  
In establishing a niche for itself Avant Tecno credits some enabling global megatrends 
that have accelerated the growth of the industry i.e. the mechanization of developing 
economies and the tightening regulations for the use of manual labor in the west.   
 
Development of Most Critical Resources and Capabilities since Establishment: The 
experience of the Founder has played a central role in the development of Avant Tecno. 
Prior to establishing the company, he ran a small agricultural establishment, followed 
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by tenure of several years in Avant Tecno’s predecessor YLÖ-tehtaat where Risto 
Käkelä worked in executive positions both in marketing and product development.    
 
In addition to many shop-floor workers joining from YLÖ-tehtaat, an internationally 
active manufacturer in its own right, Avant Tecno was able to recruit some of the 
managerial-level employees as well. Chief among them were the R&D manager and 
CFO. The successful revision of the YLÖ-tehtaat business model with the help of 
retained key personnel is evidence of the managerial capabilities at the firm. The 
company additionally stresses the importance of constant renewal of resources and 
capabilities in responding to growth opportunities: “…we are constantly wanting to 
evolve ourselves in.. As with the products, as with the sales, as with any other aspect of 
the company structure.” -PM, Avant Tecno. This is manifested in the continuous 
analysis of feedback coming from within the organization or the distributors etc. 
 
Avant Tecno also stresses the importance of the technological capabilities instilled in 
the product engineers, which allow the development of the product portfolio in response 
to feedback. In addition to technological prowess, Avant Tecno has benefited from the 
sales and marketing competencies of the sales managers whom have enacted a mutual 
gains approach in customer relationship management with re-sellers, something the 
competition has failed to emulate. Further building on market sensing capability, the 
firm pools information from across global operations and decides which segments 
within a certain market are the most feasible at a given time-frame. 
 
Reseller partnerships are carefully coordinated and the firm stresses the importance to 
provide a complete support package to help grow the business with the re-sellers.“…we 
are, like I said, in more constant, building a more constant sales network. We have a 
good backup for the product, we have, as in product backup, as in also personal 
backup, as in also help for exhibitions and so on, so you get a complete package from 
us. And that, well, I would have to say it's been very important for us.” - PM, Avant 
Tecno. Thus, coordinated dealer support is an important reference for customer linking. 
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Avant Tecno utilizes branding as means to communicate with end-users across 
segments. Despite changing the visual image over the years, it has maintained a single 
corporate brand globally from the outset, apart from the US, where a partner re-branded 
the products initially. Branding is centrally coordinated from the Finnish HQ and 
country specific adaptation mainly takes the form of translating the material to a variety 
of languages. Centralization is done to provide a uniform look across markets. 
Traditional mass marketing is kept to a minimum and the company instead tries to 
ensure that re-sellers have adequate and up-to-date promotional material. The corporate 
web-pages are maintained in five languages and provide localized product information. 
 
Avant Tecno has also been able to rely on considerable networking capability, 
underlined in upstream activities by the network of strategic suppliers and in 
downstream activities by the global network of strategic resellers. Additionally, 
university collaboration in product development has seen the company branch out to the 
educational sector. The firm also stresses the importance of trade fairs in networking.  
  
Avant Tecno was able to replenish the resource and capability base of predecessor 
Ylötehtaat, exhibiting dynamic capabilities in the process. Since then, a combination of 
technological, managerial and marketing capabilities has produced an organization that 
is highly responsive to market impulses, owing to the emphasis based on customer 
relationship management. Avant Tecno dedicates substantial effort into ensuring 
efficient partner relations, and thereby growth and survival are inevitably CRM efforts.  
 
Entrepreneurial Orientation and Lateral Rigidity: The company culture at Avant 
Tecno can be broadly defined as free-form and entrepreneurial, where individual input 
and initiative are encouraged over formal administration. Executives believe that 
facilitating an environment free of bureaucracy and a strict hierarchy is a necessity in 
order to fuel innovation. There are some country specific differences between the 
Ylöjärvi-based HQ and the subsidiaries, evidenced by how e.g. German management 
has instilled a more procedurally-driven work environment locally.  
 
 104 
 
The entrepreneurial culture of Avant Tecno has evolved with the company. The early 
years were rife with risk taking, underlined by how the company invested heavily in 
internationalization before first securing the domestic market. Later, having established 
an international presence, the company has become more risk averse whilst still 
experimenting with new segments by introducing loader attachments in order to further 
penetrate current and potential markets. The firm believes that continuously 
experimenting with new market areas and products are necessities for continuity. By 
supporting composed risk taking and a highly autonomous working atmosphere, Avant 
Tecno executives hope to encourage development initiatives and keep the company in a 
continuous state of evolution. New initiatives are carefully assessed irrespective of their 
source from within the company and potential ones get the full backing of management. 
   
Because of the heavily contested nature of some customer segments, Avant Tecno 
competes aggressively with some direct and indirect competitors. Yet, the aim is not to 
compete with price but provide a differentiated offering via quality produce as well as 
service and build a strong manufacturer brand in response to lower-priced produce.  
 
Avant Tecno stresses that with an entrepreneurial mindset devoid of autonomy and 
bureaucracy, it can better respond to changes in the environment and sustain a 
competitive edge, without having to constantly invest in new resources: “I would say 
due to the lack of bureaucracy we are very good in that, at least compared to our 
competitors…they often seem to be very slow in coming up with new things and new 
ideas, whereas we seem to be faster than they are.” – PM, Avant Tecno. Executives 
believe that the flexibility fostered by the culture was of great importance in responding 
to the challenges of high growth from 2003 onwards with largely the same resources. 
 
In summation, Avant Tecno has become more risk averse as operations have matured, 
but maintains that without patience for failure in product prototypes, new country 
markets and customer segments it would quickly lose ground to competitors. The 
principles of the culture have not changed as much as the processes have. 
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Governmental Support: Avant Tecno concedes that the governmental support it has 
received has been minor and mainly taken the form of reimbursements on some of the 
expenses that arise from taking part in an international trade fair or exhibition. 
Additionally, Finpro has supported the company in low-cost market data and country-
market business environment consultation. The firm stresses that agencies with a 
governmental mandate should do more in shortening the runway for 
internationalization, underlining the fact that in addition to financial subsidies they need 
to offer operational assistance in opening up markets and launching Finnish products 
abroad. This includes outlining the importance of international markets, locating forums 
for networking and introducing products as well as linguistic assistance.    
 
4.1.4 Case Vacon - B2B Born Global  
 
Vacon PLC develops and manufactures frequency converters, which are used to control 
the speed of electronic motors in industry. The firm was registered as Vaasa Control 
LTD in 1993 when 11 former ABB engineers founded their own frequency converter 
business in Vaasa after ABB moved its frequency converter unit to Helsinki. The 
company took on the name Vacon when enlisting to the Helsinki stock exchange, in the 
year 2000. For the sake of coherence the following analysis refers to Vaasa Control 
LTD and Vacon PLC as “Vacon” throughout. The manufacturing process of Vacon is 
driven by subcontracting. Only operations of strategic importance such as product 
development assembly and testing are executed in-house. Products are made to order 
and modular. The company customizes its produce by adapting the operational software 
of the converter(s) to the customer’s needs. Therefore, much of the development work 
goes into the operational software. Vacon adheres to the Born Global label, having 
collected ca. 25% of sales revenues from outside the domestic market already in 1995.  
 
Faced with a small domestic market, Vacon’s objective from the outset was to build the 
widest worldwide distribution network possible. This global vision has come to fruition. 
In 2009, Vacon is the seventh largest supplier in its global industry and the largest 
focusing solely on frequency converters. The firm employs over 1200 people, has 
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development and production in Finland, the U.S., China, Italy and sales subsidiaries in 
27 countries. Finnish operations are spread between Vaasa, Tampere and Vantaa.  
 
The Development of Vacon in Phases 
 
Vacon founders were able to build on the extensive know-how accumulated already at 
ACEA, BBC Brown Boveri and Strömberg, all companies with interests vested in the 
frequency converter business prior to merging in to the ABB in 1988. Vacon’s 
introductory phase centered on finalizing the CX portfolio, released in 1995. After a 
favorable initial market response domestically, Vacon was not able to live up to 
expectations, which detracted some investor and led to a survival crisis, but the 
company was able to sign a crucial licensing agreement to secure the financial situation.  
 
Figure 8. Growth path and survival crisis of Vacon 
 
 
The commercial breakthrough that followed the survival crisis saw investments into 
sales subsidiaries and contracts with foreign distributors. Contacts established during 
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ABB times, helped Vacon executives recruit sales subsidiary managers from foreign 
markets as well as secure representation from distributors. With the increasing stature, 
U.S.-based multinationals became interested in Vacon, which lead to private-label and 
OEM deals that ensured a global breakthrough. After extensive investments in foreign 
sales subsidiaries and production units the firm began aligning global operations by 
means of a transnational management structure. Figure 8 shows Vacon’s growth phases. 
 
The Introductory Phase: The early years of Vacon are characterized by fast-paced 
international growth. Fueled by public financiers, Finnvera Tekes and the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry the founders began finalizing the first products upon firm inception. 
The CX product line was released internationally in early 1995, some 14 months later. 
The line proved a success and the firm was able to secure domestic customers and 
business looked set for growth. Yet, after an initial sell-to-stock, orders did not 
commence as hoped. This detracted some investors in 1996 and Vacon had to negotiate 
a high-interest loan to secure the short-term future of the company.  
 
Building on ties initiated during ABB times, Vacon executives licensed a Vacon 
component to U.S.-based manufacturer TB Woods, whom turned into a distributor the 
year after. The ca. 750 000 € deal was enough for Vacon to finance the high interest 
loan and secure the business financially. Backed by renewed financial prowess, Vacon 
was quick to pursue a global vision in operational terms and Vacon GmbH was 
established in Germany already in 1995, followed by a Swedish subsidiary soon after. 
The managerial seats in these and many of the subsidiaries that followed were staffed 
with people Vacon executives came to know during tenures at ABB or its predecessors. 
“…it (Sweden) was based on the contacts we had during Strömberg times, two fellows. 
And I think they were working, they jumped from ABB to Siemens, if I remember right. 
And we picked up, let’s say, refreshed the contacts…Germany is ABB friends, 
Netherlands is ABB friends, Sweden is Strömberg friends, Spain is ABB friends, UK is 
Strömberg and ABB friends” – Former CEO, Vacon. A network of distributors around 
Europe was also grounded on similar contacts, which saw Sweden, Portugal and Poland 
become the first important foreign markets.    
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1996 was the advent of the commercial breakthrough, as underlined by the strategic 
partnership signed with Finnish MNE (KCI) Konecranes in a deal whose negotiations 
were initiated already in 1994. The deal saw Vacon take over the inverter production of 
Konecranes  on  an  OEM-basis.  This  was  obviously  a  risky  move  for  Konecranes  as  
Vacon was still  far from financially stable.  Thus,  the MNE insisted on a 30% stake in 
the company and a seat on the board to have a say in strategic management. Vacon had 
little option but to comply, but despite the loss in managerial control, a deal with a large 
international firm increased the marketability of the start-up. 
 
Commercial Breakthrough and Foreign Growth: In 1997 Vacon became a private-
label supplier of U.S.-based Honeywell. The MNE was to sell CX products of the 
HVAC segment  (heating,  ventilation  air-conditioning),  mostly  to  the  U.S..  Soon after,  
Vacon Swiss elevator and escalator giant Schindler became the second large OEM 
account in 1998. In order to solidify its presence on global and especially North 
American markets, Vacon established ties with a second U.S.-based MNE. Again 
executive contacts proved crucial as manufacturing giant (Eaton) Cutler-Hammer was in 
search of a frequency converter supplier. The manager leading the search was a former 
colleague of Vacon’s CEO. The agreement, signed in 1998, stipulated that Cutler-
Hammer would sell Vacon products in the U.S. market, on a private label basis. 
 
The channels provided by European MNEs such as Konecranes and Schindler helped 
Vacon reach international prominence. It was quick to build on initial forays and 
proceeded with aggressive foreign expansion efforts by establishing sales subsidiaries in 
Italy (1998), Spain (1998), the Netherlands (1998), the UK, Singapore (1999), Austria 
(1999) and France (2000). Another driver behind FDI was the idea that Vacon could not 
cater for customers solely via intermediaries in providing installation and maintenance 
services. The strategic onus was to cover the main European markets with centrally 
positioned sales subsidiaries and distributors, an objective which was largely achieved 
by 1999. While the company had extracted its presence across Europe via sales 
subsidiaries, global markets, the U.S. chief among them, were mostly catered via OEM 
and private label channels provided by local MNEs. Towards the end of 1990s the 
impact of these MNE channels grew greatly, which lead to a global breakthrough.   
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Global Breakthrough and Expansion: In 1999 the strides made by Vacon’s major 
channel partners in markets outside Europe ensured a jump in global sales. The 35% 
year-end global sales ratio is a considerable increase from the 14% of 1998. Total 
revenues grew some 58% due in-part to high demand in Europe, where Vacon’s 
network of subsidiaries was already comprehensive. North American representation was 
solidified through U.S.-based MNE, Rockwell Automation, whose private-label 
supplier Vacon became in 2000. During the same year, the second line of Vacon 
products was released under the NX label and it slowly began replacing the CX 
generation of products. The NX series was largely based on customer feedback and 
provided higher performance and modularity. By the end of 2000, Vacon products had 
been sold to 100 countries, it had 5 private label and over 20 OEM customers. 
Operations had grown considerably and the board decided to execute an initial public 
offering in November 2000 at the Helsinki Stock Exchange.  
 
Cash reserves replenished from the IPO, Vacon moved to strengthen its network of 
sales subsidiaries within and, more importantly, outside Europe. A sales representative 
office was stationed in mainland China in 2000 and the following year Vacon signed 
several new distributor agreements in China, Korea, India and elsewhere in Asia. 
Overall, sales on the continent were heavily reliant on distributor performance. A 
decision to further extend operations came in the wake of the global economic dip 
commencing from the collapse of the IT bubble coming to 2001, which also affected the 
global market of frequency converters. Amid economic uncertainty sales subsidiaries 
were established in quick succession in Norway (2001), Belgium (2002) and Russia 
(2002) as Europe remained the hub of the business. Some 70% of annual revenues were 
collected from the home continent between 1999 and 2003 on average.  
 
In 2002, Vesa Laisi was named CEO of Vacon as his predecessor Veijo Karppinen 
assumed  the  role  of  vice-chairman  of  the  board.  Laisi  was  given  the  task  of  
transforming Vacon into a truly global company, which he thought necessitated 
international production operations. At the time of his arrival, Vacon was experiencing a 
considerable slow-down in growth as the 8% increase in total revenues coming from 
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2001 to 2002 was a far-cry from the ca. 80% average in annual growth of the six 
previous years. Amid the economic downturn, Vacon’s growth was largely due to the 
development of Asian markets as European and North American markets shrank.  
 
The midway of the decade approaching, executives saw that the increasingly global 
operations of Vacon demanded re-structuring if growth was to be sustained. The 
successful management of working capital in the challenging market situation of the 
past few years helped finance plans for further organic growth in 2003, which included 
inserting  a  common  ICT  platform  for  global  operations  to  make  processes,  principles  
and tools more uniform internationally. Investments were also made into service 
support and marketing programs to enhance channel performance. In 2003, Vacon 
began to structure the organization around three business areas: Component Customers, 
Solution Customers and OEM & Brand Label Customers. Each business area was given 
its own process, area of expertise and competitive strategy. Changes made to the 
regulatory environment of China in 2003, made FDI a possibility and prompted Vacon 
to establish a sales subsidiary and a R&D unit in Suzhou. 
 
In 2004, the firm signed a joint venture agreement for the design and development of 
frequency converters with U.S.-based Rockwell Automation. The firm also re-visited its 
global brand and started operating under the “Driven by Drives” label to emphasize 
both technical expertise and a customer-driven approach.    
 
Global Rationalization and Maturity: After recovering from the dot.com collapse, the 
global frequency converter market began a sharp increase in 2005. To meet growing 
demand, Vacon opened its first foreign manufacturing facility in Suzhou China, where 
the firm wanted to emulate the highly successful domestic manufacturing platform. The 
move was made in-line with the strategy to usher in a transnational management model, 
which  was  to  synthesize  the  global  ICT  platform  and  business  area  restructuring  
initiated a few years earlier as well as introduce uniform development models across 
international production operations. Vacon also sought economies of scale in upstream 
activities by contracting global suppliers: “We have a, we call it transnational 
management model. The way how we manage the company nowadays. Meaning that 
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certain processes are global, but then we give also local empowerment, so that certain 
processes can be done in a local way. In a nutshell this is the way. What does it mean in 
practice, it means that we have common ITC tools, we have the same manufacturing, 
assembly lines. We have the same product development models, we try to utilize the 
same suppliers as much as possible. So those are common.” - CEO, Vacon. 
 
Spurred by growing demand, Vacon strengthened its global presence further by opening 
sales subsidiaries in the United Arab Emirates (2005) India and Australia (2006) along 
with representative offices in Thailand (2006) and Brazil (2007). 
 
The global market for frequency converters experienced its third consecutive year of 
strong growth in 2007, mainly owing to climbing energy prices and the construction 
boom in Asia and Russia. Due to the increasingly global stature of operations, Vacon 
began to coordinate operations and build on geographical integration. This meant 
dividing operations into three major sales regions, namely EMEA, Asia Pacific and 
North & South America, all of which were provided with organizational autonomy as 
well as an individual sales director. The marketing function, in turn, was largely 
centralized, which means that e.g. branding was done in Finland. The intent was to 
provide regional autonomy in sales, servicing and operational marketing across global 
customer segments, whilst avoiding functional duplications through centralized strategic 
marketing  as  well  as  common  ICT,  R&D  and  manufacturing  platforms.  From  a  
branding perspective, the firm started to promote its products under the “Cleantech” 
label in response to growing demands for eco and energy efficiency in industry.  
 
With the new management structure in-place Vacon was able to acquire and integrate 
the frequency converter business of U.S.-based TB Woods relatively seamlessly into its 
extant operations over the course of 2007 and 2008 along with two manufacturing 
facilities in the U.S. and Italy respectively. In 2008 Vacon pursued organic growth by 
establishing a sales subsidiary in the Czech Republic, South Korea, Mexico, Canada and 
Denmark as well as representative offices in Slovakia, Romania and the Ukraine. The 
global economic downturn that commenced in late  2008 had a negative impact also on 
the global frequency converter market. After 14 years of consecutive growth in annual 
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revenues, Vacon’s total sales decreased by ca. 8% from the previous year in 2009, 
leaving executives with a challenge in turning the tide. Subsequent maneuvers were 
aimed at pursuing only prioritized growth investments and procedural enhancements 
while balancing these with the development in demand.   
 
Foreign Operations Mode Development: Vacon was quick to tackle foreign markets 
through a variety of modes. Export to European markets began in 1995, followed by a 
licensing agreement to the U.S., the same year. The first sales subsidiaries were also 
established in 1995 to Germany and Sweden respectively. Strategic co-operation 
commenced during the commercial breakthrough with a private label agreement in 1997 
(U.S),  followed  by  the  first  foreign  OEM  agreement  (U.S.)  in  1998  and  a  R&D  joint  
venture in 2004 (U.S.) during global breakthrough. The first foreign production unit was 
established in China in 2005 also during the global breakthrough, while the first 
acquisition of a foreign firm (U.S) was completed in 2008 during global rationalization.  
 
Development of the Product Offering: Vacon has released three “generations” or 
distinct lines of products: the CX in 1995, the NX in 2000 and the M generation in 
2009. A new generation incrementally phases out the previous generation, whilst also 
gradually adding new products to the overall range. It took the NX product family some 
six years to fully replace and complement the CX family, while the more recent 
introduction  of  the  M family  means  that  the  contemporary  offering  ranges  across  two 
product lines. The amount of products has increased from the ca. 50 introduced to the 
market in mid ‘90s to ca. 150 in 2009.  
 
The product families within lines can be divided into product groups, based on customer 
segments Vacon caters for, i.e. distributors/end-users, system integrators, private label 
customers and original equipment manufacturers, whose requirements regarding 
operating voltage and functionality differ. Each product group is based on its own 
design platform, which has ensured product standardization economies, especially 
towards latter phases of growth, as the overall product portfolio has grown.  
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In addition to the main physical elements i.e. the power and control units, frequency 
converters require a software application - a set of selectable functions that ultimately 
specify the end-use. In a bid to differentiate from the competition, Vacon uses common 
industry standards (PC/Windows) in software application programming, as opposed to 
the proprietary standards used by many of its MNE competitors. Thus, the software can 
be easily customized depending on end-user requirements. Additionally, a number of 
data interfaces enable the rather seamless integration of Vacon frequency converters and 
a given (industrial) automation system. Whilst building on the manufacturing and 
standardization economies facilitated by common design platforms, Vacon is able to 
provide mass customization via operational software.  
 
Since the launch of the first generation of products in 1995, Vacon has provided 
installation, spare parts, and maintenance services. The company has expanded its 
service networks via sales subsidiaries and partners. In 2000, a strategic emphasis was 
placed on building an extensive customer service network to help deliver on the promise 
of 24h customer service internationally.  
 
Fast-paced international expansion has also presented product adaptation challenges for 
Vacon. Despite an increase in standardization via common product platforms, regional 
characteristics and application specifics demand product adaptation:“It seems so that it's 
very difficult to sell the same product globally speaking. We need to have optimized 
solutions for different regions, plus then, different applications are asking for different 
features, and sometimes, in order to be, to have a competitive product offering, the 
product needs to be optimized for applications as well…” -  CEO,  Vacon.  Whilst  the  
need to adapt products has increased with foreign expansion, Vacon sees adaptation 
requirements as a growth limitation, but also an entry barrier to the industry.   
 
Survival Crises: Vacon’s first and only survival crisis came in 1995 when a failure to 
meet domestic sales targets detracted the main financiers, resulting in a dire financial 
situation. The sum paid by TB Woods when licensing a Vacon component was used to 
finance an outstanding high-interest commercial loan to keep the company in business. 
Table 8 summarizes the growth phases and survival crisis of Vacon. 
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Table 8. The growth phases of Vacon 
Phase 1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough and 
expansion  
4. Global 
rationalization and 
maturity  
Key strategy  Focus on networking 
to establish 
intl./global (NA) 
foothold via MNE 
partners channels, 
foreign distributors 
and sales 
subsidiaries.  
Leverage MNE 
partner’s channels 
and strengthen sales 
subsidiary/distributor 
networks for further 
international (EUR) 
penetration.  
Strengthen global 
distributor and sales 
subsidiary networks 
(Asia, ME, AUS, 
Africa). Leverage 
MNE partners 
channels for further  
NA penetration. 
Adopt “Glocal” 
management 
structure: 
-Autonomy for 
regional sales 
divisions 
-common ICT, 
manufacturing and 
R&D platforms. 
-centralized 
marketing. 
Size of the firm 
(employees/ 
sales ? € ) 
1995-1996 
Employees: 12-51 
Sales: 0-8M 
1997-1998 
Employees: 96-141 
Sales: 17-28M 
1999-2006 
Employees: 220-618 
Sales: 44 - 186 M 
2007-2009 
Employees: 772-1231 
Sales: 232-293 M 
Global division 
of sales 
(approx.)* 
DOM: 49% (1996) 
EUR: 37% (1996) 
GLOB: 14% (1996)  
DOM: 30% (1998) 
EUR: 56% (1998) 
GLOB 14% (1998) 
DOM: 20% (2001) 
EUR: 47% (2001) 
GLOB 33% (2001) 
DOM: 21% (2009) 
EUR:45%   (2009) 
GLOB 34% (2009) 
Evolution of  
foreign 
operation 
mode(s)  
Sales: 
-Distributors;  
EUR, NA 
-Subsidiaries; EUR 
Contractual:  
-Licensing; NA 
Strategic/co-op: 
-OEM  
Sales:  
-Distributors; Asia 
-Subsidiaries; Asia 
Strategic/ co-op: 
-Private label (NA) 
 
Sales: 
-Distributors; 
 ME, AUS 
-Subsidiaries;  
ME, AUS 
 Production: 
-Subsidiaries;  
Asia(China) 
Strategic/co-op: 
-Acquisition;  
Production 
subsidiaries; U.S., 
Italy  
Products CX series of 
frequency 
converters/services  
Extended CX series of 
frequency  
converters/services 
CX and NX - series’ of 
frequency 
converters/services   
NX and M-series’ of 
frequency 
converters/services 
Networks ABB legacy: 
-distributor deals 
-licensing agreement  
-subsidiary staff 
MNEs’ channels: 
-KCI Konecranes  
-Honeywell 
-Schindler  
-Cutler-Hammer  
MNEs: 
-product 
development 
Suppliers: 
-global sourcing 
Acquisition - 
TB Woods Drives:   
-sales channels 
-suppliers 
 
Survival crisis 
in end of phase  
Financial. a failure to 
meet domestic sales 
targets detracts 
financiers. 
- - - 
*DOM = domestic sales, EUR = foreign sales within Europe, GLOB = sales outside Europe  
 
Factors Influencing the Growth and Survival of Vacon  
 
Industry Development since Establishment: In a 2009 survey, commissioned by 
Vacon, the global market for frequency converters totals at 5.7 billion Euros and prior 
to a 16% decline in 2008, had grown at an approximate annual compound rate of 6-10% 
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since 2000. Vacon holds a ca. 5% share of the global market. The world's largest 
manufacturers of frequency converters are MNEs, offering a broad range of other 
products e.g. ABB and Siemens. A narrow focus helps Vacon emphasize customer 
orientation via a number of servicing outlets and build competitive advantage on a more 
consultative form of sales. The industry is highly fragmented and dominated by 
traditional triad countries. While there are large MNE’s present, consolidation has not 
taken place to a large extent. Vacon sees the size and potential of the current industry as 
the main sources of its dynamism and does not foresee consolidation in the near future. 
Also, the industry is not heavily regulated regionally nor country-specifically par a few 
exceptions like the special permit required when selling to Iran.   
   
Vacon has  reason  to  credit  the  industry  for  providing  a  platform for  growth,  not  least  
due to megatrends demanding energy efficiency: “…the drivers behind the market 
growth, I guess, are the most important (factors of growth)”- CEO, Vacon. 
  
Development of Most Critical Resources and Capabilities since Establishment: The 
founding engineers of Vacon were largely part of the same product development team at 
ABB and had over 100 years of experience of frequency converters in total in one of the 
most successful units of the MNE. In addition to technical ability; they were familiar 
with “concurrent engineering” i.e. the joint development and testing of product (line)s, a 
novel  approach  in  the  early  1990s.  Veijo  Karppinen,  the  first  CEO  of  Vacon  and  
previous head of the development team at ABB had considerable experience from 
managerial posts at the MNE. He also consulted former colleagues from his time at 
Strömberg on the managerial aspects of running a start-up, as they had established a 
spin-off, Vaasa Engineering some five years earlier.  
 
The importance of technological capability is underlined when identifying the critical 
growth factors for Vacon. Traditional frequency converters have extensive manual 
settings for installation. Vacon removed this hindrance by modulating the hardware 
with software. The (largely unprecedented) combination, allows for mass production 
and wide-scale customization which proved instrumental in carving a niche from a 
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market dominated by MNEs with substantial economies of scale. The constantly 
expanding family of products is further evidence of the R&D capabilities at Vacon.  
 
Sales and marketing capabilities have also played an important role in developing the 
business. Sensitivity to the market and customer orientation have always been of high 
importance at Vacon, as evidenced by e.g. the 24h service concept driven by a 
worldwide network of outlets, a consultative approach to sales and the continued 
emphasis on feedback in development efforts: “It's (a key capability) the, if we start 
from the front line, it's the product know-how close by the customer…” - CEO, Vacon. 
 
The fact that the company has widely introduced slogans such as “Driven by drives” or 
“Cleantech” in recent years, underlines a change toward a more brand conscious 
approach in a bid to compete with the strong brands of MNE competition. According to 
executive understanding, however, branding capability is still in-demand at the firm.  
 
Networking capability has also been of fundamental importance to Vacon, outlined by 
how executives were able to rely on contacts when establishing ties with foreign 
distributors and staffing subsidiaries. Networks also played a major part in contracting 
major OEM and private label customers. From a sales perspective, networking 
capability is also required to win contracts in some market segments, such as the marine 
business where construction is based on networked suppliers. In sourcing, networking is 
a must in order to work with the best low-cost providers. Vacon’s manufacturing 
operations are heavily based on the use of networked suppliers. Also, had it not been for 
the acquaintances at TB Woods whom facilitated an early licensing agreement, it is 
debatable whether Vacon would have survived its first and only survival crisis. 
 
To sustain organizational growth, Vacon has constantly renewed its resource and 
capability base via recruitment mindful of long-term strategic objectives. Central to the 
policy is balancing out periods of growth with proactive investments in order to sustain 
development of the resources in response to the dynamics of the external environment.   
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When examining the importance of different factors with regards to the growth phases 
of Vacon, there seems to be certain fluctuation as to the most important resources and 
capabilities at each stage. The founders were well vested with international experience, 
managerial and technical resources as well as capabilities. While R&D and innovative 
production processes were central in the early phases, sales and networking capabilities 
increased in importance as the firm moved to penetrate foreign markets. The global 
breakthrough, in turn, was again fueled with R&D capabilities, while executive 
managerial capabilities were central when rationalizing maturing operations.  
 
Entrepreneurial Orientation and Lateral Rigidity: Vacon’s first CEO, Karppinen 
wanted to instill a culture devoid of authoritarian control, emphasizing employee 
empowerment in meeting customer demands. The culture was built on a vision and 
values that encouraged individual autonomy in realizing the mission of international 
growth. An important aspect of the value setting was to engage in competition by means 
of product and service differentiation through quality and customer responsiveness. 
Vacon wanted to foster innovation, through employee empowerment. With a customer 
orientated approach it was able to maintain sensitivity to the market and pool feedback 
from different market segments to respond to the dynamics of the external environment.   
 
In the early growth phases of Vacon, risk taking was quite rife as evidenced by heavy 
investments into growth opportunities such as foreign sales subsidiaries and R&D, as 
executives wanted to pursue fast-paced internationalization. With organizational 
maturity the company has also become more risk-averse in a bid to avoid survival crises 
resulting from fiscal irresponsibility etc. Yet, it still operates on the premise whereby an 
ability to sustain short-term failures is a must for organizational development. Whilst 
executives stress that management structures have not always developed on par with 
external dynamics, Vacon in 2009 relies on noticeably stricter control routines than in 
the  early  growth  phases,  as  underlined  by  e.g.  a  common  global  ICT  platform  and  
reporting requirements stemming from e.g. the fact that the company was publicly listen 
in 2000. The firm also has to contend with change resistance stemming from increased 
control measures and the company’s transformation into a more process-driven 
organization in aligning with the demands of a global operating environment.    
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Governmental Support: Vacon’s view of government support is mixed. The company 
directs some criticism toward the ambiguity of the roles as to which each individual 
governmental support institution should fulfill. The firm received R&D support from 
Finnvera in the early phases, when commercial prospects did not convince private 
investors. Finnvera’s support is seen as a substitute for what the company perceives as a 
largely non-existent venture capitalist representation in Finland, even more pronounced 
in the 1990s. Vacon also received financial support from the Ministry of Trade and 
Finance and Tekes. More recently, Tekes has provided the majority of governmental 
funding for Vacon, in support of R&D efforts. The funding is perceived important for 
growth, since private investors are sometimes hard to convince over the potential of the 
company due to the growing amount of working capital stemming from growth 
initiatives, especially as investments in R&D can take years to produce revenues.    
 
Vacon has also utilized the help of Finpro and sees the organizations value in 
conducting feasibility studies for foreign markets. After being an important enabling 
factor for growth to-date, there are some concerns related to the gradually decreasing 
amount of Tekes funding, a trend executives are keen to see reversed. The executive 
consensus at Vacon underlines governmental support as an enabler for growth overall. 
 
4.1.5 Non-survival Case Audibit - B2C/B2B Born International   
 
Turku-based Audibit LTD was founded in 1998 by innovator Markku Tikkala to deal in 
the emerging market of voice over internet (VoIP) electronics. The company primarily 
focused on the development and sales of PC VoIP connectable handsets and apparels. 
During a history of some five years, it was globally active, supplied both the industrial 
and consumer markets, employed a total of three people and amassed cumulative sales 
revenues above the one million Euro mark, before going out of business in early 2003.  
 
Audibit knew from the outset that the Finnish market would not suffice in such a niche 
business and international markets were pursued from the start. The vast majority of the 
firm’s revenues consistently came from foreign markets within Europe, whilst the 
respective portions of domestic and global sales remained relatively small throughout. 
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Already in 1999, some 60% of the total revenues were of foreign origin. Most indicative 
of the trend, however, was the year 2000, when sales hit a record high of ca. 530 000 €, 
over 90% of revenues came from European customers outside Finland, thus cementing 
Audibit as a Born International. 
 
The Development of Audibit in Phases 
 
Audibit was unable to fully realize a sustained commercial breakthrough and went out 
of business following a survival crisis some four years into commercial operations. 
While first opting to pursue the consumer market, the industrial markets quickly proved 
more appealing and an extension of the market focus, in the introductory phase, to 
incorporate industrial customers and especially those demanding customized solutions 
won short-term commercial success. Despite a promising start to industrial sales, a 
heavy decrease in demand coupled with challenges in contracting channel partners and 
maintaining a focused approach to the market, proved detrimental to the company soon 
after. Figure 9 illustrates the developments of Audibit leading to non-survival.     
 
Figure 9. Growth path and survival crisis of Audibit 
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The Introductory Phase:  During his time working for previous employer, handset 
manufacturer, Miratel Systems, Tikkala had garnered product know-how and decided to 
test it against the prospects of the up-and-coming VoIP market. Tikkala was joined by 
long-term friend, product development engineer Jari Virta, half a year later, in early 
1999. The initial focus of Audibit was the consumer market, whose untapped potential 
was rising with the promise of low-cost communication and increasing adoption of 
broadband connections. After a preliminary design and development phase of some six 
months, the first products were released in late 1999.  In an important development for a 
resource strained start-up, founder Tikkala was able to secure the production rights to an 
internationally accredited plastics platform for a handset from former employer Miratel, 
before founding Audibit. This was crucial, because the average prices for designing and 
accrediting such molds were high at the time. Soon after, public financier Finnvera was 
convinced of the potential of the firm and provided seed money to the start-up.    
 
After dedicating the bulk of 1998 to development work, Tikkala received a patent for a 
handset component in 1999. Although Audibit had been tentatively testing the market 
by  opening  contacts  with  foreign  as  well  as  domestic  wholesalers  and  telecom  
operators, the patent proved central in securing another public financier; Sitra. The 
financial injection from Sitra The start-up was based in a small product development 
facility within the Turku area and began building on the core competencies of product 
design and development in addition to sales and marketing, whilst utilizing local sub-
contractors in manufacturing. Sub-contractors included local SME manufacturers and 
governmentally subsidized work activity centers for product assembly.  
 
The total sales in 1999 only amounted to ca. 25 000 €, the bulk of which came from test 
samples. The foreign sales surpassed the domestic ones already in the first year of 
commercial operations, whilst global sales were not yet achieved. With the Sitra 
investment, balancing out the slow start, Audibit was able to recruit Account Manager 
Mika Alamäki, from his post of VoIP Product Manager at Telecom operator Sonera, to 
administer international sales and marketing.  
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Demand in the consumer market had not developed in the way the founders had hoped, 
despite efforts to the contrary. The start-up e.g. contracted Finnish wholesaler 
Toptronics as a re-seller. The deal, signed late in 1999, saw Toptronics forward a 
bundled internet telephony package to domestic retailers. A similar agreement was 
pursued with Danish wholesaler Kiss, but negotiations never lead to a deal. While the 
consumer market was potentially lucrative, end-users shunned the high price and 
installation efforts that were associated with early VoIP solutions.  
 
Audibit also opened up its own sales channel via an online store in 2000. Based on 
tentative interest stemming from trade fair showings as well as the firms internet site, 
the market focus was extended to include industrial markets where businesses were 
targeted via systems integrators, such as telecom operators and application service 
providers. The company was also receiving an increasing amount of enquiries for 
customized solutions, mainly from different service industries where cost-efficient VoIP 
telecom was viewed as a shrewd investment. As a result, Audibit began to pursue three 
distinct customer segments, (1) private individuals (via the Audibit online store and re-
sellers),  (2)  corporations,  whom use  IP  telephony through their  own intranet  platform 
(via ASP or a telecom operator, if needed) and (3) businesses demanding specialized 
applications i.e. internet kiosks and cafés etc.  
 
Commercial Breakthrough and Foreign Growth: In early 2000, industrial segments 
were not developing as expected due to difficulties in opening up sales channels. When 
engaging in partnership negotiations with domestic telecom operators, the firm found it 
difficult to find a collaborative platform for business, due to the fact that VoIP 
telephony presented a threat to traditional telephony and many domestic telecom 
operators did not want to risk cannibalizing their main business. As a result, Audibit 
was practically devoid of potential Finnish telecom partners. Thus, the firm intensified 
efforts to contract foreign telecom operators willing to explore the possibilities of VoIP. 
The idea was to market to firms that develop software clients and provide solutions for 
IP telephony, but do not manufacture hansets. In this channel, Audibit could compete 
with low-cost suppliers due to the high-end international standard approvals accredited 
to its handset casings via the Miratel plastics platform, retrieved by the founder.   
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The move paid dividends shortly after as, German IP telephony operator Swyx signed 
an agreement with Audibit. The deal saw Audibit supply the former with handsets on-
demand and was to evolve into a full OEM agreement the following year. It was signed 
midway through 2000 and was soon followed by others, as French-based Alcatel was 
signed to a comparable agreement. The telecom giant found Audibit handsets ideal for a 
standardized IP telephony solution for corporations. Alcatel proved an important re-
seller, since it also negotiated FCC approvals for the three handsets in Audibit’s 
portfolio at the time, subsequently opening up the U.S. market. Another emerging VoIP 
empowered service in 2000, involved facilitating PC-based calls to regular landlines. 
Here, U.S.-based Delta Three established contacts with Audibit with a view on using its 
handsets in a PC-to-landline service. Since the consumer market was not developing as 
expected, Audibit decided to build on the recently received FCC approvals by 
intensifying e-commerce efforts and contracting a U.S.-based sales agent. 
 
Despite widespread foreign representation, volumes remained small, until midway 
through 2000 when UK-based easyEverything contacted Audibit through supplier Delta 
Three in search of high-quality handsets for its international chain of cafés. The 
resulting deal, some 270 000 € in value, considerably boosted sales revenues for 2000 
and 2001. Towards the end of 2000, Audibit’s reference list had grown to include 
household names, such as, Nokia, Cisco Systems and the Merlin Group. However, the 
vast majority of all Audibit’s deals were still rather small in quantity, usually including 
only downwards from a hundred handsets each  Meanwhile, global interest for Audibit 
products was increasing as samples were sent to the likes of Vietnamese, Canadian, 
Korean, Nigerian and Russian customers. In Europe similar ties were established with 
Italian, Swiss and Swedish customers, adding to the aforementioned country markets of 
France, Germany and the UK. Many of the contacts were established at the CEBIT fair.  
 
Consumer sales via the internet were not picking up as expected. To generate demand, 
Audibit dedicated more resources towards e-commerce by investing in an online 
marketing campaign and co-marketing with internet service provider SurfEU, a contact 
also provided by supplier Delta Three. However, Audibit’s revenues began to decline in 
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2001, a year which also saw the January release of Audibit’s second line of products 
the, U-series. The novelty of the new series was that its two models were the first in the 
market, connectable via the USB port. The release of the USB series of phones was met 
with tentative interest from Audibits existing and potential customers and resulted in an 
OEM agreement between Audibit and Swyx. The deal was to secure larger volumes and 
a more fixed rate of supply of handsets to Germany, but proceedings quickly hit an 
obstacle  as  Swyx  discovered  a  persistent  defect  in  a  U-series  handset.  This  drove  
Audibit into lengthy re-design efforts and postponed any potential windfall.  
 
After the setback Audibit continued to pursue growth via other avenues. The firm had 
also attracted a competitor in the form of ITEM. The French handset provider was 
building a competitive advantage on production economies provided by the use of 
Chinese manufacturers, but lacked the technical expertise to produce USB phones. The 
two companies were both searching for customers, which eventually resulted in a 
partnership. Audibit was now able to add a fourth product to the S-series, the S40, 
which was a low-prized consumer handset sourced directly from ITEM, whom was 
given the production and distribution rights of an Audibit USB handset. 
  
During 2001, Audibit added the likes of Singapore, the Netherlands, Ireland and Japan 
to its portfolio of markets but revenues were not growing. The potential usage of VoIP 
technologies had collected some momentum in various service sectors and Audibit was 
still approached by organizations that were searching for an application that required 
specific modifications to the handsets. Yet, the sporadic nature of these contracts did 
little to unease the long-term concerns. Revenues for 2001 fell some 41% from the year 
before. In the wake of increasing uncertainty, Audibit representatives attended several 
trade fairs, in hopes of sales leads and brand awareness and enrolled in the Finpro 
SPRING program in early 2002 as well as signed an agreement with local systems 
developer Firstcom, detailing a joint R&D project, 
 
In 2002, monthly revenues were dropping incrementally from the year before, which 
forced the company to deliver software development and electronics design services on-
demand to substitute for unutilized production capacity and keep the business going. 
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While Audibit was able to add the likes of Belgium, India, Luxemburg, Portugal and 
Australia to its portfolio, it was unable to penetrate any country markets beyond one or 
two customers per country. Furthermore, large accounts in the frame of Alcatel and 
Swyx were not able to push the product down the channel which resulted in a lack of 
follow-ups to the first high-volume orders, while online sales remained next to non-
existent. Midway through 2002 the sustainability of the company could be heavily 
questioned and Account Manager Alamäki was forced to continue on a part-time basis 
before leaving the company in December.  After a disappointing end to 2002, that saw 
revenues drop another 18% from the year before, Audibit filed for bankruptcy in early 
2003. The high-priced handsets were found of insufficient utility by the public and were 
replaced by low-cost head-sets, microphones and receivers built-in to the PC.  
 
Foreign Operations Mode Development: Audibit’s foreign sales were largely the result 
of own export activities, starting already in 1999, with Sweden being the first export 
market. Additionally, the company engaged in two types of strategic cooperation 
agreements by signing a licensing contract with French-based ITEM in 2001 and 
several OEM-type of agreements also starting in 2001 with Germany-based Swyx.     
 
Development of the Product Offering: The first generation of products, the S-series 
was released in 1999. It consisted of three handsets, the S100, S140 and S340. The 
company additionally released its own software client for making VoIP calls on the PC, 
holders for the handsets as well as branded peripherals used to connect the hardware to 
the PC. The S-series was largely responsible for all revenues, despite the release of the 
USB connectable U-series in 2001 with a range of two handsets, the U160 and I500.  
 
In addition to the largely standardized models of the two series’ Audibit made 
considerable customer-specific modifications to cater for the special applications 
segment. The business model, based on sub-contracting and on-demand production, 
enabled the company to be highly responsive to specific customer demands: “…I would 
say that we never said no to any customer who asked maybe to some modification or 
something like this...” -  Former  AM,  Audibit.  The  firm  was  also  able  to  build  on  
standardized design and technology platforms and make adaptations cost efficiently.  
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A result of customer-specific adaptation was the S190 model, which was manufactured, 
specifically to cater for the needs of the firm’s largest account and subsequently added 
to the S-series. Also, through an OEM agreement signed with French-based ITEM in 
2001, Audibit was able to contract a low-cost consumer segment handset, dubbed the 
S40. In addition to customer specific adaptation, Audibit incurred some country-specific 
adaptation requirements, common to dealing in the international markets of consumer 
electronics. The EU regulates the use of some materials in consumer electronics, while 
some membership countries choose to enforce even stricter criteria for suppliers. Yet, 
once the new modifications were implemented into the standard product platform, 
Audibit was able use largely the same design in all foreign markets as long as it adhered 
to the strictest country-specific criteria i.e. the German one.  
 
Survival Crises:  While the lack of a sufficient demand for VoIP handsets is perhaps the 
largest influence behind Audibit’s banktrupcy, the company is also left to speculate as 
to whether it pursued an overly ambitious and unfocused range of segments from the 
start, highlighted by how consumers quickly shunned the handsets. While the industrial 
market  was  a  different  story,  Audibit  allocated  a  great  deal  of  time  and  resources  to  
contracting established telecom operators in the hopes of utilizing their channel prowess 
in selling to business customers. Yet, established telecom operators opted out of the 
opportunity to become systems integrators in the fear of cannibalizing their business.  
 
A more focused product scope from the start, concentrated on finding the right channel 
partners i.e. systems integrators from the likes of experimental telecom operators as well 
as software developers, might have provided a more stable platform for business. After 
all, barring the lucrative easyEverything contract, the most sustainable customer 
relationships were established with the likes of Alcatel and Swyx, both of whom fit the 
mentioned profile: “I think there are (were) a lot of companies who are making 
software clients to the system. And I think, and it should be so that we increase with 
those companies to make handset to that kind of firm.” – Former  PMD,  Audibit.  The  
lack of focus was further accentuated towards the end as the firm was forced to take on 
customer projects outside its area of focus in order to stay afloat. Table 9 summarizes.   
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Table 9. The growth phases of Audibit 
Phase 1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough and 
expansion  
4. Global 
rationalization and 
maturity  
Key strategy  Secure re-sellers 
internationally from 
wholesalers, telecom 
operators, and 
electronics 
manufacturers to 
cater for B2C and 
B2B markets.  
Focus on B2B market 
via on-demand 
special applications 
and through OEM 
customers and 
system integrators.  
Establish own sales 
channel via online 
store  
INACTIVE INACTIVE 
Size of the firm 
(employees/ 
sales ? € ) 
1999 
Employees: 2 
Sales: 25K 
2000-2003 
Employees: 3-2 
Sales: 530K – 5300 
INACTIVE INACTIVE 
Global division 
of sales 
(approx.)* 
DOM: 40%(1999) 
INT:  60%  (1999) 
DOM: 10% (2000) 
INT  85%  (2000) 
GLOB: 5% (2000) 
INACTIVE INACTIVE 
Evolution of  
foreign 
operation 
mode(s)  
Own Export Contractual: 
-Licensing 
-OEM 
-R&D 
INACTIVE INACTIVE 
Products S-series of VoIP 
handsets 
S and U-series’ of 
VoIP handsets   
INACTIVE INACTIVE 
Networks Suppliers’ 
-subcontracting 
network  
Channel partners’  
-new customers (e.g. 
easyEverything) 
-marketing synergies 
INACTIVE INACTIVE 
Survival crisis 
in end of phase  
- A lack of demand and 
an unfocused product 
scope lead to non-
survival 
INACTIVE INACTIVE 
*DOM = domestic sales, EUR = foreign sales within Europe, GLOB = sales outside Europe  
 
Factors Influencing the Growth and Survival of Audibit  
 
Industry Development since Establishment: Internal estimates outline, the industry 
remained rather stagnant throughout the operative history of Audibit. Looking at the 
developments of the firm it can be speculated as to whether the industry actually 
diminished from its peak in 2000 and not vice versa. According to internal insights, the 
dot.com collapse also impacted negatively on VoIP telephony.  
 
During the time Audibit was active, the international market was populated by a few 
companies sharing roughly the same profile. However, the speculative potential of the 
market deterred entrants and many of Audibit’s competitors shared the same fate. 
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Audibit representatives observe that the contemporary diminutive international market 
for VoIP handsets is  contested between a handful of MNEs, like Siemens and Phillips 
who sell some thousands of pieces yearly, which underlines a lack of general demand.   
  
While country regulations on the use of components differed, customer needs were 
similar across the globe. Traditional telephony is an appropriate analogy where Asian 
users  want  the  same functionality  from a  telephone  handset  as  do  European  ones  etc.  
Apart from country specific regulations on the use of materials in consumer electronics, 
the industry is largely devoid of trade barriers in Europe, because of the de-regulation of 
trade between EU member states. Thus, the only country market in Europe, where 
Audibit  had  to  concern  themselves  with  divergent  customs  regulations  was  that  of  
Switzerland, albeit this had little if any commercial impact. The U.S. market was a 
slightly different story, as sales of consumer products are conditional to the approval of 
the FCC, which Audibit was able to obtain via business partner Alcatel..  
 
To argue that a market did not exist for Audibit’s produce is an overstatement as the 
company was able to collect over 1M € in total sales, the bulk of which were 
accumulated at the early stages of the tentative commercial breakthrough. However, 
outlining how much of the early demand was fueled by the hype surrounding all IT 
produce at the time, is a different story entirely. In summary, the industry provided a 
platform for the business, but not a sustainable one:” That was exactly the problem, the 
markets didn’t grow so the market didn’t exist practically. Ok, naturally there was some 
market, because we were able to sell something…” - Former AM, Audibit. 
 
Development of Most Critical Resources and Capabilities since Establishment: Both 
Tikkala and Virta, the founding engineers of Audibit, had enjoyed long-standing 
careers, mainly in managerial product development roles in international high-tech 
companies. Tikkala left an ISDN phone manufacturer, to establish Audibit, while Virta 
signed on from a company designing navigation and GPS systems for the shipping 
industry. The pair originally met in the Tampere University of technology where 
Tikkala supervised Virta’s thesis. When establishing Audibit the two engineers had a 
combined total of some 30 years of experience working in internationally active 
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companies. Tikkala also had some ten years experience as entrepreneur, being one of 
the owners and founders of his previous employer. Based on a technical background 
Audibit’s business model was built on the design and sale of high-tech products. 
  
Obtaining a key resource in the form of a handset technology patent provided Audibit 
the governmental funds to invest in competences found lacking, namely sales & 
marketing, which were added in the form of Account Manager, Alamäki whom joined 
from his post as VoiP product manager from a large domestic telecom operator. A 
telecommunications engineer by education, Alamäki had collected some ten years of 
experience in export marketing working for his previous employers. An example of the 
marketing capability vested in Audibit thereafter, was the successful employment of e-
commerce to substitute the lack of mass marketing resources.   
 
Early on Audibit also exhibited branding capability by building a corporate brand. The 
firm e.g. hoped to attract editorial publicity via sending handsets to trade journals. The 
results were positive, since e.g. the S140 received an Editor’s Choice Award in the 
Internet Telephony Journal. After opting to focus more on industrial segments, the 
company however, opted for a less resource consuming OEM supplier approach to 
branding: “Well, we at least tried to create a brand and um, here is a slogan: “Audibit, 
Quality and Ease of Use to PC Telephony”. So, we tried to brand Audibit to be a 
quality, brand not a cheap but a quality high-priced brand... It was Audibit brand, 
which was the important one…no product brands. Actually we sold products also under 
other brands; OEM-based, like Swyx, for example…” -Former AM, Audibit.  
 
Audibit also demonstrated market sensing. Despite having to deal with a situation where 
there was limited information available of a newly-emergent market, managers tried to 
pool information from the internet and newspapers, while trade fairs, were treated as 
networking forums and opportunities to gather information in addition to just sales 
venues. Yet, the firm had difficulties in inserting the information into the customer 
interaction processes, owing to the perceived remoteness of the customer(s). 
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The small size of the venture demanded procedural flexibility from Audibit’s 
employees. In what can be considered a testament to the dynamic capabilities, the 
employees had to build on their previous experience to accept a wider range of 
organizational responsibilities than they were previously accustomed to. In negotiating 
resource scarcities, Audibit also exhibited networking capability. The business model of 
the firm was wholly based on utilizing local networked suppliers, whom Audibit 
managers had come acquainted with due to previous business engagements and as 
Turku natives. In other downstream activities, networking capability is evident how 
Audibit  was  able  to  leverage  the  networks  of  e.g.  customer  Delta  Three  to  secure  the  
highly influential easyEverything contract. Marketing and product development 
synergies were also obtained owing to networking capability. 
 
When discussing the resource and capability base of Audibit in broader terms, internal 
opinions suggest that while the company could have benefitted from additions, the 
results would have been similar nonetheless. Perhaps it is not the quantity, but the 
quality of the resources and capabilities that Audibit was devoid of that merits attention. 
According  to  insider  views  Audibit  could  have  made  use  of  the  insight  of  a  business  
manager and management capabilities to complement technological and marketing 
capabilities: “…maybe there was, we should have needed some manager to our 
company. So Markku was also more develop person, I am develop person and so on. 
There would have some money person also.”  - Former PM, Audibit. This is underlined 
by the company’s difficulties in finding a coherent approach to the market.   
 
While innovative technological capabilities were instrumental in establishing the 
foundation of the Audibit, they were later complemented by sales, marketing and 
dynamic capabilities, which facilitated the commercial breakthrough. One can speculate 
on the effects added managerial capabilities would have had in installing a more 
focused and business oriented approach. The question remains, whether more resources 
would have been able to change the outcome or merely prolong the inevitable.  
 
Entrepreneurial Orientation and Lateral Rigidity: The organizational culture at 
Audibit can be described as highly entrepreneurial, devoid of hierarchy and bureaucracy 
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as well as supportive of individual autonomy, which stems largely from the fact that the 
company only employed three people at most. Audibit can hardly be faulted for 
shunning risks. Much like many other companies founded on the commercial promise 
of the internet, it was established to contest a market whose perceived potential was 
more the result of cautious optimism than statistics etc.  Innovativeness was something 
all Audibit’s employees had in common and new ideas were perceived a necessity for 
keeping the company in business, which is why they were pursued eagerly. Maintaining 
a healthy list of orders meant that the firm had to constantly re-design its products and 
processes to provide for the diversity in demand.     
 
Devoid of information relating to the global stature or the development potential of the 
industry, Audibit chose to pursue a variety of customer segments in the hopes of 
promptly finding the most lucrative one. Such an approach meant that in order to grow 
or, at the very least, survive the organization had to exert flexibility and quickly adapt to 
external dynamics e.g. the variation between requirements in different segments, which 
was answered by elasticity in product design. Because the market was practically 
devoid of competition, the firm could dedicate resources into locating further business 
opportunities, instead of aggressive competition. Thus, Audibit was proactive in 
pursuing growth opportunities via strategic partnerships etc.    
 
Audibit’s organizational culture remained largely unchanged throughout its operative 
history and while a willingness to take risks can be credited for establishing the 
company as well as some successful growth initiatives, it also provided the platform for 
an unfocused approach to the market. The high level of entrepreneurial orientation can 
be considered both a necessity for testing the potency of the market, and a handicap in 
its  tendency to stretch the limited resource base at  Audibit’s disposal across too many 
customer segments. In retrospect it seems that, neither Audibit nor its industrial 
customers knew the most opportune use for VoIP handsets, which made selling the 
application a daunting task, with obvious implications for firm survival.   
 
Governmental Support: In the advent of the introductory phase, Audibit was given 
start-up money by public financier Finnvera, whom saw promise in the company’s 
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provisional range of products. The same organization also aided Audibit in the 
investment that went into sourcing for the high volume deal signed with 
easyEverything. Finnvera later provided funds also for the development of the U-series 
of handsets and the financing was predominantly conditional to a tangible end-product. 
The commercial breakthrough of Audibit was partly facilitated by Sitra, whose outlay 
enabled the company to hire Account Manager Alamäki and invest in international 
marketing and sales efforts in addition to product development. Audibit also benefited 
from the governmentally subsidized services of Finpro whose SPRING consultancy 
program, the management attended, albeit to little commercial effect. The consensus 
among Audibit representatives stipulates that the government support received was 
largely sufficient, while the firm could have made use of additional operational support 
in international sales, networking and locating potential customers.   
 
4.2 Cross-case Analysis  
 
In accordance with pattern matching (3.1.2), the following analyzes the differences and 
similarities across the five cases described in the previous chapter. The growth and 
survival factors, outlined in section 2 provide the reference points between cases in the 
analysis. In the analysis, cases Avant Tecno and Vacon are occasionally referred to as 
“high-performance” firms for adhering to the latter phases of growth at the time of 
writing. It is also important to note that, when discussing the findings in light of earlier 
studies, product manufacturing international new ventures are treated synonymously 
with international new ventures. Figure 10 exemplifies the growth patterns of the case 
firms.  
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Figure 10. Growth paths and survival crises of case firms 
 
Industry Growth Rate  
 
Since the studied active case firms operate in global niche segments, their performance 
has a considerable impact on how the industry develops i.e. the small groups of firms 
that specialize in these industries are jointly responsible for creating product awareness. 
The MNEs that choose to partake in such a niche market often rely on a more arms-
length approach, economies of scale and a strong manufacturer brand. Of the case 
companies those yet to secure a sustained commercial breakthrough; Innohome and 
IonPhasE, welcome additional competition to the market to promote product awareness 
and subsequently industry growth. The large PMINVs of the study; Avant Tecno and 
Vacon, in turn, attest to operating in industries, where despite competitive pressure, 
there is still potential for considerable industry growth.  
 
The active case firms were based in dynamic industries characterized by estimated 
annual growth rates between 5% and 25% and the high-performance firms benefited 
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from relatively higher industry growth rates until the global economic downturn, 
commencing in late 2008, and a decline in overall demand prompted rationalization 
efforts. Empirical evidence suggests that industry growth impacts PMINV growth 
positively, as implied by e.g. Oviatt and McDougall (1994). Furthermore, a lack of 
demand ultimately played a major part in Audibit going out of business. Thus, the 
present study concurs with Mudambi and Zahra (2007), in that growing industries seem 
to provide a more sustainable platform for PMINV survival. Table 10 summarizes.  
 
Table 10. Industry growth in case firm growth phases 
Company 
(Customer Markets) 
1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough 
and expansion  
4. Global 
rationalization 
and maturity  
Innohome (B2C) 
 
intermediate intermediate N/A N/A 
Avant Tecno (B2C/B2B) 
 
intermediate high high negative/low 
IonPhasE (B2B) 
 
intermediate high N/A N/A 
Vacon (B2B) 
 
high high intermediate negative/low 
Audibit (B2C/B2B) 
 
intermediate negative/low INACTIVE INACTIVE 
 INDUSTRY GROWTH RATE  
Scale: negative/low ? intermediate ? high | Based on primarily qualitative analysis. 
 
Industry Penetration by Foreign Firms and Global Seller Concentration  
 
The fact that none of the active case firms attests to operating in fiercely contested 
industries, is evidence that industries with low penetration rates for foreign firms and 
low global seller concentration make for sustainable survival platforms, as advocated by 
Mudambi and Zahra (2007). An overview of the exploits of the two high-performance 
firms suggests this relationship transcends into the domain of PMINV growth. Avant 
Tecno and Vacon both operate in fragmented industries where large-scale consolidation 
of suppliers has not taken place.  
 
Avant Tecno pioneered the market for multipurpose wheeled loaders and while it has 
since attracted one internationally active direct competitor, competition overall is highly 
regional and segment-specific. The global industry of frequency converter’s, where 
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Vacon operates, has similar characteristics. The market leader only holds an estimated 
17% of the market, while Vacon the seventh largest supplier, holds ca. 5%. The exploits 
of these firms suggest that low industry penetration rates for foreign firms and low 
seller concentration influence PMINV growth positively. Table 11 provides a summary.  
 
Table 11. Industry dynamics in case firm growth phases 
Company 
(Customer Markets) 
1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough 
and expansion  
4. Global 
rationalization 
and maturity  
Innohome (B2C) 
 
low low N/A N/A 
Avant Tecno (B2C/B2B) 
 
low low intermediate intermediate 
IonPhasE (B2B) 
 
low  intermediate N/A N/A 
Vacon (B2B) 
 
low low low intermediate 
Audibit (B2C/B2B) 
 
low intermediate INACTIVE INACTIVE 
 INDUSTRY PENETRATION BY FOREIGN FIRMS AND SELLER CONCENTRATION 
Scale: low ? intermediate ? high | Based on primarily qualitative analysis. 
 
Industry Globalization Drivers  
 
All of the active case firms operate in industries largely devoid of trade regulations and 
vested in globalization drivers (e.g Yip, 1989) such as common market conventions and 
technical standards. High performance case firms Vacon and Avant Tecno also cite the 
enabling effect of global megatrends, such as increased demand for energy efficiency 
and the mechanization of developing economies. The impact of globalization drivers 
seems more profound for consumer market PMINVs overall.  
 
Avant Tecno, Audibit and Innohome had to react to the varying nature of standards on 
consumer market(s). For them, differences in technical, environmental and/or regulatory 
standards between countries or trade areas prompted needs to adapt the products or opt 
out of a given market due to protectionism etc. Avant Tecno and Audibit were mostly 
able to incorporate the required changes to product components or functionality and sell 
a similar, if not the same product across markets. Innohome, in turn, had to release a 
product line extension to overcome the differences between the electrical standards of 
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Finland and Sweden, a resource consuming task which jeopardized firm survival. 
Empirical evidence suggests that the existence of industry globalization drivers 
influences PMINV growth positively, as advocated by Oviatt and McDougall, (1994). 
They also seem to influence survival positively. Table 12 summarizes.  
 
Table 12. Industry globalization drivers in case firm growth phases 
Company 
(Customer Markets) 
1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough 
and expansion  
4. Global 
rationalization 
and maturity  
Innohome (B2C) 
 
intermediate low N/A N/A 
Avant Tecno (B2C/B2B) 
 
high high intermediate intermediate 
IonPhasE (B2B) 
 
high high N/A N/A 
Vacon (B2B) 
 
high high high high 
Audibit (B2C/B2B) 
 
intermediate intermediate INACTIVE INACTIVE 
 LEVEL OF INDUSTRY GLOBALIZATION DRIVERS  
Scale: low ? intermediate ? high | Based on primarily qualitative analysis. 
 
Product Scope 
 
Case firm analysis suggests that product scope management has a substantial impact on 
PMINV growth and survival. Empirical evidence supports the findings of Boter and 
Holmquist (1996), whereby a narrow product offering is an enabler of high 
international business performance for innovative SME manufacturers. In fact, the 
ability to allocate available resources across an opportune amount of product lines at a 
given time is perhaps the main determinant of performance between the studied firms.     
 
The developments of Innohome, IonPhasE and Audibit suggest that an overly ambitious 
or unfocused product scope can severely hamper a firm’s progress along the stages of 
growth and/or have a detrimental effect on survival. One of the biggest reasons behind 
IonPhasE’s prolonged introductory phase was the insistence to divide R&D and sales 
efforts across two product lines: ready-made plastics film and granulate. After 
discontinuing film production, the firm no longer required the services of contract 
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manufacturers and was able to focus R&D efforts towards extending the granulate 
product line in a move that paved the way for a commercial breakthrough.  
 
Case Innohome, in turn, demonstrates how the domestic product range may not be 
international by default. The initial plan for Innohome’s expansion to Sweden included 
all three of the company’s product lines: guards for stoves, washing machines and small 
electric appliances. Because of differing technical standards, however, only two 
products from the stove guard line were ultimately chosen, albeit after considerable re-
design efforts and a resulting loss of good-will from distributors. Eventually, these 
developments lead to a survival crisis. Audibit also had product scope related 
difficulties that factored in the non-survival of the firm. After continuously failing to tap 
into the consumer market, the firm eventually found its niche from industrial 
applications made-to-order. When faced with a decrease in demand and a survival crisis, 
however, Audibit also began to deliver software development and electronics design 
services on-demand. This did little to alleviate the crisis and bankruptcy soon followed. 
 
An assessment of the developments conditional to product range experienced by the two 
high-performance firms of the study provides a contrast. Avant Tecno started out with 
three product lines, drill rig foundation units, tractor supplies and wheeled loaders, yet, 
the first two were maintained only to fund the R&D and sales efforts of the loaders. The 
firm’s commercial breakthrough coincided with focus being narrowed down to the 
loader product line, while the global breakthrough benefited from extending the product 
scope with the “mini-loader”, product line designed primarily for consumers.  
 
Vacon, on the other hand, has maintained a focus on frequency converters throughout 
all stages. Instead of branching out to wholly new products, the firm has gradually 
increased the number of products within the product range via each new line of products 
that incrementally phase out the preceding line, through performance and usability 
improvements. Thus, since the global breakthrough there have only been two lines in 
the range. Currently in its third generation, the number of products within the overall 
portfolio has tripled and it covers a variety of segments. Also, the release of a new line, 
has usually been followed by a transition to the next phase of growth.   
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In conceptual terms, the rationale behind the above-mentioned pattern seems 
straightforward.  During  early  stages  of  growth,  a  PMINV  can  ill  afford  deploying  
scarce resources across too many product lines and types, and by doing so risks growth 
and in severe cases survival. As more resource became available later, the PMINV may 
need to offset competitive pressures by extending the product scope, which is in-line 
with what Douglas and Craig (1989) assert on part of conventional firms. Table 13 
shows empirical evidence of the pattern via product scope developments in case firms.   
 
Table 13. International product scope development in case firm growth phases 
Company 
(Customer Markets) 
1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough 
and expansion  
4. Global 
rationalization 
and maturity  
Innohome (B2C) 
 
||| | N/A N/A 
Avant Tecno (B2C/B2B) 
 
||| | || || 
IonPhasE (B2B) 
 
|| | N/A N/A 
Vacon (B2B) 
 
| | || || 
Audibit (B2C/B2B) 
 
| || INACTIVE INACTIVE 
 NUMBER OF PRODUCT LINES IN INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO 
 
Product Adaptation 
 
The rate of product adaptation in relation to growth differed greatly between the 
industrial and consumer market case firms. With regard to B2C case firms, the entry of 
Audibit, Avant Tecno and Innohome to new foreign markets or trade areas was often 
conditional to product adaptations due to country market differences in regulation, 
technical standards or consumer preferences. Audibit had to alter product components, 
according to country-based regulations on consumer products. Avant Tecno needed to 
make adjustments to the products, because of the high ambient temperatures of certain 
working environments, whereas Innohome’s adaptation challenges stemmed from the 
varying technical standards between Finland and Sweden  
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The case firms catering B2B markets, in turn, were mostly devoid of adaptation 
requirements when it came to negotiating country-market differences. Yet, if the 
requisite of product adaptation is based on the differences between customer’s 
applications, the requirements of the studied B2B PMINVs and B2C PMINVs start to 
resemble each other, as shown by table 14. For Vacon the majority of new accounts are 
conditional to adjustments made to operational software, if not the frequency converter 
itself, whereas for IonPhasE each new account is subject to a concept proofing period 
where the granulate solution is adjusted to the client-specific application.  
 
Table 14. Product adaptation in case firm growth phases.  
Company 
 (Customer Markets) 
1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough 
and expansion  
4. Global 
rationalization 
and maturity  
Innohome (B2C) 
 
few several N/A N/A 
Avant Tecno (B2C/B2B) 
 
few several many several 
IonPhasE (B2B) 
 
few few N/A N/A 
Vacon (B2B) 
 
few few several few 
Audibit (B2C/B2B) 
 
few several INACTIVE INACTIVE 
 COUNTRY MARKET-BASED PRODUCT ADAPTATIONS 
 
Innohome (B2C) 
 
few few N/A N/A 
Avant Tecno (B2C/B2B) 
 
 few few several few 
IonPhasE (B2B) 
 
many several N/A N/A 
Vacon (B2B) 
 
few several  many many 
Audibit (B2C/B2B) 
 
several many INACTIVE INACTIVE 
 CUSTOMER APPLICATION-BASED PRODUCT ADAPTATIONS 
Scale:  few ? several ? many | Based on primarily qualitative analysis. 
 
Also, in their more advanced stages of growth, both high performance firms: Avant 
Tecno and Vacon have been able to draw production economies from standardized 
products as well as development and design platforms that cut across product types. 
Based on these examples, PMINV growth is conditional to increased product adaptation 
requirements on both consumer and industrial markets, albeit on the latter they stem 
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from (customer) application not country-specific differences. Product adaptation also 
seems to impact survival, but in a reverse manner. Consider how the failure to bring 
concept proofing periods to timely conclusions led to a survival crisis at IonPhasE or 
how the resource consuming adaptations Innohome undertook, to expand to Sweden, 
had the same outcome. Thus, while the commercial and global breakthroughs of INVs 
seem to benefit from product adaptations, excess resource commitments can also impact 
survival prospects negatively. Pressures in the global rationalization phase, in turn, 
seem increase the need to standardize products.   
 
Resource Amount and Governmental Support 
 
Upon their introduction to the market, none of the studied firms was able to build on an 
abundance of resources relative to the established firms within their respective 
industries. Avant Tecno purchased the remains of industrial manufacturer Ylötehtaat, 
including a sizeable production facility, and contracted its key blue and white collar 
employees albeit with the help of a high-interest commercial loan. It remains the largest 
of the case companies at the outset of operations with some 40 employees and 3,3M € 
of sales after the first year of operations. Other case firms relied on founding groups 
between 2 to 13 employees, more modest fundamentals and initial year-end sales.  
 
The case firm founder groups consisted of experienced product specialists and/or 
business managers, whose skill set is perhaps best distinguished through 
“innovativeness”. A trait that was shared by all PMINVs of the study, innovativeness 
transcended to managerial processes as well as technical aspects within the companies. 
For example, Innohome, draws from a business model where all functions peripheral to 
core competences are outsourced, providing the firm an alternative to ownership-based 
control of resources and associated risks.  
  
All active case firms manufacture high-tech products based on patented technologies, 
while inactive case firm Audibit also supplied a high-tech market. The importance of 
patents in offsetting the resource-based advantages of more established competitors was 
of pronounced importance, especially in the early phases. Patents often became the 
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tangible output of technological innovativeness vested in the companies. Patents 
attracted private and/or public financiers and lead the firms to pursue growth initiatives 
through improved financial resources. Consider, how Audibit reached a commercial 
breakthrough with the help of the public investment conditional to a technology patent. 
Also, after high-performance case firms Avant Tecno and Vacon had negotiated a 
commercial breakthrough, their increased stature and credibility coupled with growing 
demand helped attract further resources to the company and meant that growth 
initiatives were less dependent on outside financing. The resource base of these 
companies grew as they progressed through the growth phases.   
 
Governmental support provides a boost to a firm’s resource base and all case firms 
benefited from some type of government support. The vast majority of public financing, 
outside of start-up grants, took the form of product development subsidies, conditional 
to a patent or a tangible end-product. In some cases, the expenses from participating in 
trade fairs and seminars were also subsidized. In addition to financial support, the case 
firms also made use of governmentally subsidized consultancy services. 
 
Increase  in  the  amount  of  resources  seems  to  draw  a  parallel  with  PMINV  growth  
through phases. In the early phases, PMINVs may need to rely on intangible resources 
to make up for resource poverty relative to more established firms, but as they grow in 
stature and become less dependent on loan financing, resources need to be 
supplemented through growth initiatives, which upon opportune implementation 
produce a snowball effect in enforcing the resource base. It is also safe to say that a lack 
of resources, financial in particular, ultimately spells the end of a company. In as much 
as government support takes the form of a boost to a firm’s resource base, it influences 
PMINV growth and survival positively.  
 
Although difficult to tie to a precise timeline collectively, table 15 shows some generic 
trends in resource development conditional to the growth of the case firms. 
 
 
 141 
 
Table 15. Development of resources in case firm growth phases 
Resource Category 1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough 
and expansion  
4. Global 
rationalization 
and maturity  
Financial 
 
-Sweat capital 
-Governmental 
support (financial) 
-Commercial loans   
-Private financing 
-Governmental 
support (operational) 
 
-Based on Initial 
public offering 
 
N/A 
Intangible  
 
- Innovativeness 
-Founder contacts 
-International 
networks 
-Global 
networks 
-Brand equity 
Physical 
 
-Patents 
-R&D facility 
-Foreign sales 
subsidiaries 
-Mass production 
facilities 
 
-Foreign 
production 
facilities 
-Common ICT 
platform  
-Acquisitions 
(Brownfield FDI) 
Human -R&D 
-Sales 
-Managerial 
-Marketing 
-Administrative 
-Executive 
-Branding 
-Top executive 
 TRENDS IN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT   
 
Managerial Experience  
 
With the exception of IonPhasE, the founder groups of the case firms consisted of 
individuals whom had garnered long-term managerial experience from prior 
commitments. Thus, stock managerial experience (Reuber and Fischer, 1999) was 
relatively high in these firms already during their introduction to the market. The fact 
that IonPhasE greatly benefited from the recruitment of three experienced managers in 
reaching a commercial breakthrough suggests that the stock of managerial experience 
facilitates growth, but the impact is not entirely straightforward.  
 
According, to case firm developments, the stock of managerial experience within a 
company is more likely to facilitate growth and survival when coupled with stream 
experience (Reuber and Fischer, 1999) i.e. experience accumulated after firm 
establishment. This is evidenced by how the case firms took a number of years before 
making a commercial impact after registration. Case Innohome shows how experience 
collected at the home market is not readily applicable for foreign operations and 
underlines the impact stream experience has on growth. Innohome, was unsuccessful in 
learning the market of home safety-appliances domestically. Case IonPhasE, in turn, 
suggests that a lack of sufficient managerial experience may jeopardize the survival of 
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the company, since without the inclusion of experienced managers it is debatable 
whether the firm would have survived.   
 
In  General,  it  seems  that  the  combination  of  stock  and  stream  managerial  experience  
influences  PMINV  growth  positively,  where  a  lack  can  be  detrimental  to  the  firm.  
Based  on  this  analogy,  it  is  also  safe  to  assume  that  the  more  variety in  terms  of  the  
breadth and depth of managerial experience (Eriksson et al., 2000), the stronger the 
positive influence on growth and survival. Table 16 illustrates case firm developments.  
 
Table 16. Development of managerial experience in case firm growth phases 
Company 
(Customer 
Market) 
Type 1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough 
and expansion  
4. Global 
rationalization 
and maturity  
Innohome  
(B2C) 
Stock high high N/A N/A 
Stream low intermediate N/A N/A 
Avant Tecno  
(B2C/B2B) 
Stock  high high high high 
Stream low intermediate high high 
IonPhasE  
(B2B) 
Stock low high N/A N/A 
Stream low low N/A N/A 
Vacon  
(B2B) 
Stock  high high high high 
Stream intermediate high high high 
Audibit  
(B2C/B2B) 
Stock  intermediate intermediate INACTIVE INACTIVE 
Stream low intermediate INACTIVE INACTIVE 
 Level of Managerial Experience  
Scale: low ? intermediate ? high | Based on primarily qualitative analysis.  
 
Substantive Capabilities 
 
Case firm traits were assessed under the areas of managerial, technical and marketing 
capabilities (Verona, 1999). Empirical evidence suggests that it is indeed diversity 
across these, rather than excellence in a single or two, capabilities that impacts PMINV 
growth and survival considerably.  
 
Both high-performance case firms, Vacon and Avant Tecno had a diverse capability 
base from inception, vested with managerial, technical as well as marketing capabilities. 
Avant Tecno was able to contract experienced executives and R&D personnel from 
predecessor YLÖ-tehtaat to complement the managerial and marketing capabilities of 
the founder. While the founding group of Vacon was predominantly characterized by 
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the technological expertise of engineers, it also included business and sales managers. 
The CEO of Vacon was also able to consult management of a fellow high-technology 
start-up over accelerated internationalization prior to inception.  
 
In contrast, other case firms experienced growth constraints due to a lack of variety in 
their capability bases. Despite a technologically competent group of founders, only after 
the inclusion of a new CEO, a sales director and a product manager, was IonPhasE able 
to reach a commercial breakthrough. Similarly, important commercial developments of 
Innohome were in large part due to an increase in marketing and sales capabilities, 
contracted by taking part in an export group. The sales leads generated via the export 
group enabled a commercial breakthrough.  
 
Case Audibit, on the other hand, underlines how a lack of diversity in the capability 
base  of  a  PMINV  can  factor  in  the  non-survival  of  the  firm.  The  two  founders  of  
Audibit were highly capable in the technical aspects of the business, and the firm was 
further  enforced  with  the  inclusion  of  a  sales  manager,  whose  entry  was  quickly  
followed by the commercial breakthrough of the firm. The firm’s failure is underlined 
by not only a lack of demand, but also an inability to enact a focused business strategy. 
The firm spent the majority of its time in operation trying to find the most opportune 
segment from consumer and industrial markets and could have benefited from 
additional management capabilities and strategic focus.   
 
In general, diversity across substantive managerial, technological and marketing 
capabilities seems to impact PMINV growth positively more than excellence in any one 
or two of the areas specifically. A lack of diversity, in turn, can hamper firm growth 
and, in a severe case, also survival prospects.  
 
As is in the case of resources, it is difficult to tie case firm capability developments to a 
precise timeline collectively; however, table 17 shows some generic trends. 
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Table 17. Development of capabilities in case firm growth phases. 
Substantive 
Capability* 
1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough 
and expansion  
4. Global 
rationalization 
and maturity  
Management  
 
Product scope 
management: 
 
 
Regional: 
-channels 
-suppliers 
Global: 
-channels 
-suppliers 
Transnational: 
-coordination 
-PMI 
Technology  
 
-Product 
development  
 
Product adaptation: 
-customers 
-country-markets 
Product scope 
extension(s) 
Product 
standardization 
Marketing 
 
-Product servicing 
-Export promotion 
-Country-specific 
adaptations 
 
-Regional 
adaptations 
-Brand 
management. 
 
“Glocal”  
 TRENDS IN CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT  
 
Dynamic Capabilities and Resource Fungibility  
 
The studied firms were disadvantaged in relation to their more established competitors 
when it comes to resources, especially during the early phases of growth. However, they 
exhibited a way of offsetting this disadvantage through what some prior research terms 
dynamic capabilities (Zott, 2003) and others, resource fungibility (Sapienza et al. 2006, 
pp.924-925) i.e. the extent to which existing resources and capabilities can cost 
effectively be deployed into alternate uses in response to external dynamics.  
  
Resource  fungibility  or  the  existence  of  dynamic  capabilities  within  the  case  firms  is  
transmitted through their avoidance of ownership-based asset control as means of risk 
management. The strategy of Innohome relies on a very small core organization, 
widespread use of sub-contractors and a high level of employee autonomy, which 
means that changes in the business environment are encountered largely with the same 
resource-base. Regardless, Innohome was able to obtain a commercial breakthrough. 
Case Audibit is similar, as the firm was able to negotiate a commercial breakthrough 
with a small resource-base, despite widespread changes in the business environment. 
Innohome’s growth, on the other hand was severely hampered owing to a homogenous 
resource and capability base and the lack of resource fungibility. Only after revisions 
were made, was the firm able to achieve a commercial breakthrough.   
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From the high-performance case firms, Avant Tecno’s global breakthrough was 
achieved and managed with largely the same production infrastructure and personnel 
the firm had relied on prior to the substantial increase in demand that followed the 
breakthrough. At Vacon, global rationalization was achieved through the removal of 
some duplicate activities, which required the effective re-deployment of the remaining 
resources and capabilities.        
 
Overall, in providing an alternative to ownership-based control of assets, resource 
fungibility and/or dynamic capabilities positively influence the growth of product 
manufacturing international new ventures. Following this, analogy the relationship is 
the same with firm survival, since dynamic capabilities and resource fungibilty help 
offset resource poverty, which can lead to non-survival. Table 18 summarizes. 
   
Table 18. Resource fungibility in case firm growth phases 
Company 
(Customer Markets) 
1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough 
and expansion  
4. Global 
rationalization 
and maturity  
Innohome (B2C) 
 
high high N/A N/A 
Avant Tecno (B2C/B2B) 
 
intermediate high high intermediate 
IonPhasE (B2B) 
 
low intermediate N/A N/A 
Vacon (B2B) 
 
high intermediate low intermediate 
Audibit (B2C/B2B) 
 
high high INACTIVE INACTIVE 
 LEVEL OF RESOURCE FUNGIBILITY 
Scale: low ? intermediate ? high | Based on primarily qualitative analysis. 
 
Networking Capability  
 
Empirical scrutiny reveals networking capability (Mort and Weerawardena, 2006) as 
one of the most important traits underpinning the performance of the studied firms. The 
enabling influence of networking capability is underlined by how it facilitated 
commercial and even global breakthroughs among the case firms.  
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In response to difficulties on the domestic market, Innohome took an active role in the 
creation of an export group of like-minded Finnish SME manufacturers whose objective 
was to expand to the Swedish market. Through efficient networking, the firm was able 
to utilize the pooled resources of the group and obtain a series of valuable sales leads. 
These contacts made possible the entry to the Swedish market in a development that not 
only saved the business, but ultimately lead to a commercial breakthrough. Case 
Innohome demonstrates how networking capability, alike resource fungiblity, provides 
an alternative for ownership-based control of resources. 
 
For IonPhasE, networking is essential in leveraging major accounts once a proof of 
concept has been received. A proof of concept gives IonPhasE the opportunity to “sell 
through” the account, meaning that once the firm’s granulate solution is accepted in to 
the  MNE customer’s  manufacturing  process,  it  is  generally  applicable  across  different  
“networked” production units in the organization. By exercising networking capability 
IonPhasE was able to “sell through” its two MNE accounts, whose purchases constitute 
the vast majority of the firm’s revenues. VoIP handset manufacturer Audibit was also 
able to reach a commercial breakthrough owing to a sales lead generated through 
networking efforts with a manufacturer.  
 
An overview of the high-performance case firms provides an idea of the dynamic role of 
networking capability in mediating PMINV growth. Avant Tecno’s global network of 
distributors was the product of successful networking during introductory and 
commercial breakthrough phases, as the firm often built on successful showings in trade 
fairs. Yet, to provide for the substantial increase in demand coinciding with the firm’s 
global breakthrough, Avant Tecno streamlined the manufacturing and introduced 
internationally networked suppliers. In doing so, it was able to draw manufacturing 
economies and better respond to increasing competitive pressures.  
 
Case Vacon is perhaps the biggest testament to the relationship between networking 
capability and growth. The firm’s global network of distributors is grounded on contacts 
the founder’s had established during their time at previous employers ABB or one of its 
predecessors. In addition to expanding internationally through distributors in the 
 147 
 
introductory phase, Vacon also established a range of foreign sales subsidiaries, most of 
which were staffed by individuals Vacon executives knew from prior commitments. 
After achieving a commercial breakthrough through the combined efforts of the 
distributors and sales subsidiaries, Vacon intensified networking efforts toward major 
international companies and was successful in negotiating private-label and/or OEM-
agreements with four MNEs. The additional market exposure and sales provided by 
these strategic partners facilitated the global breakthrough. Yet, the increasing 
competitive pressures meant Vacon had to rationalize its supply structure and 
networking efforts were successfully coordinated toward utilizing internationally 
networked suppliers. Further rationalization was pursued through the acquisition of the 
driver business unit of a U.S.-based competitor. The acquisition strengthened Vacon’s 
foothold in the Americas and provided access to a network of distributors as well as 
suppliers, which became invaluable when integrating global operations. Table 19 
specifies the nature of the impact of networking capability in case firm growth phases.  
 
Table 19. Networking in case firm growth phases 
Company 
(Customer Markets) 
1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough 
and expansion  
4. Global 
rationalization 
and maturity  
Innohome (B2C) 
 
MNEs: 
-channels 
 
Export partnering: 
-channels 
-customers 
N/A N/A 
Avant Tecno (B2C/B2B) 
 
Founder Contacts: 
-customers 
Trade fairs: 
-distributors  
 Sourcing: 
-international 
suppliers 
Education: 
-R&D 
N/A 
  
IonPhasE (B2B) 
 
Education: 
-recruitment 
MNEs: 
-customers 
-channels 
N/A N/A 
Vacon (B2B) 
 
Founder contacts: 
-channels 
-recruits 
MNEs: 
-channels 
-customers 
R&D partnering: 
-products 
Sourcing:  
-global suppliers 
Acquisition: 
-channels 
-suppliers 
Audibit (B2C/B2B) 
 
Sourcing: 
-subcontractors 
MNEs: 
-channels 
-customers 
INACTIVE INACTIVE 
 NETWORKING EFFORTS AND OUTCOMES 
 
Based  on  analysis  of  the  case  firms,  networking  capability  seems  to  impact  PMINV  
growth positively, as implied by Oviatt and McDougall (2005). Since it also provides an 
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alternative for ownership-based control of resources, to offset resource poverty, it seems 
to have the same impact on survival.  
 
Entrepreneurial Orientation and Lateral Rigidity in Decision making 
 
When assessing the growth and survival impact of the trade-off between entrepreneurial 
orientation and lateral rigidity, it is useful to contrast the case firms that are in the early 
stages of growth with ones that are in the latter stages of growth. This exhibits whether 
PMINV’s decision making becomes more “rigid” and less entrepreneurial as a function 
of growth through the phases, as suggested by Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009).  
 
IonPhasE and Innohome exhibited entrepreneurially oriented decision making, 
characterized by employee autonomy, risk taking and pro-active behaviour, in 
negotiating survival crises and subsequently reaching a commercial breakthrough. In 
response to the severe financial difficulties stemming from the bankruptcy of its 
contract manufacturer, Innohome took a considerable risk in expanding to the Swedish 
market, with an already drained resource base. While the move ensured a commercial 
breakthrough, the firm was left to negotiate a survival crisis stemming from the resource 
requirements  of  the  expansion.  Also,  the  culture  of  the  firm  relies  on  employee  
autonomy as a pre-requisite for keeping operations going with only four employees. 
 
IonPhasE, on the other hand, became distinctly more entrepreneurially oriented as the 
current owner recruited a new management team in the advent of the commercial 
breakthrough. In contrast to the authoritarian management structure of the early days, 
the new administration encouraged employee autonomy and opted for a highly pro-
active approach to the market where commercial objectives were considered a priority. 
These actions were supplemented by outlays into machinery and facilities, in what can 
only be considered as risky investments considering preceding business performances. 
Yet, the moves paid dividends in the form of a commercial breakthrough, albeit with the 
drawback of a survival crisis, also resulting from excess resource demands.  
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A look at the case firms in more advanced stages of growth suggests that their decision 
making during early stages was no less entrepreneurially oriented than that of Innohome 
or IonPhasE. Both Avant Tecno and Vacon are based on an organizational culture that 
encourages employee autonomy and the firms took considerable risks in undertaking 
FDI very early in foreign expansion efforts. Additionally, the two firms have been 
successful in balancing out periods of subdued growth with pro-active growth 
investments. Upon achieving global breakthroughs and resource maturity both firms, 
while maintaining a patience for failure in growth initiatives, are less inclined to take 
risks and exhibit less employee autonomy. In Vacon’s case this is partly due to the 
responsibility  of  governance  that  comes  with  a  public  listing.  Avant  Tecno,  in  turn  is  
content with its current majority share of the global market and does not want to risk it 
via aggressive FDI or other large-scale growth initiatives.  Since the introductory phase, 
neither Avant Tecno nor Vacon has encountered a survival crisis. Table 20 summarizes.   
 
Table 20. Entrepreneurial orientation in case firm growth phases 
Company 
(Customer Markets) 
1. Introductory  2. Commercial 
breakthrough and 
foreign growth 
3. Global 
breakthrough 
and expansion  
4. Global 
rationalization 
and maturity  
Innohome (B2C) 
 
high intermediate N/A N/A 
Avant Tecno (B2C/B2B) 
 
high intermediate intermediate low 
IonPhasE (B2B) 
 
low high N/A N/A 
Vacon (B2B) 
 
high high intermediate low 
Audibit (B2C/B2B) 
 
high high INACTIVE INACTIVE 
 LEVEL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL ORIENTATION 
Scale: low ? intermediate ? high | Based on primarily qualitative analysis. 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that entrepreneurial orientation influences PMINV growth 
positively while lateral rigidity increases as a function of growth. Risky growth 
initiatives, associated with entrepreneurially oriented decision making, in turn, are more 
common in the early stages of growth and can influence PMINV survival negatively. 
Conversely, as the PMINV approaches resource maturity, decision making tends to 
become more laterally rigid and risk averse.  
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4.2.1 Consumer and Industrial Market Differences for Growth and Survival 
 
In a bid to contrast potential differences between industrial and consumer market 
PMINVs, the present study focuses on the existence of organizational capabilities that 
prior research has found influential to the performance of market-driven and brand-
driven firms (Day 1994; Urde 1999). Empirical scrutiny suggests that the growth of the 
B2B case firms benefits from market sensing (Kohli and Jaworski 1990, cited in Day, 
1994, pp.43) and customer linking (Day, 1994, 44-45), while the growth of B2B case 
firms benefits from  brand supportive dominant logic (Beverland et al., 2007).   
 
Market Sensing and Customer Linking 
 
The commercial breakthrough of IonPhasE was achieved after a newly recruited 
managerial group instilled a more pro-active and commercially oriented approach to 
business. The strategic overhaul underlined the importance of market sensing or 
organization-wide generation and dissemination of market intelligence for the benefit of 
strategic planning. The main responsibility of market sensing was given to the sales 
force, in a move that also highlights the organizational importance of customer linking. 
The growth of IonPhasE is dependent on how efficiently the firm can generate sales 
from a proofed concept product. As the product version can then be utilized in a variety 
of manufacturing processes within and sometimes across customers, customer linking is 
imperative for growth and largely responsible for the firm’s revenues thus far.    
 
Before going out of business, Audibit achieved its greatest commercial success and a 
commercial breakthrough due to customer linking, while the limited information 
available of the newly emergent VoIP apparel market meant that the firm had to enact 
market sensing as the basis for forward planning. Since inception, Vacon has relied on a 
consultative approach to sales and a sustained emphasis on customer feedback in 
strategic planning, which are also illustrative of market sensing. Furthermore, Vacon’s 
global breakthrough was facilitated by “sales through” OEM and private-label MNE 
channel partners that benefited from customer linking.  
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Brand Supportive Dominant Logic  
 
The B2C PMINVs, of the study Innohome and Avant Tecno exhibited brand supportive 
dominant logic (Beverland et al., 2007) and a preference toward managing a corporate 
brand, as opposed to a series of product brands. During the introductory phase, 
Innohome was successful in generating end-user pull through mass media advertising 
that focused on promoting the corporate brand. The campaign had a highly positive 
impact for growth. Owing to resource constraints the firm has been unable to emulate 
such brand building efforts since and has had to rely on low-cost brand building through 
e-commerce, which has impacted growth negatively.   
 
While collaborating with distributors in promotional efforts, the branding activities of 
Avant Tecno are centrally coordinated from the firm’s headquarters in Finland. The 
firm maintains  the  corporate  brand  as  an  assurance  of  quality  for  the  consumer  and  a  
competitive advantage against “weaker” brands and as such it has a direct impact on 
firm  performance.  It  is  worth  noting,  that  while  the  U.S.  is  the  only  major  market  in  
Avant Tecno’s range of foreign markets where the manufacturer has failed to make a 
considerable impact on, it remains the only market where products were sold under the 
distributor’s brand.  
 
As expected from the outset of the study, the impact some of the studied growth and 
survival factors varies pending on whether the PMINV caters for consumer or industrial 
markets. The following highlights these differences based the on empirical analysis. 
 
Differences in Industry Factors 
 
The B2B PMINVs of the study were less restricted by barriers to trade and could build 
on globalization drivers more consistently than their B2C counterparts, which echoes 
with the views of Anderson and Narus (2004) whereby industrial markets are more 
globally integrated. Growth on industrial markets was, to an extent, conditional to the 
existence of market sensing and customer linking capabilities. Market sensing is of 
pronounced importance to strategic planning, since secondary data of global B2B niche 
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markets is scarcely available or expensive to obtain. Since the international B2B 
environment needs to be analyzed as a network of relationships (Håkansson & Snehota, 
2000), customer linking capability is also of profound importance to performance. 
Analysis suggests that a B2B PMINV needs to assess each customer as a link in a chain 
of potential customers when pursuing growth.    
 
The B2C PMINVs of the study, on the other hand, had to deal with less uniform market 
conventions and more regulation across countries, which lead to unexpected, time and 
resource consuming responses. Yet, where globalization drivers were available the firms 
greatly  benefitted  from  them  in  terms  of  growth.  This  suggests  that  the  extent  of  
globalization drivers need to be assessed before resource commitments are made, since 
a reactive approach can be detrimental to growth and even survival.   
 
Differences in Product Factors  
 
Empirical analysis suggests that product adaptation for manufactured goods is highly 
resource consuming, and perhaps one of the reasons INVs are often based on industries 
where revenues stem primarily from the services and know-how sold either separately 
or in conjunction with the product.  
 
The B2C PMINVs of the study made product adaptations as a response to country 
market differences. As a result they were often profound yet infrequent i.e. conditional 
to expanding to new foreign market. This suggests that unless the product is readily 
applicable to market conditions, successful entry to multiple diverse foreign markets is 
difficult to achieve and expansion efforts need to be paced. Furthermore, an overly 
ambitious approach can in an extreme case lead to non-survival.     
 
For the B2B firms of the study, product adaptations were less profound, but more 
frequent as they were usually conditional to differences in customer applications rather 
than country attributes. They were also collectively less resource consuming than for 
their B2C counterparts. Yet, since adaptation is often done in unison with the customer, 
the actual sales process can take a considerable time and the lean time prior to revenues 
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can undermine growth aspirations as well as, in an extreme, lead to non-survival. This 
connects with the views of Håkansson and Snehota (2000, pp.45) whereby, for B2B 
firms, marketing builds on the effort of allocating the firms resources across different 
relationships according to likely return.  
 
Differences in Resources and Capabilities  
 
Although, the existence of networking capability had an enabling effect on performance 
across all case firms, its impact as a growth and survival factor was perhaps more 
profound on industrial markets, as evidenced by the two born globals of the study. Both 
firms cater industries which, despite being global, centre on a relatively small hub in 
terms of personnel. In fact, empirical evidence here echoes the statement of Madsen and 
Servais (1997, p.565) whom stress that many contemporary industries are characterized 
by global sourcing and international networks, elements that help enable the born global 
phenomenon. Against this backdrop it is easier to fathom, why the growth of B2B 
PMINVs  of  the  study  was  greatly  enhanced  by  their  ability  to  tap  into  such  globally  
integrated networks and in doing so contract large accounts and/or channel partners.   
 
For the B2C PMINVs of the study, marketing resources were a central determinant of 
performance.  To  supplement  the  sales  efforts  of  re-sellers,  these  firms  had  to  actively  
take part in generating an end-user pull, a resource consuming feat, especially for an 
SME. Resource constraints here were partially negotiated via the use of innovative e-
commerce marketing as well as brand supportive dominant logic, which saw marketing 
resource pooled for the benefit of the corporate brand as opposed to diverse product 
brands. However, results in demand generation were at times conditional to traditional 
mass media utilization (e.g TV/print), which underlines the impact ample marketing 
resources hav on growth and survival.  
 
Table 21 shows the discussed differences between growth and survival determinants of 
the studied B2C and B2B PMINVs. 
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Table 21. Consumer and business market differences for PMINV growth & survival 
 Industrial market PMINV Consumer market PMINV 
Industry Factors 
 
Globally integrated 
industries where market 
sensing and customer 
linking capabilities mediate 
performance. 
Industries less globally 
integrated, where the 
existence of globalization 
drivers mediates 
performance. 
Product Factors International performance is 
conditional to customer 
application-based product 
adaptation(s).  
International performance 
is conditional to country 
market-based product 
adaptation(s). 
Resources and 
Capabilities  
Networking capability is of 
pronounced importance in 
contracting channels and 
“selling across” large/ MNE 
accounts     
The importance of 
marketing resources and 
brand supportive 
dominant logic is 
accentuated in generating 
an end-user “pull”. 
 
4.2.2 Revision of Propositions 
 
In compliance with analytic induction (3.1.1) the empirical part of the study is 
completed by a revision of the theoretical propositions to highlight any emerging 
themes unaccounted for in the conceptual build up of the study. 
 
Product Manufacturing International New Venture Growth   
 
Proposition 1a: The commercial and global breakthrough of a Product Manufacturing 
International New Venture is positively related to the industry growth rate, the 
globalizing enablers in the industry, the amount of resources and managerial 
experience, the substantive and dynamic capabilities and a high level of entrepreneurial 
orientation in decision making.   
 
Proposition 1a is predominantly supported by the empirical analysis. All of the studied 
firms benefited from globalization drivers (Yip, 1989) such as commonalities in 
country-market directives and a lack of protectionist policies and trade regulation, albeit 
industrial markets were generally more devoid of barriers to trade than consumer 
markets. Commercial and global breakthroughs mostly coincided with industry growth 
(Vernon, 1966) and were fostered by risky growth investments attributable to 
entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). Generally, case firm 
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advancement along these phases benefited from experienced managers (Reuber and 
Fischer, 1999) whereas the amount of resources (Barney, 1991; Laanti et al., 2006).and 
variety  (Eriksson  et  al.,  2000)  of  managerial  experience  also  grew in  parallel  with  the  
firms. Yet, experience did not always translate to diversity in substantive capabilities 
(Verona, 1991), which had adverse effects on the performance of some firms.  
 
As cases IonPhasE and Innohome underline, it is not merely the existence of substantive 
capabilities, but diversity among them that tends to facilitate PMINV growth. IonPhasE, 
despite holding a wealth of technical capabilities, was able to reach a commercial 
breakthrough only after the injection of marketing and managerial capabilities saw the 
firm transform to a more commercially oriented one. Similarly, whilst strong in 
technical and managerial areas, Innohome obtained a commercial breakthrough only 
after the inclusion of marketing (sales) capabilities via part-taking in an export group, 
lead by an experienced sales manager. Furthermore, dynamic capabilities (Winter, 
2003) were instrumental for the case firms in negotiating resource constraints and 
achieving commercial and global breakthroughs.  
 
 Proposition 1b: The global rationalization of a Product Manufacturing International 
New Venture is positively related to higher global seller concentration in the industry, 
pressures for resource alignment, and a low level of both industry growth rate and 
entrepreneurial orientation.  
 
Proposition 1b receives support from the empirical data, as evidenced by an account of 
the developments of Vacon and Avant Tecno. Approaching resource maturity, an 
increase in competitive pressure and a decrease in industrial growth drove the need for 
resource alignment for both firms. From a strategic perspective, these changes in the 
industry dynamic fostered requirements to integrate operations internationally and 
thereby avoid duplication of certain activities and thereby cut costs. Furthermore, the 
extent of entrepreneurial orientation in decision making markedly decreased as the firms 
arrived to a stage of global/regional rationalization and maturity. It should be noted, 
however, that the decrease in industrial growth and subsequently demand, is at least 
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partially due to the global economic slump commencing in 2008 that has overshadowed 
the most recent developments of these two case firms.    
 
Product Manufacturing International New Venture Survival  
 
Proposition 2: The survival of a Product Manufacturing International New Venture is 
positively related to the industry growth rate, the amount of resources and managerial 
experience, the existence of substantive and dynamic capabilities, and a lower level of 
entrepreneurial orientation.  
 
Proposition 2, similarly to proposition 1a, is predominantly supported by the empirical 
analysis. The survival of all case firms benefited from industrial growth, with the 
exception of Audibit, whose exit from the market was largely due to a stagnant industry 
and lack of demand. The survival crises experienced by case firms were mostly pre-
empted by resource constraints, usually financial, which suggests that the amount of 
resources the firm has at its disposal is positively related to its survival prospects. Case 
IonPhasE, in turn, underlines the importance of managerial experience for survival as it 
is highly unlikely that the firm could have survived its first survival crisis without the 
inclusion of added managerial experience. For its tendency to produce risky growth 
initiatives, entrepreneurial orientation can also be associated with many of the survival 
crises experienced by the case firms during their early phases of growth. This contrasts 
with how, high performance case firms, whilst exhibiting a decrease in entrepreneurial 
orientation in the latter stages of growth, had also managed to avoid survival crises.   
  
As evidenced by case Audibit, the survival of a PMINV is perhaps more conditional to 
diversity in the select managerial, technical and marketing (substantive) capabilities, 
than the word existence implies. Although the majority of Audibit’s failure can be 
pinned down to a lack of demand, the firm’s survival could have benefited from 
managerial capability to supplement its evident technical and marketing capabilities. 
Finally, while it can be argued that dynamic capabilities can help supplement a 
PMINV’s resource constraints or the mentioned substantive capabilities, case Audibit 
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shows  that  despite  being  able  to  reach  a  commercial  breakthrough  with  only  three  
people, the survival of the firm would have necessitated more resources and capabilities.  
 
 Product Manufacturing International New Venture Survival and Growth 
 
Proposition 3: The commercial breakthrough, global breakthrough, global 
rationalization and survival of a Product Manufacturing International New Venture is 
positively related to high networking capabilities. 
 
Proposition 3 is the most explicitly supported by the empirical evidence. All of the 
studied firms markedly benefited from networking capability (Mort and Weerawardena, 
2006), and it was often among the primary catalysts that fueled a PMINVs transition 
from a given stage of growth to the next, as case Vacon best exemplifies. In providing 
an alternative to ownership-based control of resources, networking capability also had a 
positive  impact  on  the  survival  of  the  case  firms,  since  survival  crises  were  often  the  
result of a lack of physical, human or financial resources.     
 
Proposition 4a: A Product Manufacturing International New Venture provides a 
narrow product offering during the early phases of growth and a wider but related 
product offering during the latter phases of growth.   
 
Proposition 4a is supported by the empirical analysis, IonPhasE, Innohome and Avant 
Tecno all narrowed their international product scope before they were able to negotiate 
a commercial breakthrough. After narrowing its focus down to industrial loaders, Avant 
Tecno’s subsequent global breakthrough was partially achieved by again extending the 
product scope, albeit with the addition of a related product line, the “mini-loader”. 
Vacon, on the other hand, has maintained consistent focus on frequency converters, 
although with timely updates where the new “generation” or line of products gradually 
phases out the old line, which means that to-date, the company has supplied a maximum 
of two lines at the same time.   
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Proposition 4b: A B2C Product Manufacturing International New Venture does 
considerable country market product adaptation during early growth phases, but offers 
more standardized products in latter stages, whereas a B2B Product Manufacturing 
International New Venture does less country market product adaptation throughout.   
 
Proposition 4b receives support from the empirical analysis. The companies supplying 
consumer markets had to undertake large scale product adaptation, in order to cater for 
select country markets. Innohome was unable to expand to Sweden without 
considerable adaptations, owing to different technical standards. Audibit also had to 
change product components, to be able to supply country-markets where regulations 
were stricter for consumer product components. Avant Tecno, in turn, provides different 
versions of a product to different trade areas, since less sophisticated models are more 
in-demand in developing economies than developed economies. Also the loader 
manufacturer has been forced to adapt its products according to the specific 
requirements  of  certain  countries  e.g.  differences  in  ambient  temperatures.  Yet,  it  has  
gradually incorporated these changes into the offering, resulting in more standardized 
products across markets and segments. In the latter phases of growth, the firm has 
offered products, which can be cost-efficiently uncovered of the accessories that are less 
in-demand in some markets.    
 
For the industrial market PMINVs of the study, country market product adaptation was 
not an issue, as the country of origin of the customer has little meaning to e.g. Vacon 
and IonPhasE, since most of their adaptation requirements stem from customer 
application specific differences. Consequently, if the onus is placed on customer 
application-based adaptation, the positioning of B2B PMINVs and B2C PMINVs in the 
proposition can be reversed. The implications are discussed further in 5.1. 
 
Proposition 4c: The growth and survival of a B2B Product Manufacturing International 
New Venture are positively influenced by a predominantly market-driven approach, 
while the growth and survival of a B2C Product Manufacturing International New 
Venture are positively influenced by a predominantly brand-driven approach.    
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Proposition 4c is partially supported by empirical evidence. The case firms primarily 
supplying for industrial markets: Audibit, IonPhasE and Vacon can credit the growth 
enabling effects of market sensing and customer linking capabilities, associated with 
market-oriented firms (Day, 1994). Furthermore, brand supportive dominant logic 
(Beverland et al., 2007), that can be attributed to brand-oriented firms (Urde, 1999), had 
a positive influence on the growth of the firms catering for consumer markets: Avant 
Tecno and Innohome. However, the impact these organizational traits had on case firm 
survival is somewhat inconclusive. Unlike with dynamic capabilities, research was 
unable to conclude whether these traits constitute an alternative to ownership-based 
resource control or establish conclusive evidence of any other type of positive impact on 
survival. In general, the industrial market PMINVs of the study were primarily market-
driven whereas the B2C PMINVs of the study were more brand-driven. Nevertheless 
proposition 4c is re-formulated as follows.         
 
Revised Proposition 4c: The growth of a B2B Product Manufacturing International 
New Venture is positively influenced by a predominantly market-driven approach, while 
the growth of a B2C Product Manufacturing International New Venture is positively 
influenced by a predominantly brand-driven approach.    
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The final section of the study summarizes the main findings, highlights theoretical and 
managerial contributions as well as advocates potential research avenues that can build 
on its exploratory nature and empirical conclusions.    
 
5.1 Summary of Findings  
 
In summarizing the findings of the study, it is useful to re-visit the research objectives.  
 
Physical Product Manufacturing International New Venture Growth and Survival 
  
Research objective 1: What factors impact the growth and survival of physical product 
manufacturing international new ventures on their way to adulthood?   
 
Of the wealth of factors that potentially impact the growth and survival of product 
manufacturing international new ventures identified by international business literature, 
the present study focused on the impact of select industry and product factors, firm 
resources and capabilities as well as the trade-off between entrepreneurial orientation 
and lateral rigidity, with the following results. 
 
Industry factors: In reaching commercial and global breakthroughs the active case 
companies of the study all benefited from a relatively high industry growth rate 
(Vernon, 1966), a low industry penetration of foreign suppliers and low global seller 
concentration (Driffield and Munday, 2000) as well as the existence of industry 
globalization drivers (Yip, 1989).. Based on this evidence, these industry factors 
influence PMINV growth positively. A low industry growth rate, in turn, was one of the 
main causes of the non-survival of the inactive case firm, which suggests that a 
comparatively low or negative industry growth rate can lead to non-survival.  
 
The global or regional rationalization of the studied PMINVs’ operations was executed 
in response to increased global seller concentration in the industry, a substantial 
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decrease in industry growth and other pressures for resource alignment, which underline 
the impact of these factors for in reaching resource “maturity”  
 
Product factors: The way in which the studied PMINVs managed their product scope 
(Boter and Holmquist, 1996) had a considerable impact on growth and survival. A 
narrow product range proved a more sustainable platform for resource deployment and 
growth during early stages of growth and enabled a commercial breakthrough. Yet, 
extensions to the range in the form of related products were required to facilitate a 
global breakthrough and to offset increased competitive pressures. A failure to 
coordinate resources across an opportune number of product lines, in turn, proved 
detrimental to growth prospects of case firms, whilst threatening the survival of some 
and contributing to the failure of one.   
 
The commercial and global breakthroughs of the case firms were conditional to product 
adaptations (Calantone et al., 2004), either stemming from customer application or 
country market differences. None of the firms could readily offer an international 
product portfolio and difficulties in resourcing adaptation efforts hampered growth 
prospects and led to survival crises. Furthermore, upon approaching global 
rationalization and maturity, case firms were able to offer increasingly standardized 
products. This suggests that the commercial and global breakthroughs of PMINVs are 
positively related to the rate of product adaptation, whilst global rationalization is 
positively related to increased product standardization.  
 
Resources and Capabilities: Empirical evidence suggests that, the amount of resources 
(Barney, 1991; Laanti et al., 2006) and managerial experience (Reuber and Fischer, 
1999; t Eriksson et al., 2000), the PMINV has at its disposal as well as diversity across 
its technological, managerial and marketing (substantive) capabilities (Verona, 1999) 
are positively related to growth. Also, the existence of networking capability (Mort and 
Weerawardena, 2006), dynamic capabilities (Winter, 2003) and resource fungibility 
(Sapienza et al., 2006) seem to positively influence growth as well as survival.  
 
 162 
 
The commercial and global breakthroughs of the case firms were positively related to 
the amount of resources and variety in stock as well as stream managerial experience at 
their disposal. However, firm growth here was conditional to the existence and diversity 
in substantive capabilities across managerial, marketing and technological domains, 
more so than excellence in any single or two these substantive domains. A lack in these 
resource and overly homogenous substantive capabilities, in turn, hampered case firm 
growth aspirations as well as in extreme situations also survival prospects.  
 
In providing an alternative to ownership-based control of resources and capabilities, the 
existence of networking capability, dynamic capabilities and resource fungibility were 
positively related to the commercial breakthroughs, global breakthroughs, global 
rationalization and maturity as well as survival of the studied PMINVs.   
 
Entrepreneurial Orientation and Lateral Rigidity in Decision Making: The extent of 
entrepreneurial “agility” in decision making was found to mediate growth and survival. 
Some essential growth investments were the product of entrepreneurially oriented 
decision making (Knight and Cavusgil 2004) but so were some detrimental survival 
crises. Increased lateral rigidity (Luostarinen, 1979) resulted in a decrease of risky 
growth initiatives and thereby fewer survival crises.    
 
The commercial and global breakthroughs of case firms were achieved through 
entrepreneurially oriented behavior, whereas the global/regional rationalization of their 
activities coincided with an increase in laterally rigid decision making. The firms 
suffered survival crises solely during their introduction and commercial breakthroughs; 
times characterized by entrepreneurially oriented decision making and risky growth 
initiatives. However, commercial and global breakthroughs were largely the product of 
risky growth initiatives and as the firms approached resource maturity they became 
disinclined to pursue risky growth initiatives i.e. more laterally rigid.   
 
Entrepreneurial  orientation  seems  to  have  a  positive  impact  on  PMINV  growth  but  a  
negative impact on survival. Lateral rigidity in decision making, on the other hand, 
seems to have a positive impact on PMINV survival, but a negative impact on growth.  
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With an understanding of how the studied performance factors influence PMINV 
growth and survival in general it is possible to evaluate whether and how their impact 
differs pending on whether the firm caters for the industrial or consumer market.  
 
The Industrial and Consumer Market Difference for Growth and Survival 
 
Research Objective 2: How are the pathways to adulthood different between physical 
product manufacturing B2B and B2C international new ventures?   
 
From the studied product manufacturing INV performance attributes mentioned above, 
notable differences between consumer and industrial market firms were found in 
industry and product factors as well as resources and capabilities.  
 
Industry Factor Differences: The industrial markets supplied by the case firms were 
found to be more globally integrated than the consumer markets. This accentuated the 
importance globalization drivers, such as uniform market conventions and technical 
standards as well as trade de-regulation had on consumer market PMINV performance. 
The lack of globalization drivers within the industry often prompted highly resource 
consuming responses in the form of e.g. product adaptation in addition to making some 
country markets inaccessible altogether for consumer market PMINVs.  
 
Product Factor Differences: Owing to its resource consuming nature when it comes to 
manufactured goods, product adaptation efforts mediated the growth and survival of the 
studied PMINVs. However, the nature of adaptation varied between the consumer and 
industrial market PMINVs of the study.    
 
The  B2C  PMINVs  of  the  study  made  adaptations  when  attempting  to  enter  foreign  
markets. Therefore, adaptations were relatively profound and infrequent in nature. This 
meant  that  unless  the  product  was  readily  applicable  to  market  conditions,  successful  
entry to several diverse foreign markets was difficult to achieve owing to the resource 
requirements of product adaptation and expansion efforts needed to be paced as a result. 
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This stalled growth aspirations, whereas excessive adaptation requirements stemming 
from overly ambitious expansion efforts led to survival crises.    
 
The B2B PMINVs of the study, on the other hand, adapted their products when 
attempting to add to their portfolio of customers. Since adaptations were mostly 
conditional to differences in customer applications, they were less profound but more 
frequent in nature. Despite being less resource consuming than in consumer markets, 
the fact that they were done in collaboration with the customers meant product 
adaptations often took comparatively more time. Therefore, an overly ambitious set of 
on-going product adaptations led to stalled growth aspirations and in extreme cases 
survival crises.  
 
Resource and Capability Differences: Growth for the studied industrial markets was 
positively related to the existence of market sensing and customer linking capabilities 
(Day, 1994), whilst brand supportive dominant logic (Beverland et al., 2007), had a 
similar impact on consumer market firms. Consequently, in terms of market orientation 
B2B PMINVs followed a more market-driven approach (Day, 1994), whereas B2C 
PMINVs followed a more brand-driven approach (Urde, 1999).  
 
The commercial and global breakthroughs of the studied B2B PMINVs benefited from 
market sensing, due to its importance in strategic planning, and customer linking, as 
customers were managed based on their network value. Due to the more networked and 
globally integrated nature of industrial markets, the relationship between networking 
capability and growth was accentuated for B2B PMINVs. Also, the commercial and 
global breakthroughs of the B2C PMINVs called for comparatively more marketing 
resources, owing to the resource consuming nature of demand generation.  
 
5.2 Theoretical Contributions  
 
In the vein of analytic induction (3.1.1), the main the findings of the study are discussed 
against the backdrop of theoretical discourse in international business and 
entrepreneurship literature in the following.  In addition to the contributions mentioned 
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here, the study posits theory-based research propositions, and revisits them after 
empirical scrutiny in 4.2.2 as well as forwards a theoretical framework for the study of 
the growth and survival of product manufacturing international new ventures in 2.3.1 It 
should be noted that the propositions and framework are based on those of Gabrielsson 
and Gabrielsson (2009 pp.7-14).      
 
Product Manufacturing International New Venture Growth Phases and Survival 
 
Despite deviating from the traditional views of internationalization (2.1.1), case firm 
behavior exhibits commonalities with some conventional lifecycle models of 
organizational growth (2.1.3). The principle of stage-wise organizational growth 
models, whereby firms develop in identifiable stages (e.g. Scott and Bruce, 1987), 
receives empirical support in the present study. Furthermore, the phases of stable 
PMINV growth or “evolution” seem to be mediated by transitional crises or periods of 
“revolution”. Opportune management of these crises sees the firm proceed to the next 
phase of growth, while a failure can lead to non-survival, a pattern discovered in 
conventional firms by Greiner (1972) nearly four decades ago. The PMINVs failure to 
manage a survival crisis seems more likely to result in non-survival than regression to a 
previous stage, the latter being an alternative advocated by e.g. Churchill and Lewis 
(1983). This is perhaps due to the “make or break” nature of accelerated 
internationalization where the opportunities of global markets are offset by resource 
poverty (e.g. Oviatt and McDougall, 1994), especially during early stages of growth.  
 
Grounded in stage-wise organizational growth literature, the INV growth phases 
introduced by Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009, pp.5-7), namely: (1) Introductory, (2) 
Commercial breakthrough and foreign growth, (3) Global breakthrough and expansion 
as well as (4) Global rationalization and maturity, provide a useful blueprint for 
studying PMINV growth and survival. The following discusses the main parallels and 
departures underlined by empirical evidence. 
 
Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009, p.5-6) advocate that INVs are likely to receive 
minor foreign sales in the introductory phase and that they introduce foreign 
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subsidiaries in the commercial breakthrough phase, which somewhat contradicts with 
some empirical cases of the present study. For example, IonPhasE drew the vast 
majority of revenues from global markets from the outset of commercial operations, 
while both Avant Tecno and Vacon established foreign sales subsidiaries very soon 
after inception, during the introductory phase.  
 
As evidenced by case firms of the present study, PMINVs are often established by 
product specialists, who may lack the managerial expertise required for fast-paced 
growth. Thus, while the introductory phase centers on product development, 
commercial breakthrough becomes conditional to contracting the required expertise to 
the firm, irrespective of how difficult this may be for the founder(s) to accept, as 
suggested by Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009, p.5). Additionally, the authors 
underline the importance of securing the right channels for foreign market servicing 
early on, which also proved highly important for the growth and survival prospects of 
the case firms.  
 
The  notion  whereby  the  INV  needs  to  be  able  to  manufacture  sell  and  distribute  
products in volume during the commercial breakthrough phase (Kazanjian and Drazin 
1990, cited in Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson 2009, pp.6) was of fundamental importance 
for the PMINVs of the study. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that the 
challenge may be manifold for PMINVs in particular, as production costs are relatively 
high, whereas sales and distribution channels themselves are substantial. Their 
establishment and management require significant resource commitments and sales are 
often mediated by middlemen as opposed to e.g. in the delivery of information goods. 
 
Analysis also supports the views of Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009, pp.6) in that a 
(PM)INV’s global breakthrough coincides with expansion to the product offering. 
Product scope extensions were central for case firms, in offsetting the increasing 
competitive pressures at this stage. Also, cost efficiencies resulting from duplication of 
efforts began to emerge, in accordance with the views of Scott and Bruce (1987, cited in 
Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson 2009, pp.6), and prompted the need to rationalize activities 
internationally. Yet, findings regarding rationalization were somewhat contradictory. 
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The conceptualization of global rationalization and maturity (Gabrielsson and 
Gabrielsson 2009, pp.6-7), somewhat fails to account for the developments of case 
Avant Tecno. Global market leader in its niche, the PMINV draws ca. 20% of revenues 
from outside Europe. The firm has two foreign subsidiaries, in Germany and the UK, no 
foreign production facilitates and has rationalized activities within Europe to avoid 
duplicate operations and costs. In other words, it adheres to a phase resembling regional 
or international rationalization and thereby provides some insight as to what happens to 
mature born internationals.   
 
Finally, PMINVs seem most prone to survival crises during early phases of growth. 
Neither of the two case firms that achieved a global breakthrough, experienced survival 
crises after the introductory phase. Overall, survival crises were most common in case 
firms in the commercial breakthrough phase. Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009, p.13), 
also speculate that the risk of failure for the INV is greatest in initial foreign expansion 
efforts. Indeed, while it is perhaps impossible for any firm to completely eradicate, the 
threat of non-survival does seem to considerably diminish towards the latter stages of 
growth, at least according to the empirical evidence of the present study.   
 
Product Manufacturing International New Venture Growth and Survival Factors 
 
The impact of INV growth and survival factors outlined by Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson 
(2009), namely: industry growth rate, industry globalization drivers, resource amount, 
governmental support, managerial experience, substantive capabilities (management, 
technology and marketing) dynamic capabilities, resource fungibility, networking 
capability, entrepreneurial orientation as well as lateral rigidity was subjected to 
empirical analysis.  Also, product factors, in the form of product scope (Boter and 
Holmquist, 1996) and product adaptation (Calantone et al., 2004) were assessed. In the 
vein of Sapienza et al. (2006), Delmar et al. (2003) and Romanelli (1989), results show 
that growth and survival are distinct outcomes theoretically, but their relationship is 
difficult to describe. This is underlined by how only entrepreneurial orientation, lateral 
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rigidity as well as product adaptation exhibited bilateral impacts on the outcomes, when 
discussing growth in terms of case firm commercial and global breakthroughs. 
 
Entrepreneurial orientation (e.g. Lumpkin and Dess, 1996) was found to have a positive 
influence on the commercial and global breakthroughs of case firms, but a negative 
influence on survival. Lateral rigidity (e.g. Luostarinen, 1979), in turn, had a negative 
influence on case firm commercial breakthroughs, but a positive influence on survival. 
Similarly, commercial and global breakthroughs required product adaptations, whereas 
excess adaptations could threaten survival. The rest of the abovementioned antecedent 
factors exhibited a unilateral impact on commercial and global breakthroughs as well a 
survival i.e. their underlying influence on case firm advancement along the two phases 
and survival was the same. For example, industry growth had a positive impact on case 
firm commercial and global breakthroughs and survival, while negative industry growth 
had a negative impact on commercial and global breakthroughs and survival. 
 
Overall, empirical evidence suggests that the growth and survival of PMINVs in is 
considerably impacted by networking capability (e.g. Mort and Weerawardena, 2006) 
and the width of the product scope. 
 
In providing an alternative to ownership-based control of resources, networking 
capability greatly contributed to the growth and survival of case firms. Moen (2002, 
pp.170) finds that born globals are disadvantaged partly due to the considerable 
challenge of establishing international distribution systems. The present study highlights 
the challenge for PMINVs, faced with the resource consuming task of establishing and 
managing physical channels internationally. Nonetheless, the commercial breakthrough 
of case firms was often conditional to finding the right sales and distribution channels, a 
task which greatly benefitted from networking capability.   
 
Many case firms started with an ambitious product range, yet, the commercial 
breakthroughs of all active case firms were achieved through one product line, which 
illustrates the importance of deploying resources across the opportune amount of lines. 
This echoes with the findings of Boter and Holmquist (1996), whereby high 
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international performance of SME manufacturers is conditional to a narrow product 
scope. Although, commercial breakthroughs were achieved via one product line, global 
breakthroughs were conditional to the launch of a new product line, while 
global/international rationalization and maturity also coincided with either extensions to 
current lines or replacing a contemporary line with a new one. This is  in-line with the 
views of e.g. Douglas and Craig (1989, p.55) whom state that, in response to the 
increased pressure brought by international competition, the manufacturer needs to 
consider product variants and even extensions to the range.   
 
The Industrial and Consumer Market Difference for Growth and Survival  
 
The present study concludes that industrial markets seem to provide a more sustainable 
growth and survival platform for PMINVs based on differences in both firm and 
industry factors. This somewhat echoes the findings of Luostarinen and Gabrielsson 
(2006) whereby Finnish born globals prefer industrial markets, since they can be 
reached with more limited marketing budgets.  
 
Empirical  findings  suggests  that  while  B2B  PMINVs  can  generally  rely  on  cost-
effective personal selling in establishing a sales channel as well as “pushing” the 
product through it, B2C PMINVs need to convince the channel middleman in addition 
to the end-user in generating an end-user “pull”, through a more resource consuming 
combination of mass marketing and personal selling. These findings underline that 
PMINVs are no different to “conventional” firms in this regard (see e.g. Webster 2000). 
However, when one considers the well resource constraints (e.g. Oviatt and McDougall, 
1994) of INVs overall, the more resource consuming nature of marketing in B2C 
markets disadvantages consumer market PMINVs compared to industrial market 
PMINVs in terms of growth and survival.   
 
In line with (Anderson and Narus, 2004, pp.15), the present study finds industrial 
markets more globally integrated than consumer markets, underlined e.g. by how B2B 
case  firms  were  able  to  rely  more  on  globalization  drivers  (e.g  Yip,  1989)  than  their  
B2C  counterparts.  This  also  works  against  B2C  PMINVs  in  comparative  terms,  as  
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globalization drivers were found to influence PMINV growth and survival positively. 
Furthermore, B2B PMINVs seemed to benefit comparatively more from networking 
capabilities, due to the more globally networked nature of some industrial segments.   
 
Empirical evidence implies that consumer market PMINV growth is positively 
influenced by brand supportive dominant logic (Beverland et al., 2007) in strategic 
planning and promotional efforts. Industrial market PMINV growth, on the other hand, 
seems to be positively influenced by market sensing (Kohli and Jaworski 1990, cited in 
Day, 1994, pp.43) in strategic planning and customer linking (Day, 1994, pp.44-45) in 
promotional efforts. The division of these capabilities among case firms suggests that in 
terms of market orientation, B2B PMINVs adhere to a more market-driven approach 
(Day, 1994), whereas B2C PMINVs follow a more brand-driven approach (Urde, 1999) 
comparatively. Yet, a more definitive conclusion here would benefit from a larger 
research population and a more descriptive approach.    
 
5.3 Managerial Implications  
 
The findings of the study point to several organizational and strategic aspects that can 
benefit product manufacturing international new venture entrepreneurs and managers.  
 
Organizational Aspects 
 
(A) The value of patents should not be undermined when attempting to attract public or 
private financing into the firm. Patents provide tangible proof of the innovativeness and 
potential of the firm and are among the most important means to offset established 
competitors. Also, patented technologies can be licensed or sold to generate income 
quickly in times of volatility.    
 
(B) Diversity in capabilities across  the  domains  of  marketing,  technology  and  
management is equally, if not more, crucial to performance than excellence in any 
single or two domains. Accelerated internationalization demands professionals across a 
variety of respects, a requirement that should not be overlooked when establishing the 
firm or renewing its resources and capabilities. 
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(C) Networking capability provides a valuable alternative to ownership-based control of 
assets and can prove instrumental in opening up sales channels and partnerships.  
 
Product Strategy   
 
(D) Product scope management is of crucial importance to performance. An overly 
ambitious range of products, especially early on, can severely hamper the growth 
prospects of the firm and even lead to firm failure. Due to the differences in national 
markets and industrial customers, physical products are highly prone to adaptation 
requirements,  which  strain  the  resources  of  the  firm  and  produce  lean  time  before  
revenues. A commercial breakthrough is not necessarily conditional to a plethora of 
product lines, but ensuring that one product line is available and appealing to a plethora 
of customers. Once the firm matures and more resources become available, extensions 
to the product scope may become necessary in reaching global markets and offsetting 
the competition.    
 
(E) Product servicing is one of the few means available when competing against MNEs 
and manufacturers from low-cost countries. Whether dealing with business customers of 
the industrial markets or re-sellers on the consumer markets, adding a high-quality 
service element to the physical product can make the difference in customer value and 
in generating a sufficient end-user pull.    
 
B2B Marketing Strategy  
 
(F) The organization-wide generation of market knowledge i.e. market sensing (see e.g 
Kohli and Jaworski 1990, cited in Day, 1994, pp.43)  for  the  benefit  of  strategic  
planning has a positive impact on performance on industrial markets, especially when 
coupled with customer linking (see e.g. Day, 1994, pp.44-45) i.e. the capability to create 
and manage close customer relationships. 
 
(G) New accounts on the industrial market are often conditional to lengthy collaborative 
product adaptation periods, which means that resources must be divided across 
accounts according to likely return (see e.g. Håkansson & Snehota, 2000, pp.45). 
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Entering an overly ambitious amount of contract tenders can severely hamper the 
growth and survival prospects of the firm because of the lean time before revenues.    
 
B2C Marketing Strategy 
 
(H) The consumer market supplier should view the corporate brand as  an  effective  
means to communicate with not only the middleman but also the end-user. Brand 
supportive dominant logic or setting the firm’s culture and structures around the 
corporate brand (Beverland et al. 2007) can assist the effort. Brand recognition is of 
crucial importance when competing against MNEs and low-cost producers.  
 
(I) Product adaptation on consumer markets is often conditional to country market 
differences in regulatory and technical standards or variety in consumer tastes. Hence, 
adaptation can be a costly affair and the resource strained manufacturer should take 
caution when attempting to enter many country markets in quick succession, especially 
product compliance is uncertain prior to expansion.   
 
5.4 Suggestions for Further Research    
 
While the study was able to cautiously substantiate some of the potential growth phases 
and survival crises of product manufacturing international new ventures, it also opens 
up fresh avenues of inquiry. As evidenced by case firms, a coherent account of the 
(PM)INV growth  phases  should  perhaps  account  for  activities  that  take  place  prior  to  
the establishment of the firm or pre-introductory phase.  For  example,  the  growth  and  
survival of case firm Vacon greatly benefited from personal network ties the founders 
had established in prior commitments. Revisiting their original research on firm 
internationalization Johanson and Vahlne (2003) also recognize the substantial impact 
business relationships, including those established prior to the firm have on 
internationalization and the choice of country-markets. 
 
The present study deals with Finnish PMINVs and thereby views the INV phenomenon 
from  the  perspective  of  a  small  and  open  economy  or  SMOPEC  (Luostarinen,  1979;  
2.2.1). Hence, directing the empirical focus to PMINVs originating from countries with 
comparatively larger domestic markets and/or stricter regulation on trade would produce 
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interesting grounds for comparison. Moreover, most of the antecedent factors (2.3.1) 
studied for their influence on the outcomes of PMINV growth and survival exhibited a 
unilateral impact (5.2). Future descriptive research could attempt to substantiate whether 
this holds true for a larger population of firms and is statistically generalizable. The 
finding whereby B2C PMINVs adhere to a brand-driven market approach and B2B 
PMINVs a market-driven approach, in comparative terms, would also be interesting to 
submit to statistical inquiry. Additionally, further growth and survival factors that 
potentially have a bilateral impact on the outcomes of PMINV growth and survival (5.2) 
would be interesting to explore.  
 
A topic sure to interest consumer market PMINV executives relates to the marketing 
resources required to generate an end-user “pull” (Webster, 2000; 2.2.2). The present 
study concludes that B2C PMINVs must rely on generating consumer demand to pull 
the product through the channel rather than simply rely on re-seller efforts to push it to 
the consumer. This is challenging, owing to the expenses associated with large scale 
demand generation at least through traditional mass media such as television and print. 
It also presents an avenue of exploratory inquiry, due to e.g. the plethora of novel low-
cost e-commerce promotional means available today. Future research could focus on the 
resources and capabilities of mature B2C PMINVs and attempt to further substantiate 
the organizational traits that enable mass demand generation cost-effectively.    
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AM - Account Manager 
 
AUS - Australia 
 
B2B - Business-to-business / Industrial market 
 
B2C - Business-to-consumer / Consumer market 
 
CA - Competitive advantage 
 
FDI - Foreign direct investment 
 
IDP - Inherently Dissipative Polymer  
 
INV - International New Venture  
 
MNE - Multinational Enterprise 
 
MD - Managing Director 
 
ME - Middle East  
 
NA - North America  
 
OEM - Original Equipment Manufacturer 
 
PMINV - (Physical) Product Manufacturing International New Venture 
 
PMI - Post-merger-integration 
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PM - Product Manager  
 
RBV - The Resource-based View of the Firm 
 
SMOPEC -Small and Open Economy 
 
VoIP - Voice over Internet Protocol 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A:  CASE QUESTIONNAIRE     
 
1.  Background Information:  
 
Please describe… 
 
a. The firm’s foundation and the people involved? 
b. When the company was founded (initiated, registered & products were 
ready for sale)? 
c. The development of the size of the firm in sales revenues and number of 
employees since establishment (statistics)? 
d. The  share  of  firm  revenues  coming  from  outside  of  Finland  and  its  
development from establishment (3 years, 6 years, now)? 
e. The share of firm revenues coming from outside of Europe and its 
development from establishment (3 years, 6 years, now)? 
f. How and when initially it became obvious that the firm is seeking to 
internationalize/globalize its activities, and why? 
 
2. The Growth of the Company: 
 
Please explain… 
 
a. Any distinct phases that your firm has gone through during growth?  
b. What have been the most critical decision making points to achieve 
growth since establishment? When? Why? (during which phase)? 
c. How the firms first products were born  
i. How you developed the product and found the market/customer 
for it? 
ii. When you started initial / pilot sales and to whom?  
d. When you started sales of your products in large volumes and to which 
countries? 
i. With which product(s) were these sales achieved?   
e. The firm’s expansion to foreign countries and when sales started in each 
foreign country?  
i. When you received your first major foreign deals and from which 
country? 
ii. How you expanded to foreign markets from then on and to which 
countries did you expand to and why? 
f. Have you begun to expand to markets outside Europe? If so, describe 
how and when? 
i. What countries outside Europe did you expand to?  
ii. Did you try to further penetrate extant markets in and outside 
Europe and if so, how?   
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g. Have you started to align your operations and activities across countries 
globally? If so, describe when and what activities have been aligned?  
h. How the firm’s foreign operation modes have developed since 
establishment? 
i. How the firm’s product offering has developed since establishment?  
i. Have country specific differences produced a need to adapt 
products. If so, how? 
j. How well the adjacent picture illustrates the growth phases of your firm?  
 
 
3. The Internal and External Factors that have Most Influenced the Growth of the Firm: 
 
Please elaborate… 
 
a. What factors have contributed to the global growth of the firm?  
b. What factors have limited the global growth of the firm? 
 
4. The Major Challenges the Firm has faced during Growth:  
 
Please elaborate… 
 188 
 
 
a. Whether  or  not  your  company been  at  risk  of  going  out  of  business?  If  
so, please describe the crisis situation and in-case of non survival, please 
describe the survival crisis.  
b. What factors (external or internal) contributed to the crisis or crises?  
 
5. The Development of the Firm’s Industry: 
 
Please describe… 
 
a. The industry growth rate since the establishment of the firm? 
b. How similar/different the consumer/customers needs are across 
countries? 
c. The competition in your industry? 
i. Are there global competitors. If so, please name them? 
ii. Is consolidation taking place within the industry? 
d. Are there trade barriers in the industry, e.g. customs, trade limitations, 
protectionism? 
e. The nature of the industry environment has impacted on your firm 
growth at the different phases/critical points you mentioned earlier? 
f. How the industrial environment has impacted on your firm survival? 
 
6. The Most Critical Resources and Capabilities of the Firm: 
 
Please describe… 
 
a. The development of the firm’s most critical resources and capabilities?  
b. The main founders’ and top management teams experience as 
entrepreneurs and with regards to international business (years)? 
c. The firm’s most important physical resources (equipment/plants), 
intangible resources (experience, brand names, innovative human 
resources etc), and financial resources (internal and external)? 
d. The most important firm capabilities (core competences) in technology, 
marketing and management? 
e. In terms of resources, have you managed to adapt to the dynamics of the 
business environment and renew your resources and capabilities? If so, 
please describe how? 
f. The firm’s relationships with suppliers, customers, competitors and other 
important contacts?  
i. Your efforts in building networks and success in leveraging 
them? 
g. The role of market understanding and customer interaction in reaching 
your business objectives? 
h. The role of branding in reaching your business objectives? 
i. The nature and timing of any government support received by the firm? 
j. How these discussed resources and capabilities have impacted your 
firm’s growth in the critical phases/points you mentioned earlier? 
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k. How the discussed resources and capabilities have impacted your firm’s 
survival? 
 
7. Characteristics and Development of Firm Culture:  
 
Please describe… 
 
a. In terms of experimenting growth initiatives, taking risks and responding 
to possible failures: Has the firm culture changed since establishment? If 
so, please describe how? 
b. Whether and how you encourage the emergence of new ideas from 
within the firm?  
c. What is the firm’s attitude towards failures when implementing growth 
initiatives? 
d. The firm’s alertness to emerging opportunities and aggressiveness in 
pursuing initiatives 
e. Whether you attempt to predict future developments by analyzing current 
market opportunities OR try to create new markets by influencing other 
parties? 
f. How aggressively you compete with competitors?  
g. The extent of hierarchy, bureaucracy, established practices and traditions 
within the firm? 
h. The firm’s ability in rapidly adapting to changing conditions?  
i. Whether the selection criteria for growth related initiatives is based on 
expected returns OR affordable loss  
j. How the discussed culture attributes have influenced the growth of the 
firm? 
k. How the discussed culture attributes have influenced the survival of the 
firm? 
 
8. The Role of Government Support:  
 
Please elaborate… 
 
a. The firm’s opinion of the governmental support currently available? 
b. Whether and how government support could have better aided the firm in 
critical decision points and advancing from a certain growth phase to the 
next? 
 
9. Additional Information: 
 
Is there… 
 
a. anything important that I have not asked about firm growth and survival? 
b. any material that you could distribute that describes the firm’s growth? 
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APPENDIX B: SOURCE MATERIAL LISTING 
 
 Audibit (inactive) Avant Tecno LTD Innohome LTD IonPhasE LTD Vacon PLC 
E
x
e
c
u
t
i
v
e 
1st Interview: 
-Jari Virta, 
 Product Manager 
 
 
 
2nd: Interview: 
-Mika Rajamäki, 
 Sales Manager 
1st Interview: 
-Jani Käkelä,  
Product Manager 
1st Interview: 
-Matti Myllymäki,  
Founder 
-Pertti Haavisto, 
Managing Director 
 
2nd Interview: 
Pertti Haavisto,  
Managing Director  
1st Interview: 
-Tage Johansson, 
CEO 
 
 
 
2nd Interview: 
-Tage Johansson, 
 CEO 
1st Interview: 
- Vesa Laisi,  
CEO 
 
 
 
2nd  Interview: 
-Veijo Karppinen, 
Former CEO 
D
a
t
e
  
1st Interview: 
-16.03.2010 
 
2nd  Interview: 
-23.03.2010 
1st Interview: 
-02.03.2010 
 
1st Interview: 
-02.06.2009  
 
2nd  Interview: 
-26.10.2009  
1st Interview: 
-02.06.2009 
 
2nd  Interview: 
-27.10.2009 
1st Interview: 
-22.03.2010 
 
2nd  Interview: 
-12.04.2010 
P
l
a
c
e 
1st Interview: 
-Turku 
 
2nd  Interview: 
-Raisio 
1st Interview: 
-Ylöjärvi 
 
1st Interview: 
-Espoo 
 
2nd  Interview: 
-Espoo 
1st Interview: 
-Espoo 
 
2nd  Interview: 
-Espoo 
1st Interview: 
-Vantaa 
 
2nd  Interview: 
-Vaasa 
S
p
a
n 
1st Interview: 
-90min 
 
2nd  Interview: 
-74min 
1st Interview: 
- 111min 
 
1st Interview: 
-105min 
 
2nd  Interview: 
-118min 
1st Interview: 
-108min 
 
2nd  Interview: 
-199min 
1st Interview: 
-107min 
 
2nd  Interview: 
-107min 
S
e
c
o
n
d
a
r
y
 
D
a
t
a 
Monthly investor 
reports: 
-1999-2002 
 
Monthly sales 
reports:  
-1999-2003 
 
Product 
catalogues 
 
Marketing 
material 
Income 
statements:  
-1996,1997, 
1998,1999, 
2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 
2006,2007, 
2008,2009 
 
Product 
catalogues 
 
www.avanttecno.
com 
Product catalogues 
 
www.innohome. 
com 
PDF Presentations 
of the firm:  
-IDP market and 
client cases, 2009 
-for potential 
investors, 2009 
 
www.ionphase.fi 
IPO circular 
-2000 
 
Annual reports: 
-2000-2009 
 
Financial 
statements: 
-2000-2009 
 
Product 
catalogues 
 
www.vacon.com 
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APPENDIX C: ORGANIZATIONS OF SINGLE-CASE DESCRIPTIONS 
 
FCC – (U.S.) Federal Communications Commission 
 
Finnvera - Finland’s Official Export Credit Agency 
 
Finpro - Finnish Foreign Trade Association 
 
Sitra - The Finnish National Fund for Research and Development  
 
Tekes - The National Technology Agency of Finland  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
